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Previous studies of the influence of personality on
behaviour in experimental games have provided conflicting and
inconclusive results. The present investigation was designed to
search on a broad front for persC'ncility correlates of behaviour
in a two-person bargaining game, the one used being a derivation
of the Deut sch and Krauss Trucking Game.
Five personality tests, covering fifty-three personality
traits, were administered to 192 undergraduate students 2ttending
courses at The University of Stirling, and from these the
experimental groups were randomly chosen, the only constraint
being the sex of the subjects. The tests were The Sixteen
Per sonali ty Fact or Quest ionnaire, The Guilford/Zimmerman
Temperament Survey, The Study of Values Test, The Ldwards Personal
Preference Schedule, and The Test of Social Insight.
rrhe trucking game was played for 30 trials by two groups
of subjects, each containing 24 male dyads and 24 fomale dyads,
under two experimental conditions: Condition I, where subjects had
access to full informat ion regarding the other's payoffs, and
Gondi t ion 11, where only incomplete informat ion of the other's
payoffs I'm,s av:ülable.
It was hypothesized th2t behaviour in the game would be
influenced by (i) amount of information available about the payoffs
of the other; (ii) sex of the players (comparing single-sexed dyads) i
and (iii) players' personality.
No differences due to oi ther amount of informat ion
available about the other's payoffs, or sex of the players, were
found. An analysis of the data provided by the combined experimental
groups i however, successfully located indicat ions of per sonali ty
effects on behaviour in the game, as measured by total joint payoff
summed over 30 trials, total time taken, the number of concessions
made to the other player, and first strat egy-choice on individual
trials.
viii
The personality variables concerned were ~mot ional
Stability and Hadioalism/ConservatisD, (li'actors C and Ql of The
Sixteen Peroo:tÐ.lity J"aotor Questionnaire); Personal Relations,
(Ii'act or P of The Guilford/Zimmermaii Temperament Survey); Theoret ical
Value, (T scale cf The Study of Values Test); Exhibition, ('exh'
variable of The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule); and
Cooperat i veness i (Scale ILL of The Test of Social Insight). It is
suggested that the rclationship of these personality variables to
game-p12ying behaviour should be the subject of further investigation.
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SECTION ONE A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT AND RELATED LITERATURE
PART ONE
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iiih~) D,,:.~crìDti()n of importF\DCe t,~) group participation in
dec:isiC'n-ma.kin~.:; stu,.'ti()DS in the world of practical 2ff,~-i.irs hes been
ltCculTp8.,nied by a prolifer'ihon of books and ,ccrticles in the psychGlogical
li tern,ture. Dj. verse thw;re ,ical, technical, and experimentp,l apnroaches
t.J the decision-makin!! process I're represented in this proliferatüm.
One source eJf constributi')Ts hcès b\èen the exp,crimental research on
behaviour in siw.lL gTouDS (cf. Hare, Borgatta, Bnd Bales, 1955;
Str.Jdbeck and Hare, 1954; Raven, 1959; and 'lerauds, Altman, and
McGrath, 1960). Here attempts have been made tn study under contrêilled
conditions 2",spect:3 of decisiun-muking long stL:.died by case t;.istC)rYa
In the eX.tJerirnental stud~y of sLlaii groups, C)ne \ffell-
defined precise approHch hp,s rcsul ted from the development of the
theor,y of ga138S, rLnd diiring recent "~18ri, s there h::'.s t'88n c()nsiderR,ble
attentj.on given to "mixed-motive" gn,mef3 (behavioural situations
in which individuals must chJ'Jse bEtween resp.~nses which are
,~s sumed tu serve different m,~ti ves - that is, si tua tions in which
the goals of the players ",.re prcrtically coincident and partielly
in conflict).
'lhe selection of such situations se ms to be b sed on
both theoretical ,md nrr,cctic8.1 re: sons. The maiur theoretical re2son. L
is th2.t much reS8Etrch ìn this area stems from tbü:')ries of sn'~aii
group behn.viour in vvhich 8 fundcünental assumpti,:)ll is made thr-tt
mutu2llY cooperative boh2viour 1JGtween members leads t" the
forL1atíou and i1airitgin~-:,nce cif grcup~:3, cU1d mutually c':yinpeti.ti VEJ
behaviour results in the disruption of groups.1
The maj)T practical r8asun for em'ohasi s upon cooperFl t.lCJn
versus competi ti':Jl1 in ttie game s':i_tU.D,tion is thE: interest by
researchers in this field in pr,:'bler:s of business and industrial
eccinomics, and ii1ternrtLmEd. !YJli tics. 'rho fundamental assul.ption
..........................It.................g................c~........o...
l. These notions h"lve been expressed by Thibaut and Kelley (l959),
and by Romans (1961).
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made here is that cOGplration iüad~ to the resolution of conflict,
wherü2s coi:peti tion leads to its continuation '1nd intensification.
On thc business cconomicB SCoilci, this is amply illustrated in
(:jver.ycla,y life -b,: the cut-price ¡'wars!! thE:~.t rar~c bctv.'üün Su~')c.rmarkct8~
At thü international 1 vel, it is perhaps best (~pitomizcd in the
"2rms race" betwu;n the countries commonly :ref,;rrod to as v:orld
powers, This arms raCF: i 8, in il::n;)T VUIYS, an':.Jth(:::r v(:rsi on of the
prisoner's dileLlma game. There is no esoape from paradox, but that
the 'dilemma' is rcalized to Gxist and its implic,,,,tions understood
is obvious. 'J.1hc IB.to Presìdr.:nt John P. Kunncd;y of the United Stgt~.:s,
S ocakìng of ti:e C!,rrrs r¿,:i.C8 bctwc:-c;n Russia and his own nation fj,t the
Commencement, .AII¡(Jrical University, Washington, D.C. in July 1963,
said:
!f'i'oday, I3hould total war 0ver break out again _ no
matter hOTt, - our tlNO coimtrios ,¡,;;rill be the primex:y
targots. It is an ironic but accurate f,';ct that the
tv;o strongest powers arc the two in most danger of
dev.8stn,tj_on. 0....... and, oven in th.c cold w::1I . ~..
our two countries beHr the heaviest burderts. For we
arc both devoting massive sums of :moncy tu weapons
that could be better devoted to co~bat ignorance,
poverty, and disease!.\"it.; aroboth caug,.~t up in a vicious and dangerous
cycle with suspicion on onc side breeding suspicion
on the other, and now weapons begetting counter-
weaDons .....
Both the üni tcd States and its allios, and the Soviet
Union and its al1ie s, have a mutually de,c'p inture st
in a just and gcnuìnc peace in b al ting tiie arms
race. ti
'l:he rcjoinder to this statement may well bc found in
. . e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. .. .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . .. .
1. An analogous example is provided by Cassad~' (l957), "ho
rocounts detiüls of CL price ",rar which ragE,d among taxicab
companüs in Hm7thorne, California in 1949, in his p2per
"Taxicab rate W2r : counterpart of Int0rn2tional Conflict".
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President Lyndon B. Johnson's Oefenee Hessage to Congress
(JnnU'J.ry 18th, 1965) :
"But all our exp..'Tience of two cGnturics reminds us
tho.t 'To be prcp2rod for ii8T is one .ii' tL2 i:lO.st
ef'f8ctu~il DI\:_û.ll2- yf' pr('SCrVi' n'l' pc"n"''c! !I.J .C". .'- ,~" .', " . . ,__c_\._. .
In short, tuc' dilcoma hp.s long' oCi:n rccognizcJ. e,Yid
hEtS bc:(;r~ rei tcrat(~d t:i;~2\~si.rid t -'_H1C aga.!_n.
ilhe Iioyclopmcnt of GnlL1(; fJ1hcory, ~
'The new matht-mrLtic,J,i atYDr()sch gruYiC theory t. the
problem of interest conflict is genera,lly attributed to Von
J'eumann in his oa,;)cors of' 1928 and 1937, although :F'rechct (1953)
has raised ft q;;.ostion of priority b,Y 8'.ig;:cstin(3' that st.;veral
pepers by Bord (1953) in the earl;\, ninete,m-twcntics rca,lLy
laid trio fO'DcÜ\tions of ga'ie thiCory.l
HeeD.rdlcss of any debate:ible priority, the ff_iet rerir:iins
thl'it neii~hL.r group of p,3D8rs attracted. mùch attention on
pubij.cn_t~,-on. ()thcr than t".ose ;J1l.ritioD(d., there. W0re almost n:-)
other papc:;.::"S before tb.c public;:ltion of Von lll;umann 2nd lvlorgenstern i s
book in 1944.2 For tW) decades much of the matcriel lay
forgottEm, 2nd it is to their great orcdi t th::t Von lkumann and
lVorgcmstern attcrriincd t,) wri to their book in terns triat could,
vii tt po,tümo'J, be comprehurided by the non-mptho'iaticcü scientists.
(Ehc r€sul t i,7EtS hig-hl;),' f3ucc(;ssful if Gnc is tC) judg(~ from the
attcl1t.,-on subsequcntl;y Given t.,-:. the tl:ec)ry.
. . . . . . . . . . . 1; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. llh8se pa ,crs have b(~:on tr¡:~u:181att~d into .l~nglish aEd republished
vTith comments by Frechet and Von NCUniClJm (1953).
2. 'lhÐ er:l.ginal ed:L tion of !!!lhcDry of Gain.cs and Economic Behaviour"
8!Jpear!,d in 1944, but the revised edition of 1947 is the more
standDrd rcfcrci:c:(;, and it includc;s the first statorr;.c;nt of
tlw theory of utility.
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The Approach of GaQe Theory
ThE) term "theory of games" ew,y well be decried as
misleading, and indeod has bi:;en by I::.:ny au thnrs (G. g. LUCG a.nd
Raiffa, 1957; Hapoport, 1960; Shubik, 1964). Although :fir 'H2ny
purposes the 2.n~Jlof:;J is good, the word !lg!:.L:J~C" Gc'trricB ~gith it
many und~¿strablü ;;onnotations. In the: contt;~xt of gH.TIC theory,
"game" is not merm!; to imply the Lwk of seriousness which
might OG 8.ss,-)cip"tcd vvith its usual meaning, but rri.tbc:r' the
thht so-called !1parlcur games", (Llore apprDpr~I-(;ttel;y cetlled
"ganGs of stratc2sJri), offer the purest (;xamples of situations
, ,iQep~
which aI''' taken as prototype,s in this new theory of c:mflict. In
these si tuaticns "rat.i..onr',li tyif is central. 1i fa.miliar eX8,:rple of
such rationa.li ty is S0-en in tl.!.8 way pCDple plPv.:, for example,
chess. For each ::1 yer th~re arc three possible outco~8S; win,
dreuw, ê;.Y1'i lose. A plc\,!r pr8f8rs 'IYii: tu drc:\v\! and dre.'i~1 to
lOSE), and s - does his opponûnt, excüpt for thE: oppCJnent the outcomes
are revcrsGd. :F;ach player makes hie choice of TI8VeS on the basis
of reasoning which goes something lil:e this: "If I do this he is
likely t 'J do that, in wt:,ich case I will have '.1. choice of this or
that...11 Wc co:n.sider Cl pIG_yeT ration;: \vno imputes rationality
to his OJDOl1Cnt.
;
1.Ge.~EJs of stra,tEJgy offer a good model of rational
behaviour in situ2t.ons whero there" are cmifl.Lcts of interest
with A nUI11)t~r of ç~.ltern.atives open at e2~ch php,se of thf; situat.i.on,
and Y;There Ik::ople êlT8 in a. pCJsi tion to cstiLlE:te consequcncE:~s of
their choices, taking into consideration tho very important
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. /i -.tJZ'ìtep;,:i: in polì tics
be defined g"D.ora Lly ",S
instructions as to what
( . ' b \\or Dusi~8SS or war or C _GSS) can
a general plan of action ccntaining
to do in every contingGncy.
n ~
c-:i rCUI:~st8.nCe tl-:,;~-:- 'Jute 'l1K!S c::re- determined not only by one t sown
choices l)ut a~GQ by the Ch0iccs others, ~.)ìier T7huDl GnE: hps ne)
c')nt:col.,
V~rh~1.t exactly, then, ir' gr1Elc t1:1e")ry? Basically, ì t
pro"iridE.S :eiC' i.:)r t:n~: st-i.)d.;y d(;c.~sicn ~nr;._:in(r in sltu:"~,ti()ns
~_;í' cnnflict. It dccils ~-j.th hUL1F.Ln proc8ss0S in Vlliich thci
indiv:idual_~'l;~"Jr,;;r (::ir dccisi;)ri-me;~kin.~', unit)l is not in c::i.nt:rul
of other players (Jr iu:itr~) entering' int:) the 8nvirJnment. It
is rtddrsssed to pr(:b18D1s invJlving cDnflict, ct)oper~tion, or
b()th, ;-.'i,t mr~ny lcvc::l;_~_; and !lthe stc:Lge Liay '-ie set to rcd'lect
pri:nrLrily political, psycholJgical, soci clogical, fj cGl1omic,
or citlier ,",sects CJf human aff,ürs." (Shutiik, 1964). B;;ulding (l962)
h(:~s dt~scribed game theory 3,8 "Rn intellectu8.l X-rsy" ìNhich
r0vûF-':.ls lIthe skeletal st:;'uctnr8 ,)l' t!lOSG sncir:l sys'tc's :,V.:181'8
decisions intere.ct J unCi ... therefore, the ,~'ssenti~\i stl'uctur~) of
both c:.- nflict i:1l1d cGcpf;rat:ion.11
j:il tJ10Ugli th~; cuncept (if str;=¡t goY is DiJt rQl(;v~:.~nt tu
certfiiri f~rms nf competition, ( 1::r, non-int(;rncti ve contests
in iNhi ch (:011 tpstants mp.. tcn 'prc'\~.:c ss er skill, '~:ut c\TC not peX':r:1i tt8à.,
:.:.r hE'~vC n~) cppurtuni t;y, to i.:npcd8 tht:: 8fforts i')f their compE;ti ti)rs,
and v.rhich tiJE;T'cfCì""t: 1'::11i o'i)_t~:)icl(j the ;.)c~:'pG of gaind theory), the
distinctiun is lL)"t onc of v/hiGh nJn-specic:.lists are p~\rv~l,re
)?rÐquunt mentions ').f g~¡Jnc tlicc)r:r in 1)(~lpUi2r 'vi¡Tr.l.tings on
relatüd subjects h VE'! giVC:'l tli'2 imprc;sdiuYl that r~ 1:'Bsis Las
fin211y bee:i found for ani ting in a single conc8ptur:l scheme ¿.i-ll
si turit:t:J:"'l8 Wfj8rG p~.:.rtic's V:i.8 £"JT pcsiti::)ns )f r~,:lvrLnt8ge )1' compete
fer prizes: :pc'ints in ::-; p¿irlour (;rir:~G, prof'i ts ~)r shares of the
ri1r-'~rk8t in busintss CC;Jipct::..tion, or, in thc context of interne,tiona1
l'ole:::,ions, thp real er ime.giri8d L;aincs in security, :J ;\,.JeT, prestigc~
. .. 11 . . . . . . . . Q ., . t' . . '" " . . . " . . " 4; " . .. It . II .. . . . . " . II . .. " Il . .. . . . . .. 0 . ., . ., . . . . . . . . . . ., . .
10 Il\t-G dscision unit ma;y he t=,D ind~_v;.dun.l, n gr:;up, i::~ formc=tl (;r
n.il iü.f'.~:riL::ti organiz2tion, OT EL sDci..-ty. "The distinguir~~hing
fOt:.ture ':'if !;~ p1r-'yer is th~:,t he ()y it IlrlS p"n cJ~)jt:;CtiV8 in the
gEunc ~~nd ";pcT'ntcs under :i ts CPIVTI urders in t!1C sülectioll of
its actiGns." (Shubik, 1964).
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and strategic advantage in future contests. Once gmae theory
is defined as the "scivncc of rntional cunfLict" (Ilapoport, 1964),
i 1i is ea,sy e.nd tüEipting tc. e0:-c1udc that " mastery of the t;_lcory
makes on(; a successful competitor.
Presented in this wa;'1, the v!idesprcad interest in e. thoory
whi ch 'hias .firs t pre scntcd in n.n invol vpd nJucl fJ.:b f3 trus~) me~ ::hE.,!-'~e_ti cal
troatise b,,;C(ìLh:S und(;rsta.:ide.bl€.
In an ago of suimait LJo8tings, of acticm by thcc Joint
Chiefs of Stp;.ff, of conferencGs \7i thin the Ùili tud L"Je..t5.c'l1s Securi t:r
Council, c'tDd of industrY-7JidL col.lccti ve b:Jxgaining wi th
countrywide impn,ct, social scicmtists can expect the pressure for
knowledge clJlicLrning the clect sion-rnrücing process t Cl incrunsi.;, A.l'd
it is n()t surprising thcrefore thc\t game tiioory hi'S attr2cted
widcèspread inttJrest, especially in the Uni ted StF~t(;S wh8re,
according to Rapoport (1964) tha'b attitude of a faith in science
'lS a tool for me,steTing the environmont is prevalent. II~Ierc
game the:iry see:l1S especially pertinent, for it purports to be e"
science uf rc,t,ional decisèon in conflGct situations." (paw; 4).
- 10 _
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UtUity
'l'hc g2LO si t'iation cssEmtially requires ç,,~,ch player to
cnoosc on0 of a I1lì"mo ,r'~).f ~:;,1 tcrncttives. I-n garnc tb.ecr.:r therefore, it
is rcqu'irvd. thf!t C.t._ ,,)1.1tCC)'jC¿~ EJr8 siJccifi aL.; th::~t eaoh pIn.yer iS
Rware of his ¡)refcrc:n.";c f~)r on':': :)utC()~"lC' ()v()r an;)t?ior _ that is,
that h8 valuÐs GPC~l ()utc()mc differ2ntl,y.
It ' d 'i 8 2.3~:: ue'll). .in
'-;81'113 táE()I'Y th::~~t r,l=- outcoi:1es c:.~n
be ri;pri~;scnt(;d by numbers. J?or exa.npls, if the;: only (;utcomCB are
win, lose, or draw', i can dta;¡d fur 'iVLn, -1 for 1/)88, and 0 for dravv'.
How thcs8 nUJilbL'r~3ELre a.ssign:;d .is not the concer:n of gt;,:ne thoory.
INhil..-, the actuc-2-1 dcterLiiDf.it.l(Jn :Jf the' payoffs is not the
gainc theoretician's concern, he does spucify the scale on vrhich such.. _._-
determination should b() "wde. In ordGr to ver ),fy "ny rulE' produced
by ri1¿~'a.ns nf t.1:L~ tho~-:ry, it i.s nGC88":ar~T
which people assi to auto )m~8 and the
to kno, the vnlues (utilities)
probabilities of All the
pussible outcones a8s'JC~iJLtcd v.:i th cfich chuice ()f action. It is then
PO;""siblC tc.J comprcI'ü the expected utili t:i gi:ij.n of the action taken v!i th
the expectEd utili ty g~p,irJ.;:3 of otl'L:,r e.cti:)TIs..
Expecte-1i utility gains arb surrm of products of utili tics
and prob2.bili tics. This ;Jeans essentially thEtt utilj. ties must be;
as;:;igncd ~~:Lçal vaIn s, and not ~i;i:';rc:.ly ordinD..l :ranks. Von
Neumnn and ITorgenstcrn (1947) in c(lnpiling their treati,E on f'3lnC
theJry f()l tit nCGcssmoy tu put utility thcor,y on a rigorous basis,
becGw3e nu¡n"ric,ü uc;ili ties played !'n c:ssciitial part in the theory.
In ter,~is uf mod(:r~1 concepts of ri:'sor, this L1E'ant that ê! procc:durc had
to be specified for asccrt:iining a given
cision-makerfs utility
scale. In order to spücify such Ft procedure Van NGumann and
li;lorgens tur:n assUl:',L(i thc! t a preference can 81 ways
d G t crr:i ne d
between any two 'risky' outcomes. Their method has thG advantr:.g8
of s¡bsti tutir¡g preferences among prcbabili ty mixtures of outcom;s
for the task of f~GBi,ying nur:erical values diroctl;y to outcomes,
anà it is P"SStJ.Eì.'d thc:~t choico d(:'cisionr~ of trJis 8,:)rt can be ubtained
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experir:entally. If enough of these choicc' decisions ars elicited
,r~DcL they gre consist(:r~t a~id trc1;"'si tivc, then, in principle
a utility sc,:tlü Cê-l,ll "be cstn,blish¿;d for E~ ¡,riven inriividUc-tl reln.tiv,~
to some set of outCOrlcs. As Raj)oport (1964) p~!intr; cut :
"IiSS"clL1ing" th¿lt t 8 cr"n be d,)il(~, tJ:1.erü iG ;lD :'(-;cò tu
add the axiom to the effect thEtt risky nu.tc'Jy;ic:::: with
grea tor Gxpected utili ty ;~,rc ,;referred, b¡;cause the
utility scale is defined by just such preferences ......
In short, the ffaximization of expected utili t,( value
has been built into the very definition of utility."
J¿:rCJff the puint of view of p2rsir:wny, the 2dvantp,ge of the
Von Neumann/Morgenstc:ni defini tion of utility is unq'iostLmed. The
difficul t t,s.sk of aSt~igning l1umurical vrilucs to rH1.tc~;;ries hr-s b ¿~n
r8placucl by 8. seemingly casir;r onu of oi"dLriL~T' outcon8s. In tn.eir
schemü, poopIL ,!='¡l'b sir:ply Dssw:nud to r:aximize utility. Specificaiiy,
the 8xisteIlce of utility is assuL.(.;d in "5(J.2ie theory and r~lso thrLt
Vt~i.riou.s C)utC":¡lú0S (thu results C)f choices a::ionf" 8.1 tc;rnntivc
C,~)aTSCS of 8.ctinn) h,:-~ve different utili t;)r values a3c-3':Gir::,tt~d with
thCl:1. If the v;~trious cutconcs arc the different pa;;roffs which l!;::lY
ELCCTUC in (1 ge-me, then t'nE~ rl1athern.atic2,,1 rclr::tion between the amc)unt
of the aCGual payoff (if it is mcasurnblo) tmd its utility
consti tutes the "utility function" of the individual concerned.
As ci,lr8ady pointi~;d c)U:~, gEL1C thee-I'il n180 ~-::,SE;ì:Uü',/8 th8.,¡' in uvcrJ
game s; tuation the obj(;ctive of a "rc-cticn2111 individual is to
maximize the utility expectation accruing to him consistently
wi th the constraint of the Si tuntion - thH,t is, to
t ~U3 much
of this utility as it is p(Jssiblo to t, ti,king iiitJ pccmn t the
efforts of all the othor Wrritional" particlppnts of the game, ~rho
arc tryin¡t tC) do the saic. Shubik (1964, praro 9) puts it likc this:
"The problems faccd in game theory 2ro mOTe cGmplex
thc:in those of simplfJ rûCL"'imizfLtioYl. 'lhe individual must
c:-'Dsider ho,y to achieve as much HS possible, t;:,~,kinrr into
;;,coount th,,, t thero Clrc :ithf;r,s whDse goal s differ from
hi S o'wn 2nd whose actions have pvn effect on all. The
decision-makc~r in f-J. gnHG' facos a cruss-purpose optimization
problem. Hc must adjust his PlCUll3 not only to his own
- 15 -




but c,lso t~) the desires imd
Tli,tiDnali tv
__--."_~4
.ii thE:~:)ry such ~-'LS th;.-:t u.ndi..r discussi-:D cann;')t exist
\yi tnout e Sf:1ulr¡)tjJ)rH~ b,-~ut the incli vid~iqls y!i th w.hicb. it pu.rports to
be c:)YlCCrnf::C:. Ono ('ì.-SBuin¡~:ti('n h; s alreridy DCê'n st8ted ~ thr:t ErLch
player chc,uSE:s in such a viay r"~s "bc' L1E:ixiinize his utili tyo J~ sGccìnd
r:issumpti.:;n ~)f (.rame thc:.ìry is thnt er'ch player is c~.Jnsidercd tu know
the numerical utili tics of the other players invc,l ved, anè!. wt:ioh they
il'e tryin!r to L12cximize. (In:,thc;r words, 82,ch p1ayer is ;;ssumed to
kn;¡w tlieJreflH'8n'8 ¡J'-: t terns uf '1,11 the 'ither plp,:vers).
'l'üis p"ssumpti':.)n, 8,nd -.;thcrs r-ibout the PIEJ.,.'ier i s alìili t;¡
t peycui VG the (fP.me si tun tir)n" r~rE freq uen tly SUL1,ccd unc!¡c'r the
phrase nthe theory El.SSUE188 rationnl pla;iersll~, (Luce and REel-ffa,
1957, prige 5).
'llhnugh it is l1()t a1 WCtJTS ripp:~treEt, t:ie turni "re.ti()nn.llt
is frr fr'JlJ precise ::~"nd the diffurcnt mcic',els uf rrt ,inne,l (1t~cisinn
thG'~)r:)r c,":"n end de) me_D.n different things in diffcrsnt si tu,?,tions.
ThE; ni-Jc1cls which must:)o distinr:rtJ.ishcc1 arc the f,)rma19 the prE:scriotivE-
(C)T n()ri:i,:,~ ti VG), !-ind t/iC 8c1'i riti VG (:,)r (~8pirical). Of the'se three
the dcscri~)tivQ "I " -. .lT-:ù(;l. LS thi,t must ncn,rly rcli:tud to the bdifwic)ur¡ü
, 2
scicnC8S ..
.0... '0..(; "8 .....0.. ~.......'" ........................... .....0...... ,,_. ~o... fI
1. Usually an individuf'l is f8.ced in ,~~ r:iven s:itunti~)n 'Ni th Fo cert,~,.in
nii~bcr of choices i)rql tcrnc\tiv8 cuurses of ¿':ctiDn, CflCh c()urse
being likely t lend til a c::)iisequence or anu (jf sevcrftl possible
c")nsequence s.. "VIE; C.9l en indi vidut~i r,':\.ti;~)n:'Li if h(~ trl-KeS into
nCCDl.1.nt trH~ TJ()ssiblc. cunsequences of each '_,f the c,.)urses of acti )n
open to him; if hei S fLware of (:1 cert::",in preference order r~¡.nonc
the cnl1sequences rU:1,:t ;:i,ccc;rdingl,y Ch()t_.'S(~8 the C,JilSC: of (3,ction
which, in his estimiction, is likely to lend tf) the JiDSt proffJrrecl
CGurse of CtiCD th:it this individual will ch ose hut cils) cm
cC.Jurscs ,)f "cti.'.."n which ()thcr indi vicl.lJJ-J..ls v:ill ChOC)S8, nvor WhC;il
he may hnve ne contr~)l. In th"t CEeSG the preferE:nc s Df those
other indi yid urü s for the clif:teren t cut C'11CS nay diff er from hi s.
Vie usun,lly think ()f an individual F.:8 re.tion;:?-,l if he takes these
m"tten, int:¡ Clcc'cmnt". (R2.~)()port, 1960; pp. 107-iOa).
2. A clescripti vc the()rJ s(H:ks tr.: find TJrinciplcs 'which guid.e real
i~;e:)pies' dc:cisions. It I:Qust thc~rQf,')re relJ ¡~Jn 1:ghe.viou.T8.1 datE....
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probr',bili ty
In arriving 2.t Cl c'kclsion (chnosinCê the optil.lil strategy)
Ft l1rn.tionr:.l1f plC:,lCT' IlUi:-t con8i(:l~?1' not ".,iil;? th(; utili ty Vr'iu(;~~s ()f the
possible CJUtCUI:1l.S, but :?vJ_SO the"; prcbn(ili t;y ef OCC1)..ünc;~ those
outcc)mes. Prubabili ty is such 2L CCìrT"~~Jn w'~Td thDt i ts me¿:nii!.1~~'
is wid,::~lJ ::ssuu\.d t;r) bt, clü2r. A ")r !:,'bili tyll is sup-ÇJc:sed. tC)
carry F: pr,,'ici se fhaniE" ,C:.Y1:::\ nl.ll~:1i:; ~-'.. cal vr:l ue ;3,JTC lreq u..E:n tly
assignLd tn JJrClba.bili ties. In such C~:U3C~-) thcr8 is alvTD.Y'fl ,3, \iang.r
of extrap~)i,;.'.tini':s' the proi:cisi:)n )f a concüpt frCliJ (-ul ri~:r(;F, lHhere it
is justifi0d tC) ()thc'.l' arbi~S ìvl'sri; i t i~": :ri-et. 'iVC; Elc\'l uso thE; term
"probability" in scvGrri~i diffÐrent SGnS(Jf~, but v¡hcn we sVíitch the
m(;aning~ V'I8 li1ust give nntiCE) of sucll c,'-.eDgc. For eXH:"1ple-, using
the arguBGnt of "insufficient rCiison!l, it r;dg,ht be said the,t th8
'probabili ty of a p~.J.rticul::ir frJocc, say ~3ix, ~Jf A. die c':Jr:iing' UIJ
after a singl e throw is 1/6. Herc it i 8 srgu0~ thRt there is no
m:Jrt~' f:;.nd nu les~) T8asun foT' CL six to come; up thrtn for D.ny (ìther
of the rCE1Lining five fLces. Thus VTC jt-:stif¿f th(; c188i;~mm nt of
equ8..l prol)c.bili ti€8 t~) 0:v8nt~~ thy~t ¥8cerri alike in cvc-ry ,)ther
respect. Ar'¡,.l-c!Jcr p0C1si1)le ìr,ay uf c8ti¡~1,r,tint; the nrnbn.bili ty ef ti. six
CJDing C.-i) "T~)Ul" bE: to thr~)w the die Llc:,ny tinc,s in succcs~;ion Eind
()oservG that tnc ~.n,,:,r8 tines 1. t is thríJwr~, trH., more ncri.rly 1/6 i¡vill
be the fraction ef ti'~1Cc-- six will come up. Since tr.:iR urocedure
rcsc::bles an cxpcriJdricntRl test p.nd r~pp8ars to p'ruvid(~ an opor'':,tional
defini tion of probability, t~iis mt::thDd ùiay ,:pp(:.ar ilIJl'C Bucc2ssful.
H,vHver it should vc noted tlvit in asinf~ the term "the Ewre nearly"
wc h:-¡vt) nbandcxQc-d pre;cis on. ;lhis att:i tuclc in many C2,ses is
porfectly accüptable fur it rin,y be argued th,'l the cDIlcept of
prob2vbili ty is nccdod (d)nly s.s EL tool for IT8.king Gx;c:isions and
thr',t we may trust llUr experionce which snov!V' that when e, die,
V;¡Li()SG Ilfairness" w(: have no rC'Clson to suspect, is tür:)vrn, c~~ch
nwnber C;)L1',,~~3 U"C1 v"i th approxiri1ti.tely the snmc; frcquc:ncy in 8.. large
numbur of thrCJ''''. Howi"ver, it l.ust be recognised that in su doing
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we hew," givøi: tip. ko con('-"pt of p;obabj"i ty as soi;ething thAt has
:~,n indc0endent existence, 2nd thr,\t if 10 wj_sh to d8fine probability
prp.:ctically, the,t is, in tGrl',18 ".f c;;xTkriencí:~, wo l~1U8t dufirlG it in
terms of L'.n obf.h.::rvccl frequency. While such r', restriction is
largely acec rttúJlc, thc;X'ç E~ru inst;::l1CC r~ WhCl"t,' Vie rire l\)I'Cbd. "tu ¿~"i vs
yet an.()~h(;r m(_;r:.~'liYlg to prot,Ctbili ty - for uxr-:mplc, \iv'hen wtJ d~) not wish
to give up assi/,rning probabili tiC8 to EVel1t~j whict.by their nature
CEin may occur once (Such ",11 8vunt, for eXP',mple, is tilt outbreak
of a nucl(::(l,r war).
The prcb':~bili ty of such .:').:.J event ,¿~ntGrs many d.:-scussic\ns
which ::"ro indeed raticnal (as opposed t:) emotional). It is BE,id tt,t
decisions involving the pro'iabili ty of the ;'utbreak of R nuclec"r war
riro D2.sed on HCE~iculatc,:'J risks" (w, i.ch teru impli(;s calculrttions
inv:Jl ving proba1:ili tics) . Since tLu probabi li ty of such im evont
eRn have nDthin(."\ t,:) (~: () l,ri tli its freqiiency of occurr(::nce (since nonc
have yet occurred, and in ,,11 likelihood, only very few could occur),
them either the phrase "the probability of the oirtbrelck ,of ,'1 nUClfJ2r
war!! is mt:':aning'lcS8, er else ~"probabiii ty!! has anothE:'r rncaning _
a sort of "de,gee uf belief". Bernoulli (1713) vias among the
first L) define probability as degre2 of confidencü in 2 pr,)p~)sition
of whost truth we cannot bee certiün. In his wurk AI'S Con.i::ct~
(The Art of Guessing) Bernoulli pointed out that since Wt cannot
genor.',llY know wi th certr,inty whether or n:it an event will occur, we
can unly havo a "degree of confidence" in the truth of the
proposi tion thiü ",s8erts its.iccurp21ce. This degree ,)f c.mfidence,
ide'itified with the' Drubability of the event, 2nd de!Jendont on the
kno~\vleclgo thD.t tl10 individuR.l hB~S at his dìsposal, has since been
exuressec' by man,y withors (e.g. De Ivbrg'ln, 1847; Keyncs, 1921;
Hams'lY, 1926; Konprriqn, 1940; fond Sr,vp..i;8, 1954). It is illustr'lted
by the fclluwing examp18 :
!!In 1952 many pc')ple "believed thcì.t Eisenho,,7cr he.d EL
birsger chti.ncc to be elected President th8..n StevenscJn,
and so it turnfxl out. In 1948, many people believed
tha t Dewoy h'ld R, bigger chanco th'ln 'lruman, but it
tUJ~nod out:)th'-Twiso. 'rhe elections of 1952 and 1948
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were imiQuc f:'1cnts, and so their probablli ties could
not have bh:n related to any t:r'4u.mci"s. Yet neither
belief vias untircl;v unfoulldE-_~d, wht:,tlh;;r the final outoone
justifi.ed it or not." (Hapoport, 1964,p8¡:os 2~) - 26)
Since we hcve t_j d\__8,~~ "lHi th t('.E.GC dcr;:';_:cs of L1clief in.:JUT
inV8 stit:~n,tions of hur!l8.ìJ. affp).irr, tl'h: ne tion CRunt) t be 8xcl udGd frC)il
our analysis cf 'r,ü:onal cLcisions."
FrOEI D,ii this it follo\,':.'s directly that the qUÐstion nVv11A,t
is the probo.'òili ty of an event?!I lH1S no ~_.;h~;cininp; as i t st~.i,ids, since
probabilí ty hr'!B several cl ifferent n~~'nnings. It eRn IIlcan a nuribe¡t
of possible cases. It can moan ::1 ninlh:.r inferred frC1I1 the:. ol"s8Tved
frequency of an evc;i t in 1I2ny sUDooscdly "identical" si tuations.
It can mean Et degree of belief. InplL'd in this degree of belief
is the notion that thc prob2bility of an event changis in the light
of VJh2.t WG kn;)l1.', nnd tr:crc'fuTc t.riis kin~~ of pre-babili ty r),t lf~Rst
cannot residE: "in th8 Ðventsll 2,S such. Thnt ìs, thE sumEJthing we
call 11 the ê1rcb8 hili ty of '1. event" if) not ,'n ob jccti vc property of
the event but ikpends on thE' way w~ dcfin0 the context in which
tho event is to be considered - this possibility doiwnding on our
atti tudc8 and L)cJlicies of action.
In sh;)rt, arbi tQTY comyments enter all calculations of
pro1iabili ty. This is espccü'_lly truo yihun wü hpve no informaticm
at all on which to b!'se our estiT'ntes of ~robar;ili tic'S but E'.re
found neverthelcss to iwsign ,or')"habilitiGs to events. Frum this it
i;,"'lY be c';ncl uded tlm t the "probability of an ev"nt" becomos (for us)
the rcs1J.l t of sOJ"iicthing wc ourselves did. - rt. rt;sul t of ,,? ~h;ci8ion.
Hatiunal decisions 8,re b"sec1 on choice pr'èferonces, and in t'1is
light, prob8bili ties which we p_ssign t) events boc'Jme reflections
of our preferences r"tL.er than of our knc1wledgc'.
VJha.t consti tutss a Game ?
Whc'n dEcisions are ilEtde u.n:ler certainty, the player
(or decision-naJcer) has cOlIpLôtc control ov,)r the outCOl'lC. Such
S-L tua tions, hOìivcver, are exceptionr"i and 1..suall,y a choice of action
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o-m l"'nd to a numbor of different ü~oi,'ws .. ~h(',t ill, wncn the
d0Cisiou-mtiker f.:tccs 8,1' opponent "!Nho is als:) rationn.l. and informed
of 2011 the relüvnnt frwts; who can aLso make choicüs aff8ctini,"
thü nutcomes of the si tu!',tion, but whose interests (th2ot is, his
orderin,q' of pref(;renCe8 of the outccrr.:tCs) ELre not the.: sai:.e. Game
theory is c, '1cerned with probloEis of this type, the e,ssocin.ted
si tuatiomi being callod ga"ms of strê,tegy.
In order to be described as a "game", these "n.ssociatod
si tUfètions" must exhi bi t certain chCUacteristics. Firstly, in R
g8,me therE: must bo two or more Dlayürs (de cisi,m-:2cJ~o:rs) with at
least parti20llY conflicting interüsts. (Note that this imncdiotely
excludeB soli t2oires, in which thero if, cinly onc player with an
"intercstll. 'llhere is et second pla;ycr, Ghanc8, but this L1(:\Y bG
disqualifidl~,s a bona fide pla,ycr since Chance is indifferent to
thE; outcome - she is a, duI!~my pla;ycr. (Janes ':',gn.ins.t Nature, such
as that of the "Commuter's chronic uTIibrblla problem" cited by
Rapoport, 1964, p.p. 3l - 32, art) olso thereby cxcluded).
Socondly', it is 2. prerequisite :-)f 2. gEJJne that each of.
the players h;s a range of choices C2ollu(~ strategies. (This
excludes playing a slot; n,w!iinc,. cJ'rue, there is r, conflict of
interests, t!io man playinit the ;Jüclüne agains t the "Housc", and
also, thu slot machine is a bona fide playcr, but the J'Em is not.
' ..__c_._.__
Ho is a dummy pI20yer since hc., ccinnot mnku c,hciiccs, but ncrely
insert a coin "nd pull Cl lever).
Il1hirdlJr, p plaY:Jf t.he gß.I:C c(xnsists ef q single
simul tauecus choice of 2, strategy by each of thE, Dlayers, and
f:mrthly, when cach '.)f the plnycrs has chciscn his strfJ,tegy, the
outccime:if thu gmne is dctermined. ('his is a direct consequence
of thc dcfini tion of str'Jte¡;y which allows the two-perBcin game
tD be ronresented as a raatrix in which the: rOV,n'1 a:rG the strategies
Jpen tc, onc pla,)er, the colui:lUs 20re tr:u strate.cries open to the
other) .
- i~ -
Finlly t'J 1,e described ae a ganlf, th8 situation must
hFve i='.ss c.iQted with c:::cr-i ,:.¡ixtccwie :-'. set of pp"yoffs, 'JUt: to each
plrt:;ier.
These fivE: rc'qnirem(;nt~j c()n,sti tute the; scc'pe of Ti tUFLti,:)ns
which CHn in principle be re1Jri~'sÐntE;d !J.S ,S~ê"1T~LCS.
The il2.thcmaticnl t.~H'::)Ory ~)f ~-jG;,Les d.__ntinguishes ftrE:itly
bctwcGn f-;2.f(:;:S inv':::lving tV¡:)pi::~ycr8 f~nCL galGCS involving mCir0 than
two 'jlayers. Amonè; the,) fcJrmer, there is cm ii:port,snt clistinction
betwe~;n zero-sum ganGS and ii,:'n-zero-sum games. ¡lhu nnmi; "zero-sum"
derives from the fpct tl120t the sum of tne payoffs accruin,; t))
the playc'rs is zer~) r8ge,rdlcss tJf whgt ttiCJ outcume of the grUelC is.
It follwcs trw.t in two-person zero-sun cames, w¡'w,t~m; player wins,
th(~ ither necessarily 10s8s. The same is essontially true in
"constant-sum" games, where th8 sum of tne pnyoffs is the sane in
1e.ii8utcomc s.
. . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .
1. Wheth8r thilô sur;) is zero or no'; is irrelevant because the zero
point of tho utility scale on which the: payoffs arc determin'2d
is arbi trc.ry anyway.
CHAP'j1ER 'j1HRLL
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Ths simplest :C.~,':i:1C is OYl'-.. ~vi th ti,' ¡:;l:::''ii.:crs wh,:)se interests
c'IJìJ1s,tcJ.;y c;":,in\~l;,lu !:.Di.:L v;'h ca.n C" IrE~,l1.mic:.:~to frt:oly" This cr-¡~se, while
chr:1,;:.lJ!iuncc1 jY lVr-'3_'1:ul.L nnd SChLfii tt (1963) is tri wicLl !:3Xid rntllí;l'
uninter(jst;i:'~g t(~: thü gaL18 thcc:;rist,
, " 1
:-"ne- ploscr (rL,:;t"oinst "the vr)rld ,1).
sinç~8 tt12 tWCJ crl.n be trcn.t 2,8
llhe next siuplcst CD.se is 'ilihere:
there r;TS' tVT,:) c'.yers y¡h )S8 intcrusts rLrc dir:,notricAJ.ly '~"PP'~ìsecl.
This si tuclt;ic~n is cc'.llccl the tvvr)-pcrsun zeru-sum ¡~;amc 0 Its 2-nalysis
is the simplest, Rnd, in the opinion _if s: Qe, is the (l(.ist bRSic
)~,r,,')bi8in in g:-:lme the ~;-r;y:, s:incE~ the VT11!)1 e remainir.t:: the -¡ry WE.~S
')riF;inally f .,;rimil:::1tcc1 ()n the bn.nis 'if this G.nn.lysisl\
In such :1 r;,'JJd;";8 it ìr-i snicl that Pla~\Ters i tl.lld 2 a.re
stri' ~t ~~"~~~~ri' c,'s
__~.--::.:... _., ~ j, _ ~. f cr,ch ,thcr 0110 ri :'vc (;, tri 0tly -'j1) ""'S-~ n))" --refe""encc,'~ 4~"'. ~::-.-'.._...~:--:  _,j ~.. ¿
pgtterns f.):e thE. ":;utCC)!\lCS )f t~rie ~2.mG. Many pe.rl:)ur games ,~\re
strictL.y ce'IipGtitive in this sünse - ,:)r at lce..st t:'-G rules aT\;
desif~':(".ec~ (;:) :~iaku the:::: .':;trictly c':iJ!lt;eti.ti vc pruvide(;~ each i.üaycr
nrL8 c-- prc'fer2rl~8 )C~ttcrL thnt coincides wi th S~)~;iC ncitura.l qut3~nti ty
att2"cher1 t t~18 .iutC ,TkD. 1'i8 F', :nore scricus 8x.J.::1~)le one Elir:rht be
t(-;llIJt€'d t cinsic:~';r vn,T' ,~-;_S the Vi ~~.Jt cxtrccc exr:u:l:f?le ,:.If interest
c'mflict, ::mt 2,S .i,uce 8 Le.' 11.2,iff"t (l957) pint ;Jut, c:t the
gl,,~)t;ui level "'r¡HT is )I'(-)tn.~.ìl,jr n,:'))~ strictlJ e tttiVí: 8:tTICe b~)th
fe,cti::.:l1S vi'uuld :1)rcEumrtbi~y prefor (l. dr;:~vt t ì cutur-.l ~::.nnihíiationQ
H:;yr8VSr, rtn indi vidu.r:,l engageTJent vTi thin thE: C '\r~text cif r.i ì,var cr\n
p8rL~'",;'C¡ bc' C'- l1sidcT(;:d El strict.Ly c,).G;peti ti ve g~lElt).
Fr )Ll the Dc)int ¡Jf ViCY;f .'f s~,:;eking ~:'"n (l)timal str~ltegy,
.. ...CI.. ~."..""~,, .....0. ~..." ...", 0".. .... "tI...;i ........... ... .......,. to"
1. It is nc)t Lioe.nt ,i.ITr;J1y thn.t these n(J~.c'.)nfiict games !;l.rc dcv:'iid.(,f ps;irch:_::i::.gica'.1 inter'.;?:t - merely that they (;T8 trivi,::l fr;'im
tile gGD.e-thecTctic pJint ,;f view,
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d'l . -' 1a sa:i_E-.: -.poin Lt,
thure c.TC two classes of two-ners()n zerü-&um griffcs : those with
and thoSG without.
ll~viro-Per80n Zero--Sum Gn..:'~1CS r.ri th ~1il'.:~: c,.~Pcin.i..~
Let us c:)nsidcr g 8i8;)18 CXt~:nple
11h0rc :-J.rc two pl ayür s, A B. Pliiyer A has t., c' cn,Dicu;
of 3,ction, 2'1 pnd 112; Playcer B alsG hr'i~ tvn




(ap bi), (a2, bi), (ai' b2), 2nd (112, b2). ¡'hc'se OUtC036S cPen
be rG "Ore sen t(;d on 2, 2 X 2 YHrl trix. Since in tilt: ZL'r().- sum è~'amo A
wins WhE\t B loses and viCt) VriTSf::, VJQ n¿,,~d ,-,'nly enter i\f S ig'!:iins
(or losses) in the matrix, understanding tht-lt B' S :s'cins (or Ì(Jsses)
will be tte same numl)crs 7Ji ih tJ'cc opposite sign attached.. Let
tho payoff's fJr the four JutCO':1ces of our (;nBe Le as r80resented






This means thrt if Ji chooses 3.1' and B chooses bi, A gR..ins
(B L)ses) 5; if le chooses 2.1 and 3 cho)scs b2, A gains (B loses) 3;
if A choDses a2 8Jid B che'uses bi' A i.rains (B loses) 6; if A chooses
8,2 and 13 ChOOSdS b2, A l()s~'s (B ga.ins) 4. E"ue th,:lt the hest
outcome fcir A is a gain of 6; the best Dutcome fur B is ,~, REcin
of 3. IvlJr¡cover A can p:uar;:intee hio¡,self .'3. g20in of 3. If he
. . . . . . . . . . '" . . . . . . . '" . . . . . . .. '" . . . . . . . '" . . . . . . . . . . . '" . . . '" . . . . . '" . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l. ß saddle-point is an outcome in which th8 payoffs to both
'p1aY8rs D,rc the "b(;.st of tiie worst". 'Ehc meth::xi whcrebJ'~ this
is arrived at is known as the "minir:ax" stre,tügy, (since it
Diinimizes the U12ximuil iO¡~s), and the l)L:tCO:,:i? gives p., sort
of stE~ble equilibrium.
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chooses "l he is surs to get at least 3 and r:ossibl;y 5 if B is 80
fo,)lish fe,S t,) choc:se 01. Of course, A 11,""11:1 like t,) gain 6 which
is in the R2 J~OW but he kn()ws it is t' o1ish for him to choose a2
in the hope of B chousing' b1. F')r 'wh;i shnul() B chuose lJi'? On
the contrary, it is ce-rt:.:i.iyi thr.,t 'B '.viII ch.;;,)se ;.\
'--2 '
b ,.;C2,USC T~ ì s
better () 'f with b2, no oattcr T'¡~'l,::~:: Ii.:J u,.' 8.
- -----~ Being certqin (if this,
A chc)!)scs ai, becaUSE; that; is wÌ1ere he ir~ .~,~8St uff, givEJTl th~'.1,t
B ChU()Sí=jS b2.
Thcref::ire we expect that (ai' 112) Fill b0 the pair
chosen. A's gain is 3. Hc is assur"d this g20in by the, structurG
~)f the gaGie and tb.üre is ni.~.thing B Cf'"E Cio t~) prevent it. The.
best B ca:ri du is tu make sure that A F;ct~~ .!_l;crs th;~,r;. 3. He is
therefo'e als:) Cl S8ur" d Cif the "ocst" p')ssi"ble outcome (the "least
'Vvurstl! from B t s point ,:')f vic1¡v, but r::e.thcr:iatic2.11y th8 sr;,mc thing).
11he ga:i.18 just \:1.c",crilicd is p,2Xticularly SiE1Pl since
B i S choiCE is obvious. He is not even tempted tn ChCiOS0 b2, because
there is nothing for hi8 in thcêt oolumn which is not bettered in
the; oorresponding ontry of the oth"r oolumn. ThereforG B neod not
even try to figure out wi~at A is likeJ.y to do. A, on tlJ.EJ othcr
hcin;:L, must resist tne tcmptnti:Jn of choosing 20 (wi th its i uring
¿
gain c:f 6 in bi),
'1'he OflSC w,icrc P.1Jth pJ.a'/ers must rE:sist temptation is











Here A faces the temptation of choosing ill' since his
b'Teate st payoff (9) lies there., JJikewise B might be tempted to
choose b3 because his greatest payc)ff (11) is there. If bcith
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yield to the temptet,un, then B'S hop8~ BrB re2olized. However,
if B is rational, (which ÌEip1ies thc,t he will impute rationnli ty
to A), then he will not tumptcd t" chouse b3 since
t:) tomptati,:::ni. rl1he: risk L\;r
he will Dot
assu~:rG thr't K --¡Jil1 ,~,riolc1 A in
playill(r ai is JJou grüR,t. Taking the c.!pponcnt' oS rCt:.'èscninF-~ into
ttccount it becomos cls'nr th;:~t A will cho:)sc 8.3 rind 13 v/ill clL)(lsC
b2. 'lherefore (a3, b2) is 211 yitcome thnt en joys Cl ocrtcün
stability: vari:')l:is chains of reasoning cunverGE; on it - it is
the equilibrium point Bnd the Ol1tocGe is roferred. tc' PeS the
maximir: solution of ths, g,~~.EIQ.
Thin n~dJticn ~Jf r:n equilibrium ~n?~ir, thu:J.g'h ab~;tractly
arrivtd p,t, is not as might be SU(~g0ste-d, n a figment e)f the
theoretical mind"; it ha.s its c,ymtcrrJE\rts in such prnctic:-l
r;;ffaiTs as battles a:ric.1 r:iilitary s-cratcf.~:Y. '1\,/0 pcipeyS by Ht:iyv.¡(),)d
(1950, 1954) have ilUtlineè thE: rcLtiun between rülitary-cicoision
policy e,nd tVir:J-pcTsnn zer,-J-sum gaiTiC tht:)ry. Ay, actix'-J.l example
may befound in "the 8o"ttle :)f thE) Bisi'wrck Sea", an inoidont
whiohlJccurred in the c:iurse iJf Wi)rld 'i'ar Two.1
~-Persc)n Zero,..Suip Gt-:ncs \'ri th:)liLSn.ddlc-Pc)ints
G~ll.18E like ChGSS and Chcckcr2" in which no choices are
conceR,led from anyone, c,rc celled genes of perfect infornption. It
is shown in Ri'Jne thüory th~,t trie p¡woff natricos of zero-sum :;aines
of this sort always lw,vc saddle-points. Games which i),re not of
perfect informati,m ¡¡PI nut hr've 20ny saclcUc-puint in their payoff
me~trix. In such en.8GS, the straigti¿'forwr~rd choiCE ~')f stratogy
(thu m=imin i, which constitutes the solution of the two-pi~rson
zero-sum game, cP..l'not be appli\Jd, at least not in the same way.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00 .
l. The B,q ttlfJ ')f thE, Bi sl'arck SeE: he'S hiecn ci tied by H2oYwuod. (1954)
and qw)tied by Luoc and Raiffa (l957, p"ges 64-65).
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'l'hüre is, however, a way 'if re-establishing the ffa:iimin solution
for a two-person zero-sum gnm8, even if it hHS no s8.d(~iie-p,)int.





How should such a game be pLayed? Consider Player A's
point of view. He would like 4, so a2 is tempting. But -2 threatens
there, For security's sake, ai is m:)('ü attractive, it guarant5es 1.
The maximin principle would indicate c'l since 1 is the better of the
tw:i w"rst outcomes, 3..ld so it seems then that I'l should be Pla;rer A's
choice.
Let us now consider PlaY'òr Bls vücwpoint. He would like t"
win 2, and so !lEe inuld play b2, if ha could bo sure that 11 would
play 8.2, But he suspects that A will pr'ihahly play i'l' because
thit t is where A's raaxinin lies. If he were sure ,rif 11 playing Po, ,
he would then play bi' At this point a further susnicion entfirs
-L
B's mind. Su)pcse .h is aVJaro ef his (B's) reasoning so far.
If 3 could be sure of that,MiVh t not 11 them play a2 Emd win 4 ?
then he vnuld plp.y 02 and win 2, the nos t he can win in the game.
However, suppose A he.s foll'.wed the argument right to this p:Jint,
will Jl not then play ai' (to SEive himsfilf), so as to win 2? But
if Ji d'JGS this, then 13 should plro..y b.. .................
l-
At this point the argument 'b8Cc)rn8S tautologous.
Ordinary logic will not be sufficient to esta'r)lish et "rational"
strategy for either player. Su,;:ose, hOFcvfJr, that each plEwer
plays each of the
definite r2otio of
available strate¡šios at random, but in some
frequencies. Suppose A plays ai 35% of the time
mixing his strategicsand a2 65% of the time. We say that he is
- 25 -
:Ln the r(~tio 35;-65.. Von Heuüannl S L"Linimax thc~)rem (1928) str:tc,c.)
+11"c"tv 11 +,.1' (:,-re- i'r, 0,'. '..le,fiV¡-.L'tr- 'Y,',;'+.'..,',') -'+' C'tr~teCF" ni'xtu'~e i""'r c'"~)c:' ~)l ~YL;rv~. _.__ _~ _ _ '.. __.I.. .  __ V. J ii .. CL "6,) l' ~". ,_-,. çl~.':.L t -'C"., ç._
li'hich .nas ell the pr:)pcrties uf 'e il2J(imin". This wiii guarru1.tee
thu In::!i:-;t f:2.ch plb_:n::r C("'cil get in t sense ef lung-ri. expected pay~)ff,
if thë ~Jppunc:ni fcllo'ifs the SBT2(; pniic~y ,1nd uses his maximin
. i
strategy mixture.
Like the game \\,i.th Cl sadd18-p()int, th8 tV-J()-pers()n zero-
sum ga:nG v'i thnut Et s(1~dd18'-P,)i:nt a,lso h::..s i ts '¿raçtic~.l appiic~"tii~)ns.
Re.pnpwt (l96ü, p:iges 159-161) ci.tes ns an example a hypothetic!','
lí.ili tHT'JT situ,: t i,)n in 'ivt.ich Pc muni tions truck runs the ri sk :)f
B-noush.. 1'he truck pas sos '.nrcr cj. ther Df t,/r:) roads every day.
'llhc enemy sünci.s a detr~.chm.ünt tC) arnlJush t.h,e tr~ick, the' detachment
hiving t¡~e choice :)f blocking ReEd 1 which is good, or Rx',d 2,
'Nhich is PO'")T. Assessing the utili tit:.'s ':;1' 82011 3i18 fClr erch
payoff, 2XJ.cL a;3srunin;.~ st:r:ict oppositioYl of intereBts, Rl:j,pDport










Sin(;8 therc,; is no saddle-point, thi s is a g ;.?ne of lIJ.xed
strnteg;y. 'The b(;st strateg;y mixtures (or, as they are sometimes
cr-111ecl~ "strp"teg;y recipris") qre ;:~.S follows 'J'he truck should.
CYiO' 'se th(~ ROA.às i E.nd 2 in tht~ r:l.tio 4: 3. llrn.: ambush party shuuld
cno )f.1e thê riO)(ì(:s in the rn.ti'J 5:2. 11:1(0 valu2 0,f the gaL10 t~) the
. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . .. .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . t: .. . . . . 11 . . . ..
l. It EJh'Juld be noted the,' t if the 0ppGnen t departs from the maximìn
mixtixI'e, hL can du ni better, hut m,w cl,.! worse, if the first
play-er sticl(s t,r) his LlD..ximin mixture.
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~herE' iii, however, a WE:,YJf re-establishini-~ the mexiinin solution
for a two-person zero-sum fraE18, even if it he.s no saddle-point.






How should such a game be played? Consider Player .A's
point of view. He would like 4, so a2 is tempting. But -2 threatens
there, For security's sake, ai is nu,'e attr2octive, it guarpcntees 1.
The maximin principle would indicate E:i since 1 is the botter of the
two w-,rst outcomes, a'1d so it seems then thp,t ai should be Player A's
choice.
Let us now consider Player B t s viewv.'nt. He would like to





would play b2, if he
suspects that A will
could be sure th'it A would
he would then play bi'
B i s mind. Su)pose h
prnbably Dlay a" because
-'A iS maximin lies. If he were sure e)f A. playing ('ol'
At this peint a further susDicion enters
Might not A th0n play







reasoning so far.is awaro of his
could be sure of that,
most he CetYl win in the gamE).
However, SUppOSE: A has folL)wed the !lr';Uin0nt ri¡o:ht t¡i this ¡Joint,
will A not then play ai, (to save himself), so 20S to win 2? But
if A does this, then B should play bi ................
At this point thE) argument bec'J'.ks tautologous.
Ordinary logic will not be sufficient to establish a "ration2ol"
stratecy for either plnY8r. SU.o)ê)se, hiJv:ever, that each plcwer
plays each of the RVEülnble strategies at random, but in scmo
defini te ratio of ìrequoncies. Suppose A plays ai 35% of the time
and a2 65% of the time. We say thiit he is mixing his strp.,tegiGS
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j.n the rD.,tiu 35~' 6;.. Van Heur:irnin is ninimc:u theor2il (1928) str:.tcr~
th~,t l!t.h.(;re is 8. defini te r,:-'ti. :Ji stratCg;r nixture f\)T c8.cn p1r:.yer
¡,C1rhich ha,s ::.~.ll the pruperties (if F, maximin". This will gunrE\ntcü
the' mc!st (:F.ch pl¡:c,:TE;I' CtUl got in tho sense of iG~g-run expected payoff,
if the opp'_)ne:ut follc)ws
1
strategy mixture. ~
the samc; '~JCJiicy and uses his m2~imin. c _.~
Like tl':e g2.LIie y;i.th a sadclln-point, the t1lTO-P8rSon zero-
sum gaue ìÃ/i thuut a sr1Jidlc-lJoint ,c'"lso he,s i ts practicc~l Eipp1ic8.tioiiS.
R2oP')pcirt (1960, p'_'ges 159-161) cites f,S an exanple El hypothcticcü
rnili tery si tu.~ tiun 1.n 'iV1'iich f'~ muni tions truck runs the ri sk ~)f
ambush 0 I'h8 truck passes ()vc,r et ther Df t'H:~) r()Cids ever,Y day.
'lhc en0l:1~r s8nds a detr'.ch8t_~nt to fuubush t.he truck, the detachrnent
l'L:.iving tL.e cll()ici: ~)f t:'lockí:og' Hc);-'d 1 \tvhich is g'ood, or R")(Jd 2,
"which is PO")T. áss8ssing thG utili tics ,';,d ee,ch side f(:r 8,--,ch
payoff, 2x1.d tL3.suming st::c'ict oppusitinn c)f interests, RC:'.poport








Since tÜCY'c; is ÎlO saddle-pDint, this is ag 0.1.18 eif nij.xed
str::t8g;y. The best strateg,y rriXtur8S (ur, as they are sometimes
cr--lled, "strê,te.gy recipesll) qre rl,S follo'Ns l'he truck shculil
chcwse the ROiC,ds 1 cnd 2 in the TCitio 4:3. iJ:rW rtmbush party should
Ci1(Y)SC the ri)Pt:s in the rr!,titJ 5 ~2. The value nf the ga;ùc ti) the
........;l..........................................to.........~~...."...o
,
~ . It sh:iuld be noted thut if the oppcmmt departs frcm the: maximin
mixtuI'e, he C2.n du nJ better, but mn,y d¡ w)rse, if the first
play-er sticl(s t() hi S L"Dxir:in mixture.
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truck is 5/7. In other words, these tactics, where each side
does its ":;est, will in the lon,š run peW off ')/7 utiles (wie.tover
these l.ay be in the cont(;xt of the iSm),,) peT rtm to the truck.
Nei ther the truck C)r the äôbush peTty can improve their respective
1chances.
Beyond the two-person games jus t d(;scri bid, " sec.ind l'Elj rir
game c18,ss includes what are known PS n-person rc.rames (that is,
gar~es in which there are three or L1ure plesers). N-person gaf''CS
may be subdivided into two gr~)ups: negotiable (zero-sum ga:nes)
and n,=in-negotiable2 (n()n-zcro-sum gc/nes).
Negotiable Games.
The m1,in feii.urc ().f negctiabl.ü gamos is that with
cDlllunication allowed. coali ticJns mr,y be f'JrLJ;d. Von Neum20nn and
Ivorgenstern's (i947) theory of the n-pE';I'son game has beon tre8,ted
essentially in this context. Once a coelition has been f(;rmed,
the rem8.ining pla~ycrs can do collectively no worse and generally can
do iJGttor if they also l'.irm 'l. coalition. The n-person zero-sum
game then reduces to Cl two-person zero-sum gr.mG, vmere the the()ry
is completG. ~¡:he only new theoretical questions pDsed by thü
n-pürson negotiable game arü therefore cCJncerni'd with the process
of coalition .fornqtion 20nd the ODDClrtionment of the joint payoff
among the members.
. .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . .. .. . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. .
1. 'lhe present authcir suspects Rapoport t s hypothetical si tuc\tion
to bE: modellGd on ,~ real-J.ife nili tary si tua tion invol vini' the
protection of civilinn supply convo,Ys in Malaya against attack
by communist terrorists, rGp:irtod fully by B€resford and
Peston (1955) and cited by Shophc1,rd (1966).




NON-ZEHO- SUM GJ,liES. ¡~ DLSCRIPL1.
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More complex in their an2olysis, and much more intriguing
are the non-zero-s\.un ga¡¡i6S (often referred to c\s mixed-motive
games), where the interests of the two pl20yers partially conflict
and prirtinlly caincide. Thi~re Rre two main catcgoris8 of non-
zero-sum games : the prisuner' s dilfJTI:is "n,me anl rcla ted types;
a;-d coordinCttion games ",ne:. rcln,ted types.
The Pris,:incrf s TIi 1 crr~ila Gan8
The prisoner's dileaua gamel is a typical illustration
of how lack cJf mutual truBt, coup18d Hi th pe:rf8ctly "r~',tionfc.l"
consi dera ti :)ns, loads to diso'stcr. 2 rJ.fie dilcnma which the
players face resides in tl1eir iSJlciticin and reluctant lack of
nutuu,l unders tA.ndincs.
In one of the more common numerical representations of
the gaD;: Sh,::.yiYl in the f(jllo"ving mat:eix :
bi b2
ai +5 , +5 -4, +6
a2 +6,
-4 -3, - ')
l\lU-i'llìIX -..
PlEver A realizes thet his a2 str2oter;y will ~ive him a
lPTger payuff thn,y¡ his "1 strategy regardless ~,f what PlaYGr B elects
to do. Similarly, Player B reEúiz8s that his b2 strateGY dominates
. . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. . .. . . .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . w . .. .. . . .. . . .. .. . . . . .. .. . . ..
1. t'he nD-me "prisunerf s dilemma" dürives fr',)ll the anecdote,
orie:im~lly ascribed to A.W. Tucker, which is frequently used to
illustrn.te the mixed motives which undü-rlie the (;,ar18. Fur a
complete description see Luce 20nd Haiffa (i957, page 94ff).
2. This point of view is supported by the vmrk of Rekcsh 20nd
FeigenbaUL (1966).
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hi' ë')., Cl +r~ te ry"'rJ. c:  U ~l û v c" ,~-"j '"
~hichpJ_E~CCS i;hes
Eac.h l~'lè~L¿rer t _;(~rEjf()re r-jülects:l.:is s8c:)l~d strp,tcgy,
in (~ rey~)ff ()f - 3
ir: the r.~2' -b 2' cell ~)f the mF'.trix.. This T8sul ts
f",'r ECc'ch pVW'c,r. Lucc and R'iffa (1957) hc:,ve
C::d,i.nt2,ilH:,d tl:i~'t th:i2 U."'ha.pp.v str~.te uf p"ffnirs is indt:;(::d the ;nly
"rationgl 8 :,lution to the £S?,i':JF..
If the i G _pl~:;_ycd f,.-)r A, nurrJ,er C'.:f trial s ~ the
l'rC:Lti,~nClJ." 8"luticn is
"~;ll ~ c" Qi'~te'nt ~ 'tJ ch"i'c"ki I.~. C" -,'.-, u ,j ~ c"2" '~2 _,) v;) tuce
r"nd Raiffa hr¡wevcr, d r.!';L; c-)el J.0ve that su_ch l:.chB,vicur \¡v()uld
8-ct-ù/\lly 'Jccur.. Over r\ series (':f trials, even v-íi th~)~.lt commW1ictitic:in,
a taci t agrc 8~n',::n t, they '01 ~.;hC)Llld d8v~lcp to stay in th(~
" , "ell
"1' vl :~ ,L . ThüT8cognize, ;J ìViCV(;r, tiie.t SilCh ().:O_ agreement is
inherently unstç-~ble lJ8Cri11Se lLriilp,teral defcctiJn fr,:n:i it \iriii,
fur the defecting trial at lenst, incrcc'8c the pay,ff C)f tI18
plFty¿,r wh~) defected..
Ge:iicrally t:-ien the Prisonerl s llilcim7"la me'-;Y be d8fJCri~H-:d
'.'8 ~1. tvvc--porsC)Y. ni)n-zer~."-S:J~l g~-,;lC? playud vii thc\u_t c.:)mmu:ric,c¡ti")TI,
for which thG ~utc imes in the following IDRtrix (Rapr'Jport and
Cli~m~~¡'l lQoc~~) ... r""d. '_.., .. ..Cv .
C Di1
C2 R, R S, ~i
D2 J; S P, P" ,
I"li,¡nux 6_\~-=':--
- 30 -





2R ) (s + 'l) ') 2P
T ) It
T ) S
P ) S 1
The principle: fen,turo)f thüi type of gane then, is that
for both plcwers, strrttol.'Y 2 dcmiin20tes strategy 1. It sh,uld be
noted that no ncna::nhi vc~,18nt lh)rmati ve prcscriptiun of stra tefg'
choice is possible in such c2oses, and therefore, even c'msistont
stratc¡:sY ch~)ic(-s cann()t be explained by rationnli ty i:1T n,:-in-r2tionality
of tho ple,yers. it c'mvenHmt ind,~x of behaviour (that is, p, dependent
variEú¡lc) in this sort of gcu:nCj is tÜG re 
1 c;'..ti ve frequency of
ch CJsin(( strategy 1 (or alternatively, strategy 2). This frequency
oan 1-)e caiculc~,tod over a sequence ,r)f rel)Gf'"ted plays of the sane
gn.meby the sa:~18 pe.,ir r~;f pli,:¡,;yers, ')r ;)Vt;,r sovsr8,1 pla,yurs in a
onE";;-shot Experiment, or in r:. grnnd F'verage :Jvcr both plays r"lnd
players. There are obvious objections to calculatil1(; avero,gus of
this sort, but the meth,)d can be defended Dn thc: ;rr()Ll.d of focusing
un soma independent variables et er th,il experience or individufi1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i. Rap()ptJrt and Cham.mu.h make the fnlluwin,;?, cournent :
"Th,; l"tters representing the J)ê¡,yoffs in the above fffürix Fire
meant to 1)(; su(;'gestive. R stands for rew8~rd; it refc;rs to
the payC)ff each uf th(~ players receives asreward fDr cooperating.
S st20nds for suckcpl s paycff. 'rhis is the P2oyc)ff received
by thE:; player who cooperated 'Nhile the ::ithcr defected.
l stands for temptation, the payoff a player may hope to get
if l,e can defect 20nd ßE,t away with it. P stands for
punishment, me ted out wh¿m b ;ith players have defected."
-3l -
propensi-t;r" Pur examplE-, it aii;)1iV8 for the study e,nd ilEtnipulri;ti.)n
':ìf experiElE:nt:-11 c~;nditicins, payoff ma.trices, g:C)SS differences
1:e tween popul~,ti ;)ns ()f 'players, and S~) ~n ~ Il'iÎany such studies hEi.Ve
been reported in the literature. Of particular n:Jte flre those
reported by Rapoport and ChEWU;¡ah (l965a).
ivL:;difica tions ::)f the prisoner! s diler:ima game are
effected by dropp:img one or more of the four condtti,)ns outlined
earlier. In particular, the dor:in2nce of ströctegy 1 by strategy 2
can ~be dr opped. Many experimmts on such "weaker" forms of the
prisoner's dileruna ge,m" ne,ve rh,en repJrted. (Scodel et al, 1959;
Nlim?_s et 21, 196o; Lutzker, 1960;). A further m()dificntion Flay
be effected by dr()p,Jing the syr:inetry r8quiremen t.l
Conrdin,:ition GPJllCS
In a pure c,:Jordinr-'~ti()n game, the interests ef the
players coincide /l The prCJhleID Rrise s froLl the frict that the,Y
co,nn'Jt communicate with each ,;.,ther. While this sort ,)f' problem
is not :really G.ircctl:y reiat(~d tc the. strategic prublcfJ with \¡vhich
gB.me thci;ry is mf1.i~11:/ concerned, such si tU.EJ.tiuns, nevertheless,
can GO formally depicted r s . .-1ge~Jilt::: in normal. f()rm. às such they 'J.JE.
S'~JInetimes considured tn the cc~ntext 'Tt" game .theoretical discUSBi.iTIs.
Notable in such discussiuns has been the contribution of Schelling
(1960) who h,s brought out tiie role of prominence as El guide
to strategy choice in c'Jordina tLm gc'mes. (When it is impClrt20nt
for b,th players to "read E;êlCh other's mind" in cirdbr f:r buth
tu benefit, the promimmce)r distinctive character of cürtain
chcices plays, or eught tr) play, Ecn iD¡nrtant part).
.............0...........................................................
1. The symmetry r"quirement in the prisom,r's dilemma ensures
thr"t the gri,'TC "LJoks" exactly the sm~e to both players.
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As Shubik (1964) has pULnted out, (page 289) :
"Considerp\tionsf this sCJrt belong to the psychology
or 'tacit ar;reements', rmd, r,S nlready noted, hp.ve li ttle
to do wi th the princip;ü C\lGc:rn of giu;ie theory. Still,
it has been maintrcined, perhaps with justification, thp,t
in real-life si tUP,tions which have been cast by strategic
analysis int'J garne forI', considerati'ms of this sort do
play an important part. Tl;terefeJre any me thod dravring
cm came theciry and purpcirtinc to deal with re2ol-life
prnblems ;)1' wi th experir~ent6 in behC'viour shciuld include
crmsiderciti')ns derived from the existence of tacit
agre2ments 20nd 'telepathic communicaticms i of this sort."
BeYcmd the tvn-peI'son nm-zerO-SUD games just d8scribed
are the n-person games usually called non-negCJtiable games.
Non-N8gotiable Games.
Non-negotiable n-pers,m games nI'e gal'es in which the
(Jla,yers are not allowf:d to communicate and hence C8l1not negotiate.
(Thus no explicit coe,li tions with 2ttending side deR.ls can be m"Lde).
The principal theoretical p')int to be made "bout n-person non-
nep,CJtiable gm'1es is thHt there is a genfr"Llizntion of the rünimax
solutinn which hr:s becn shovm tu exist for all n-persrm zero-sum
WU!WS, the so-called Nash equilibri= point (arialoeTcius t" the
minimax) canuc't be c"msidered f',S 'C'" nurmc,tively prescribed soluti'Jn
(since if a teci t rigreûment or cCJe,li ticn could be 20chieved among
two or I'OI'e ,if the players, the l'ü':ibers could genorally improve all
of th8ir rcspu8tivio payoffs by j'Jint düparture frDl' the Nash
equilibriur,) point). It follows that the Ðxperinente,l treatment
CJf non-negotiable n-person gQl:ies leads essentially to the same
sürt uf questions which ferise with simil20r treat¡;ent nf two-person
non-zer8-sum gc~es.
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CHAP'lER Fl'n. : SDlIULAt'IOi" Arm GlûHNG.
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A nE'V! techniqu,e which h8¡¡ grown up along with the
àeveli:;JLlent of the use of formaL, ffQdel!3 in tilO behavioiia,l ¡¡Q'j,'!'lIlêli
is simulation. As y','t thure is no generally acceüted common
terminology, out Shubik (1964, page 7l) provides the following
reas onablo defini ti on :
"A simulation of 2, system or an organisl7 is tb-, o',eration
of cl mcdul or sinulator which is 11, rel1rosentotion of the
system orirganism. From studying the oper2otion of the
Elodel, properties concerninF( thebohaviour of the cwtual
systen aI'" infer:red."
and goes on :
"Among the reasons for constructing a simulation are that
the model is aiiienable to manipulations which would be too
expensive, impre.cticablei o:r impossible to perforri on
the entity it portrays."
As Coe (l964) has nointod out, cooputer simulation is 20
rolati vely new resoarch tool. Like questionnaires, psychometric
examiu9_tions, etc., it has certain limitations, but also great
potenti.al for the o.dvancement of knowledge in social science. For
example, one of the ever-present problems in social science research
is control of vari2obles. SimuI2otion permits the examinRtion of
two-varinble or mul tivaripble re1a ionships with the effects of
coni'ounding v2ori2obles reiio\/ed. Similarly, simulation p¡;rmi ts rigor
and pr¡;cision through simulated measurement raroly found in field
res8arch. This, in turn, allows minute exa:ninntion of complex
relp.tionsiüps which under ordinary field conditions might not be
separsoblo. A furthur point is that simU12tion progrærmGs Bore
~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. 'lhe word "simulation" and the phrase "manipUl'ltion of ; model"
arü üsscntially synonymous, except th,~t "manipuletion of a model"
might b8 taken to include ,malytical methods, whercas
11 simulGtion" is normally lüü ted to operations by digi t20l
computer or analog devices.
)
np~-.-r~..o~+:lJ". ~,~lìc"Ll iD tb'," t eXt::~cti¿l tI1;,:; Sc"1.JUC :re c)ul t s
evcl',Y t iElt:c.. Pinr' ~~ 1:i
i s t 1~ :;; 1..::1 (~ 0 iJ~'; cl V,~Ln ,f' ud rmd
C:'CCU.T',S.cy" Si~,'l1J:LP,tc.';d DT'C;/;rrr' 'IT-lC:;j ri,re C:-l. ~;lc of:.'
ucing X'usuJ. ts in
q fr,c,ctLon f'CH ,; ti:'lC Y'..,oui:ccd b:y c)rdini~o.ry rC:8cn.rc~j. L:.,..thods, and
r-.l')~'.~rt fr:)lT tccli.:.ii fcl.il;u"c, t er n'¿'\Tc:r COEL'ti ts mi8t~_ikc:3
(p'.lv1,rt fr:)rü tbuse intl'ocLicsci , ..c iium~.U1 cJ)cr¿:1,--or) (l
In r:;:Jcii ti~.ln t:; tE:chni:=~rcj_ H.rticlcs on C()~;ip~itcr siuu12,tions
':.1 n. ,:i t j.1. C blC:;'Ii1S invc:il vcd 1 like tuose uf Hcirling (19_58) rend COYlViay
,,+ "l ("9"9) "Lr~~_.J.. 9_.LL sr.c(\ll l':rttt g.rcwiing body of li tcreoturc? cue ccul
find rc-fereri,GGS to sti.idics r)f ph.)'s:i.oal processes, tr-9,ffic c()nt~"'ol,
and -th¿ like, but. there r:i"'(:: ,"'.S t Tcln,tivcl;y- f~;,w gnod 8xIicples of
simule.ti:J:n in the 8ccic:,1 .LSCi(:;1:1CC:.~ D
SíL1u12.t).(JLL Grgc:.
In. ti).u fitüd of psychology Ne-7licll t~yij SiucJn (1959) hnve
produc,~ J. E:l progrc~mm8 f -)T the s at:ion of hUI!lPJ1 thinkin.?" lNhi~c
Gyr, tc1~:0r , j\llcn (1962) hE:''vG produced .~~ prugr:=trE".o ()n
cog:'1i ti"vc: c)rg'(:,tliZrtticn. Vii thin the reA.ls .:'~,f gru''',c thcJry a
CUYlßi.d2J:ablç; nurn ',;Y' of C()Li:~nit~~r sj_J?U18.t:iJJ18 r~nd 2nrìJ.og devices tu_iye
pruvided u8C'ful results $ Spc cifi e!:ill.y, T.., SGr,lr, P 'c"j \Jil -: i Q (1 963 \)'- '-.' L t'"' ._,-,.. ., _ L.' .J
he,vc produced nn expcrir::ental anr~J.()g to tvv:J-p!:1.rty barg::,ininf:S ê~Ylc1
L:lcckcr i.' t "il (1964) :1(=',1/,0 USt:c1 t-" CCJI'~lputcr-l)r:escd expc:rirrcn t tu study
thc, cffucts of thre:a,t on :'Jf\.-cg:iinir::,~; :lll0. Yl\-g;;t.ie~ tiUL .. .f) en ::lvi 0 U.T '"
Q-r~Gii.Q is ,::;ftcn cCJJii'u.Scd. -'i~ìi th .§.L~?l:¿)(:LtiQn, but ti:iCr(; is p
)nYlC".:l' ~.i1-¡ ~ ¡:¡~t" :"r-:" ",""-.' "'1::.,r,,' 'Y'':C,-,..-,uiC crC.U..L~J v.L.. I E... c;l'.uL. ~~-::~~.:'2t.: .l S !l techniquo Fhich nn.f '.J-l may Eut
ìnakc use ;:' DiLlul;itc'o. cn:vironm(.:nt but id, Yii thout cxceptionï
. " " .. e \l . ,. ~ . '" .. ¡; .. .. . ~ c " (¡ . 0 . " io ~ . .~ .. .. . .. ¥ ~ '" .. . . " .. Cl . 0 " . '" . " . . '" . .. .. ~ . . . . . .. . . " " .. . ., ..
111 :i:hcre~.Lrc 8XCG pti ons h':.n~,'cvc-r, such \.8 the study by Orcutt ~
Grecnbcrgcr, K,irhel, !'.d IH vlin (1961),
- :. .
t;Gne",Tn "'i th human. b.ehRviour. i Whil", it has b"en cormn:m in the
past tu \we tho words "gaming" and "sìnmlati (J" synonymously, much
confusion can be caused ty 80 driing. G:~ntjraiiy, individuals in using
the word lf8iDU1(-:~.ti¡Jn!1 in rcfcrcnci;: t," ;'.,~, érr.~,;1(: ar'c rcfc;rring to gD.Lintr
in a s:iilula,tcd G~iviro~rient. '2hb rcfcrE;üC8 Elay 'he tíì th,~; siLlul~-:,ted
role of th~~ p1a2rC'rs, C-'S fr)l' (jxainplE:j V/LLf:':O gradtiat0 husinc:ss students
fill the role of union or co¡;P8ny represeutat l.ves in 8. simulatE:d
labour di spute (Campbdl, 1960; Bass 1966); or act thu pci.rt of Blanagers
of ""business firIT; in Cl "llJrket" situc;ticJn (Hoggc1tt, 1959). A
nUHiber of studies have i;EiploYE;d a siimlaLd rather than ,a E.l
player. For example, (in relation t, 'the prisoner's dilei:ma game),
, C)Scodc-;l ~1902 used a, stooge who plp,yed C', nredütermincd str8.tegy.
That is, each subject ilctually plilyod ngainst cC pre-prOgT2I11Cd
set of responses sent tu him, '.,¡thor by tho stooge (in thE; study by
Scodel), or 1,y the experi;:cnter (in ()ther studies by Soloilan, 196o;
Bixenstine ct al, 1963; Bixenstine and Wìlscn,
., 9':5.L 0 , etc. ), while.;'
beli6ving th,'t ho was E~ctua~iy ple.,~ving ngainst c!. Y8a.l 0ppCJnLDt.
flhere arc, then, rlt::tny tY('2S ,:)f gn.ming B.nd mr~ny 'pur-oos(~S
for \vhich g2.n18S canl:¡¡:; used. All are ~-J..' interest to the behavioural
scientist and many do not ruquil'8 cor:putcrB in ord8r to play them.
For example, SOr:E0 mili tery gaL1GS (rr,ln:JCVr,~s such as .NA'110 exercise s)
mak(~ USE. of ,:), 1"021 environl18r.t, oth8rs USG an c':naloir simu18otion for
the tJl1vironmen t, such "',f3 a sand table. Several poli ticl'ù gar.ing
si tua tions hAve bc.cm design"d to be plaYtJc1 with paptJr and oencil
(for exa¡r.ple, Ikle and Lei toa, 1962) anCl numerous other gr-,T¡:s have
been used in recu1t expcrimentn,l work Vii triin the frm,wwork of game
.. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . .
l. In a sil'ulation, the behEèviour of the cOJ'ponents is taken as
gi von. Thus, while necessary to a gcu::1ng exercise, the actual
presence of individuals is not m!cess2ory to a simulr,tion.
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theo~y. (FoT ç~ample. Hoggatt. 1959;
Krauss and Düut8ch, 1966). In m"ny
Jonsen and £eyebinski, 1963;
inVüstig,"),tions, as Shubik (1964)
points out, the hE.dvTviourr,l scientist is intert;sted in thre(;, ll2.in
aspects : (1) an eJL.eq:12te description of' the c:nvir~)n.:::,':nt in '.vhich
the n,ctivity takes pLwe, (2) an un',rstc;,ncin;,: of trk plnns, stn1tegiGS,
and motivations of the ducisicyn i:nrikers, n'ld (3) an ability to
predict what will happen if the decision JJccKOrS carry out tieir pJJ'ns,
gi ven the snvircinment. .A si(rllilr~ ti Oll. tn.kcs thE:' first two i tCl1:is ,'is
giVE:1ll and provides (l. 1Ysthod for o"btaining the third. Griling in a
simulated environment npW be used C,S a method whorehy thE: first is
taken p,s given, tü.8 outC~:II'K! of the geu'ie is u8s~irvC(i, riYid infürences
is doni; in uxp(-rimcnt~i,l gaLiing.
arc made conccrniri;' the in tüntions an(' moti vrc èions of tlw players. 'l'his
and the players w!y tnen prDcu)d to t r,j- out different pL'J1S and
In úper,=t t_ionr:~l earning thE eHviruTImC'iit ma,y DC t:J.kcn as gi von
strÐ.tcgi s in ordt;r t;) c~x(~-',.riillc their t)ìJ."tCODJCS.
An 2:1 tornp,ti ve Irethud of classifying ga,'lies i:oncerns the
dogreL of control and f')rr:JE:.lization in ti-.te str~ictur8 ;)f tIH::' gau;c 2nd
ttl'e levels ,)f rLchness of t'ie enviromwnt. .As Shubik (1964, page 74)
points out
"H,:m,v of the psychologists i experiment2.1 gaG'SS tend to be
extrellely Ìõipovorished in envirDnmental SlOtting and highly
controlL,d vii th r8sp8ct to t!W rules iL'ld. mp.nner of Dll1Y.l
At the other c;xtreme, games de si,gwod as operatirm"1.l
exercises for poli ticO-d~plomiJtJc neg,itiations !!ay be
very loose in structure. In the latter case, export
refereES may duci,:.te on rules r3,nj -:Jer!.iissiblc stratt:::¡:;ics
2.S the ga~::e prog-r8sse s. The cxperinental controls Day
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Prisonur r s Diier:imr~ Gri.ric~ ur t1"h: Gane of Chicken (fully
described by Rapoport and Ch 
"1!lm2:h, 1966) are examples of this
extre;ne.
2. IVlany collt.;cti VG bargc:~ining garries fc?i.ll into thi s ca tC¡j'ory _ for
example, the studies of Campbell (1960), 2nd luckm2fl (1964).
- )Il _
bo lew or non-existent. l'he exercise may hAve more
in COilt10n wi th R group psyehodynamic process than
wi th 2. formn,l the()ry of ganGs. H
Gg,mes !lS Predictors.
In the lrJ,st few Y2e..rs sirrilations of diplc)l1f¡"tic-cum-
mili tary S,'st8ffS have become comi:wn, 0s1Jccially in the Uni tad Stp.tes.
Ono of the chü,f aims of this developLKnt is evidontl;¡ to provide
somo substitute for crmtrollell experiment for the science of strategy,
which purports to d ürü wi th such systC'Cts. However, since the
conúections b t~tweE;n thc; simula t icns r:nd the real prcic8sse s arc
missing, ther8 is little hope of making simulation of diplo-mili tary
procedures a useful tool for ,',rrivin¡:; at atrntecic decisions.l In
fpoirness, howev,T, it should be pointed out that the enthusipsts of
simuLltion are well Aware of this difficulty 20nd that they E!vf',luate
the positive c;intribution of the simulation mvthud from mi entirely
differont point of view - thc dCJsignurs of simuI2otions, gmiing, and
scenRrios2 are generally agrc'ed thrt tho principfÜ value of the se
procedures is in furthering the develop:C18nt of thecry, pla;;'1s
evaluati.on, R.,nd as teaching aids.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l. There is li ttlo 8vidence th'J,t such 2oDplications arc in fEèct mn,de
or roco::miended, al though Schenck (1963) suggests th,t tnere is
cause for c()ncern 2t the possibility.
2. Scsn,s,rio - "a terli introduci'd by stratecists i,O designate
imag,ned situations (usually crises, wars, etc.) ccint:cived for
exercising str.::.,tcgic deci sion-making c:',nd t~) simul,r"i to the
invention of al terni:t.tiVG OUtCOLl8S RnQ c,-.iurSêS of elction."
(R2oPoport, 1964; pp 312 - 3l3)
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G~~~~.E_ ,08 r,t5'E~Ql1~llJi\_li:i.ds,
'j?h (~ El ppl i C,".~ ti on " +' G'aiJ:Lnt~ to training p.nd its use as e
teFtching::~id i'~ of Ú1U2.h Irur(' f'Lnciunt str~i-!ding the.n ic the me-~.th6m¿:.ticai
theory of gt:'.::ll;8.
By the: sixteenth cc:ntur,Y- many chess-like games had 8vol vf;d
v¡hich rof18ct~-d the tflctical principles ef the age, Hnd by the
eighteenth century tv,,) .lrünch cf\rd games, onc dealing wi th combrèot
,¡¿,-rations and thi" other with fortific2otions Here played 'lS 11
tre.ining aid in the b,0sic ins tructicm of mili tiiry students. In this
erE 2).SO, the viuw of v..ar r:-s an eX:~1.ct science gainbd vugue. This
f:ipproach of mn,thcm:Jtic:.:il exe.cti tudc and its representf,ticJll in gaTYlCS
inevi tably led t successively higner 18vel s of Jetail, cOl'plexi ty
eif plp,y, and sophistic2,tion in reoriJsentntion both of thlè combat
- t dt"-' +""'d +', t.L- 1eli::1en s en Hi; .Llu.. O.. QC'. lJ180
By 1812 the elder Von Rcisswitz hed jlèveloped the first
gA.118 to use E:n n.ctual terrain m ,del buil t to sce.lEj and L"ndü of
pl,.1.ster. Used ,r:B El tc¿r b3T the Prussian Royalty, it was 1atcr adr:~,pt8d
hy the younger V:in Reisswitz to a sCPuliLd fleet m.ap, with rcfinecl
rules. In Iß24 ne. c''lvinced t Chief of the GerEic.i.n Ge::i,:;r1.11 Sbff
th,,:t it WE'S not '" game et ,all but a valuable' trainer fur :ictual
t' 21'8. icms.
. . . . . . . . . . q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. For example, Helwig (1"(80) dE;signed a gmne th"t included the use
of singlE; pieces to represent entire; i:ili t!1ry imi ts rp,ther th8.n
indi vidunl trocps, the reprcsentr:,tiOYl ,Jf fi VG terrain classes
which c"'uld be used to build iq ul arbit2TY bettle-fielc1,
differenti,,"i r,ites of lIcver¡wnt f':Jr the various typcs of 'i'irL1S,
and fln independent gEL:-ltj dircct;.;r r::ither th:~Jn ë-:. pi~i./er, tu apply
the ga~ie rules t 'J t,~e player moves.
2. It is intoresting to note tlLi't its nain feiitures \Yere thnt
it WFJ.S a closí:d irf\l'C directed by an independent umpire, and
thEit the cbject of the game was not to win or lOBC, hut for
the plr:.JTers t .') t\,ttn.in sound tacticcll techniques.
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mi~ , .--1lHr(j:lf,~nc;~,i: Ln( nins'tGenth COILtU:i'y; thG Von Roisswitz
KL~ G3'£rL1 c~l vient thrOtL.;"h cfclcs r)f cor:plicr-"ti1yr: nrid si:':~iplificriti()n
;,~Thich evcntun.J.ly 1(;(1 tu Ck~rr,:.rD recC)!;;ri ticn of the Rigid KriGgspiel
for lcnv~Mechclcn .plc'_)' ~ end t!.1C Pree KriegspiGl f'::n" higher lLvel play,
P0th (Jf l/'h.i.CLl f'~.:,t~,.rcd en w'.'"lpirc who V!PLS expert in y.rarf8I'8 n.nò F2T
gp.riling. It is thi:~se E;8.L1üs th~;t he,vc ~í)mu d07in t() us with little
chango, except t~S rC(ll.lirc.)d t introduce new weaponry, and new
documont tion tGchniques.
Navnl vrar gEi.win€' hr~,d its birth in the late i 7001 s in t.oe
iJc,:s ç(~.t18r.qturl_ by r~n I;nc1is:ciman nn.J:J(:~d J'Jhn Cleri",: (1790) \'vho uBel r:
a nUL1ber of ship i:ioô.sls in vc~rious dispositions. i N2,val F:\uthr::ri tics
oneuuri:?,gec1 the- 1.LS8 ef gc::Eüng r:s F~ trri.ininc' r.(inl, o'J.d by the i890rs
the J1'nglish, ItaJ.ie,n1 and 11.8. Hr'cv.;.cs vrere me.king us(: of t.hc
jjI~Ian8uv0r Bori.rd!l, "Chart l~'laneuver!l, 2 or w1\Tp~VLl War G8.mel!, as the
Floc t-'lacti C(Ú cme)
gFL18 v.rns vtlTiuu.sly .:-cnDyin. il t the Uni tcd Stn,tcs N;:v(~l '~:vcor C 011e5'e,
.'::-í"r"'" t .-, O'~ C' (:;.: ":- "..', c:~ ~':1'."""e" "01'
"-'' c~ ~-t.:''' ' \.,,'J...1Lû hu.J -' 'ied i)')r(:; or less
con1; inuousl;y i'r,))n the't time unt il 1958 when t'ic;y were supercedod by
the ~'Je,val Electronic ì,/grfare SiL"luln,tor (NLi,/S).
'.lhe gtu:iing of n,ir op(;;r::i ti ons hr:.d r.l so De C')L18 "lvide snrcad
since: õ'i'.r')rlè. V/nr 11, but any survcy of this doveJ.cpì.:iünt is pr~clur1ed
by sÐcori t;y consid.erF:~ti()ns. It is s:.fficient t~) note tL.e,t tlî,erein
. . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It . . . . . . .. . . . . .
1" CL1he first fnrmc.tlizecl navp.~lwar grl.ne, hcnrevcr, appears tJ have
be~)n invcntc;'c: about 1878 bJi" Carta,in Philip H. C01ULib of the
Bri tish Navy.
2. For exarlple, see lVcCflrthy 1i ttlc (1912).
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lay thc. nriEiii \' L~'~8 LrJnch'::st(;i~ I~quatio.ns, 1 and thr..t, since W':rld
'de"r 11, the ;;':JTii:1.,:'::" of niT' iy,::!cr'Pìtions has bt;,:.n rot lc,'-:'st PeS p,ctive 2.8
", t f 1 " , 'fl 't 2'C:F1, ~ () _LEHh.:. anc: sen. cc)n. ie "
It is hr~rrliy nCces~'iiry t:) stFite tll2:.t traininr;' g2ElcS and
E1F1.D mET1(;'uv~:rs re iYl ex-cc'Tlsi v(~ use t :X1,~,Y f UT' mil i tc~:.ry F'cyid ll?,vnl
tra.ining v:,'i th v,~r;ying dc:¿.rr"j2S ,)f sciphisticatc'ù investinonts in
e' c-0~r')r:i'" "~putGr D'u~--r+ 3',.. ... v '. 1 \-' \..,).~l.. ç 0' .t-pu. v.
.\.r.'.',..'..~cs i'ii 1-::-: ':nco l'~vc.luri+-¡ '-jn,
~ ~ç ..("" V .. (,~ _~~
1111"1-0 Gormans used their Kricgspiel to f()rnul¿tt(~. cnd evt-luatG'
until Wc¡rld 'vva,r 11. 'rho most note,blc of these ii..ist.'.:'.nces W8r0 :
wa!' (:,nd caL1p~lign pltnis fr,Jd túC' Fr3,nco-Prussir;.n '¥':;-=~l' rit~'ht t,:.:ough
1) 'lhe püm ~)f rnilroad Ll ,bilization rmd dep1oyn18nt of the Prussian
arriy ng~'üist .B'rancG in l870;
2) The 'Ton Sch1ieffen PL?Yi ,",t t:¡( stcLrt c)f W:irld Vinr I (which rilm~st
won it fnr them nt thc outset);
3) 'I'he invasion of Polmid in Vhrld 'dar 11;
. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. HEU:1Cd ßft(~r their origi'!1Pvt,yr, :F. ì./. 
La,nchc ster (1916), the so_uations,by- expressing ths relationships betwoen victory, nUI112rical
superiori ty, ane', the superiuri ty of firGpov,'EJr, pretict the
outcome: E'.nt: cffGctiv8ness ,~;.f two oppcsing Si(lCS in ,~), mili tary-
si tUci.tion.
2. J()linson (1968) - p(.rsol1i.l C;'JL1D1unica.tiono
3. The NJ~.rV1r facili t;y occupios three floors of tnt,) centrt.; Wir:D; of
Sii~S RnlI at the HitS. Nn.vn.l i:~/2.r C,:)l.lûge. ilh6- COli1p18X ülectrical
circuitry h"is OVl'r 4000 mil s ~lf wire and 13,000 electronic
tubes instulled. It represents 2~n investment of approximatel3'
LO ¡¡iilli,)y¡ d()llnrs. Seventy persJns èir'_' assignccl full-time to
the l:u':.r G.:l,ning Dep::',rtnent, v/hich is responsible f-:yr' the
:)p(;r,i.tion cnd :"1aintainance of the l'r;:;\iS
- 42
if ) '11...(; pro.~)i)'SC;(~ invr si.'.!L of -E~n~:;la.n(J in 1940 (the g8.ì~\tJ GD '1f;ed up
the clifí'iculti88 invnlvE:;d);"' (~.nd
r; ;\ "T1
./ Ilt-ie inv::c:.sion :~)f Ri.ssia in 1941"
Not ci.ll of these Op(;r1"ltions V.K~Y.8 SUCG()ssful, but in most
c!::scs the
~ccurßtely indic~'t2d the cv~nts that ensued.
Bc,th the .I1.l1i P:)Y'CC:S ,~'(rid the Japanuse Ji,j Gxtensi VG
cr::iming ir. suppcrt of V?~tr pln,ns. tCY), the mus t si;nìfic2nt a,p.plic3-ti,:)us
òi::ing the Invgsion :Jf Normancly nnd the r¡.tt,~-ick nu Pearl Harbour..
Again, owin¿' tc' security rêstr~ctior18, it is not possible
trì ci to ~hG post-\'ic)rlrJ.. ¡Jar 11 role of gn,rning in ple-ns dev(~loprrlC'nt
and (òy~üuy"ti()n. 'lhat it continues to have en historicEü role
is inclicnt(cd by the rcvclati,m the It\tc SCllttor (thE-ll Mr)
RorJert Kcnnedy in 1963 thri,t the Bay of Pigs .)"Dcy'ation in Cubri W~\'8
tyFtr ga0dì.cd, D.n.- by the stcedy trickle of repùrtf~ issued unè-er the









As hces plready teun pointed (JUt, IsPome theory was conceived
by 1'1athpL1F!t:icir-ns, and since thL public9,ticm ,)f Von Neumann and
Mn,'lIS'imstùrn's trOD tiS8 (l947), has been developed almost excl usi vely
by them. Indeed, the theory can bü correctl,)T viewed 201: a solf-
contained b:r,c;nch of pUl'o mathematics - a system of theorens built
up froni a sot of postulR.tes. As such, t:,e thec)rems arc, logical
consequences of the postulates and can unly be wrong if errors have
crept in to the deductions. Thus, when the validi ty of the theorems,
s')lutions, etc., has bEen checked, such a purely m2othematioal theory
is pn;ctic2ollY iiluile tu criticism.
However, 20S soon as the theory is propos PS pertinent to
some p,sT)ects of the real world, (for example, as a basi s for
constructing models of humril behaviour in conflict si tu" tions), an
evaluation (as opposed to only a fo:r::ml check on lo(;ical validity)
is required. In such a siti.w,tion, however, it is lw,rdly prop8r to
criticize c~ theory fur not having accomplished something that it
did not set out to accomplish. Our eX2omination must be dinJcted only
towards the IlVJlications of, and the claims made for "erne theory
by the non-mathematic,,:l scientists.
'There hil,ve beun m¡my cibjcctions of both a theoretical F\nd
practioal LF'ture tn the use of game theor;)T in psyohological inquiry,
and in this connoction, many)f the theory's requirements hevc been
brought into question. The theor;)T assumes thR.t the players in a game
will act 1'8, ti onally (in the econ,:imic sense) - an asslLmption which is
open to questioi:. L'ven in the 2 X 2 prisoner i s dilemma-type game,
would the two players really be able to w~Jrk out the "rationE'l"
solution to their dilemma? If it is possible that they might not
m20nage this deduction in the simple 2 X 2 game, is it not even more
unlikEJly th'c"t the players Wciuld be able to identify the "rational"
outcome in a 3 X 3 game, or in a game requiring the use uf mixed
strQ tegies? Even if El player did in all these cases reoognize
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the "rational" solution, therèJ is .0 €Narantee that he would i.
fact act rationally in this economic senSE;. A player m;,ght deliberately
make an "irrational" choiCE;. For example if the ß"Æe is reiterated
over a li'rge nUiTiber of trials, ii2 might well become b'Jred and change
his strategy simply for the S2oko of change. Again, it is conceivable,
for example, th",t R chess-player would rather risk losing 20 game
than settle for a draw.
The requirement of i5cu~le thec-ry thst all outcomes be
specified numerically and t1't. t r::it::onality is the ffELimizELtion of
these by tnE. player, crm quickly hscor;¡e i', psychologic8.l pilffalL.
If, for exampIG, thG P2oyofls are in casn, it is quite !JJssible t'iat
their worth tc the plaYt:r dOGS not cJrres,)Dnd to tLuir numericaJ.
val ues. 'lo win £l in e, poker game c,ay, t ,) a given pDb,r player,
be worth m'Jre than twice 8S much or less than twice :s l.uch ,o,s to
win iO/-. Since the magni tudes of the pay8ffs play a part in
defining the experimentnl game, suoh a game in rGali ty remains
undefined if vie 'io not know wh'it pa,yoff values are assigned by the
playors to the various outcomes, even where this is specified in
monetary terms. Ánothsr illustriltion of this point is the problem
of the player whu dOGS not wish to maximize his "economic" payoff.
A father playing dominoes vii th his young son, for instance, may
heLVe the ab.ili ty to defeat hin¡, but may 2olloW the child to win.
In this case the father's self-evalucd payoff would possibly be
dee¡;ed grC20 ter to him in the satisfaction of seeing the child i s
pleasure in winning, rathEr th20n in playing rationally in the
game-theore tic sense.
In short, game theory descrlbos "ration2oli ty" only in
the eccinomic sense, y(¡ercas human players may redefine r2otionality
for thomselves in entirely different terms. That is, the goal-
directedness of players may be t.W2Tds a psychological goal, re20l
enough for the playe:rs involved, but entirely different from the
game-theoretic principle of economy maximization.
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This cri ticis!' thrit the pLiyer' s flctual gori.l Ir20Y be
different froG thr,t nssUl¡"d by the theury h' seven d82ped implications
for rei ternted versions of 2xpsrimental games. :r"I'Í8.ny pers nns v¡rho
hc've experimented with g'1mes have mn,de the assumption that 30
iterations of II ge.m" are merely 3 0 repeti tions (or trials) of the
same choice situ:,tion. It cnn he argued, and I think reasonably so,
t(i(~t this is not the cr:ise. It S88ms reas:)Yl2.ble t:) E-lSSU::8 thr'.t a win
(or loss) of 5 numeric20l points will be psychologically greater
to the player when hE: holls only ia points than it will when he holCis
210 points, 2nd that the reinforcei:ent ho receives from a p"rticular
outcome will thus vary in degree according' to the point in the gfi.'1e
wJ:uòre the outci):rrc obtnins. Such 8, conclu~i,ion would. lead to an
expectation cif sequential dependency of response, and, on the f20ce
of it J invalidate the results of experiments utilizing 20n i tersted
gmne. However, while it nay he reasonably Flssumed that learning
takes lJlFtce in iterate,:), plays (if the outcome of each play is known
to thiò subject), theI''' is evidence thnt subjects do not really
"gct the hang" of the gnme until they hewe played ita hundred
times or sc, with on 'JpportiL.ity to comUFlrn tho rcsults of diffcrent
"strategies".l In addition, 28 Rapoport (1968) has pointed out,
experiments with one-shot (non-iterated) plays prcsent 20 problem
of design Gfficiency. Since Pc decision in a 2 X 2 game takes only
,CL short time, it is extremely inefficient to ccrifino such 20n experiment
to one playmly - thc,t is, to recruit a pair 'JE subjects, give thcm
instructions, etc., c.nd ,'mlJ ,',llow them tC¡ cLCtuc.,lly perfcJrm for EL.
few moments.
. . . .. . . . . lo . :I . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ..
1. In this instancl:', "stratcgies!t nre undErstc)od to mer~.n not
simply tn" two ch:)icçs availnble in tho 2 X 2 gnrie, but the
differen t sequences of choices.
.- 4c ~
A :nn:t::u',-;i.l vr2,y out is t,:~ gn.tLer d',,-cE':. from thu s~-:,me
DFJ5r c.p Giibj;~cts on si,ví.jr8,l Jiff8T'E:;nt games, BD.ch TJlu..)T8d once.
1'üi i~'ovrcVc:r, rp.i ses 'i thc:'r prcblcms1 0,1 th,)uCh the s(¡ in turn may
bc' sf)lved.
D8f=l;Ji tc ,:-:1i the forCE()ing obj-.;ctions it ce.ri still be
argued thrit tL.u t.ilCJr~/ ',f gar.1CS in th~;. fCirrn et' the: t~vo-person
non-zero-sll"J go.ne (1.:')128 pr:)vide a Deth':;d of studying mixt.d-.mntive
conflict in the context of c'))Qtro~led 1ilbcirat.;ry experimentation.
And it h;-:ß bÜ811 ë.T'gU(;('J th~~,t such nixed-motivu gn,llos provide 8
pe,rtic;ilgrly useful mcclcl, ,n.nswering El lonrj-ff:l t need. in social
psychnlor:,y for r::. y:'cll-c ¡ntroiiL~.d interrictiun si tUC'.tion v-vi th an
easily que,ntifin,ble and untir'1bigu'Jus dependent v8,rin.ale ft,\. ne nuiiiber
of c()opcrn, ti ve - or competi ti ve - rüsponse8 lIRde by e8,ch subje ct),
in i tien providing an excellent framevnrk vii thin vl)üch pr(Jbler~s
can !~H:; stU(::í od.
moti v,.-'~ Li nn, duci sion-makinr;, p(;rs ()TIcil'i ty, c\nd persGn-percept iDn
thr\t
GalL) fUl.l lVIcClin teok (i96;;, p"gü 70) hilve furth8r argued
"Perhaps even mc)rc imp:irtant is tlic f8,ct thrè,t tll., decisions
thgt heive t~) be mridE-j' by the: snbjt:cts in the game Fire very
similr::ir to :-.r.c:cisions th:-:t are madiò in real-life 1)argaining
:.'.nd c,:;iriflict si tucvtions. The pia~Vi~rs ha,vu Cl real stake in
c':Jopertl ting', ~.';~nd :~rot at the Saue time t!:lC~r8 c~re realistic
rC2S0ns why the~ý' should c()mpet(~. M:,'\ny rcsc8.rcht-'rs SCi8 the
decisions anö. strategies in thc Priscincr' 8 DilBnirna as
prototypes of the r¡.;re ccimpl()x decisi=,ns anr', strritegies in , 2
la.liuur-.manc.1gcment bargainiYli'_;; anô intern2tl.onril llegotlr"tionsit
.......".........~.ç......................................................
1. If the results of each pIE'Y Arc fed hack t,) the subjc.cts, they
may dovelop solylú !lprinciples of plr.," c?~bstract8d from the results..
If these principles are 20pplied ¡'cross all the pliws in the
experim.cnt, ths rE~sponses may cunt:.-1;J1in2te each other.
2. Scvert;;,l texts dealing wi th t.:'J.8se ELI'(:as ()f stu.dy hRV8'J..ppGarod
Dver the Lst two decades - by ChanJicrlain 20nd Kuhn, who published
their "C.illecti vc Bargaininiš" in 1951; by \/illictL1s, whese "Complca t
Strategyst" a¡:peared in 1954; 90nd by mrJony others, such as Blackwell
and Girschick (l954); Dunlop ",nd Healy (i955); Rap')pcrt (l960,
1964); And Four2kcr and Siegel (1993).
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.As j.s t:TJJiccl1y the et'vS0, tJi(ò rtdva!1tr'-'.g~~s of tractability
cU.'ld control 2.re \'r;'fset b:i th\.: nrtificiali ty of the l¡,;¡,bore.tc)ry
environment'" Extrapc)lati'Jll uf laborn,tC'r,)T rçsul ts tC) cCìnclusions about
real life ".re nlwa;¡ s ;;cczarc!ous, and PS Rapoport (1968, page 461) h20S
p~)inted out, it is n(~t only the lack of reH,lism of the situation
depicted in the lr'lbor2otory whioh makes thE: extrapol2otion unwarranted,
but 8.130 thL' limitccl ra.ngc -)f the results ¡-btELined.1
'l'he: more soeptioal cri tics of experimental gaming may go
SG far as to argue: th,-:t tho a::tifici,r--~ii ty of thE: Gxpt~rimcnto1 grtme
QllkfJS nonsense of such ros"arch. It is undisputed that the experimental
situc~tion is n.rtificicj_.l. 'iiil.nt it is unre81istic is, hU,,/';8ver, open
L) debate. Harnett (1967) rE:ferring to busine ss gamE's, has argued
that although the expf)rimcmt"i cnvironm8nts and subjects mi,y fc"il
tn correspond with business reoli ty, behc,vioural In.borat)r,j
siuula,tiun :)f nê'~rket processes ::'~J2S pussess unique adVtint~igt.;s E18 El
resGe.rch strn,tegy, .')ftGn 'lVhile rctc~il1ing its relt.;v8nce t':~, natural
settings.
;l1hcr~: arc .few y,-hc would contcúCl the-Lt laborRtory simulation
'ifbi1ateral m:inopcily ,cm) ci1igopoly are full-fledged repre sonta tions
èJf simili',r real world mfcrkets. Fouraker AJid Siegel (1963) were fully
c')gniz'),nt uf the problc.:,¡s of 2,pplying conclusions b2s8d on laboratory
simuLc:tiüns to more complex si tur; ticms. There arc indocd f orrniclable
problems '~èssociat8d with such extensions. Nevertheless, HE,rnett! s
view ho.s becn rci terci,ted by many, including J:Jhnston and Gohen (1967)
who argued that the rp,tcona1e for v i~(;winr: proporly designed and
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .
1. livEn in the simplest CiLSE; of the 2 X 2 gaL1e, thore are 20t least
eürht incl cpend6nt varir)~Ql8s vii thin the. gr;ine rncJ.trix. If we give
er~ch p~yoff just thr"e distinct values, il'iw, mE;è~iur, ancl high),
-,e must p"rform 38 (th'it is, 6561) exoeriments to get 'c: body of
dat~ for a comprehensive doscription of how the choices arG
influenced by the payoffs.
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Inotivf-:.te1 lri.bcirntory cx;.ieriml1nts as effectiVE menns (if studying
8ct)noinic bohavi~ur i~J .sím.i.lr'T ti;, that :.ìf the C',)TIst.ructi':JD of ~lbstract
As Johnst jìl ~ind C
f!lrCeS hin t() utilize these sicple, but llSGful, tCjols in his scarch.
..ce21 vi),.)rld ì~,'ith eitl1'::'l' t;:icorEtice.l J:'-:)c1els 'i.r lc~b')rn-tr)r~T simulations
r:::DELlyticrJ.l modc-=s. ':r~'H3 inability cif ths' invcstigat;\r to C'nC;)ffTF\SS the
have noted :
tl.rlh~~ vl0aTJDri:c,Y cJÍ' scicncf~ cllibi\-o.CCS su.ch f simple' tochniqucs
rtLt:icr thixn S(~Y'le hypr)theticp~l, non-Gxistent method V\Tli(::reby
tht; crnnpl(;xi ty of ti".8 vF;,r1d CFLn bE: gTas in its full
spl\Jndour. !!
(1962) the.t thc pr;)CCSS \..l1ich is fOW1d t:J Ol)Lratc in f; 'minimal f
B~) th tílC8c; authc.:rs cnd ')rSG' thc~ cc::ncJ. n.sion of Sch;:':ni tzkí
in natur8J. si tugtiuns.
socin.,l si tuP:ti:)l1 miro;ht ¡¡,rell pruvG tu bE: a b,~.~,sic L1Gch.:;¡niSl! uperriting
The flJrtl'1cr cri ticis,:i thc:,t nuy rcsul. ts nbti:'-,DC"!c1 frem
riust
experim8nts utilizing university and cullege students iccS fjUbjf~ots
il1v:.,lid t!,~'causG C)f di(ferenc8s in ~igC, nul p ssibl,y C(hic8.tionEll
level end vocati , t t.uri cn El i':)r~, as well (;' s in occupr:.t cnn.l stF~tus,
f',~)u.'1d thr:.t the bc:haviour ().f business aY1C~ S-CU:.8~1t subjects ',~ras
in negotiatiuns, hi,S been refuted h;y Sicgel ,',nl ,Iarnett (i964) who
betwe',n such stucknts and tlKse who), in real lif",'trc; on,cragcn dcüly
csscuti 1,) s i::i , 1" tin ai. i;.~1r)~)r 'Rn.-; TiJSpects; b(',tiL':sroups exhibited
similar bi. dinrr 1J~1.t"terns ,eind conforss-d t,:) the predicti'yûs based on
the thc"jX'e"tiCD,l Flu:lels. .Bartos, h:')ViIC\l(::T, (1967) hCi.S ste,tüd thp:t it
vrho (~,rG n-:Jt 'pr()fessi'Jn~,i nug:ìtJ_A-t',',rs i_~nd :'icncrnlizc .früm their
does net SE:'Cf:l prc)fi tn1)lc' t() c:)nduct Siè~lPlc C'XT)E:Tinents '\~iitÌ1 subjocts
bC~l,::tvi'Ju. tD thnt .e)f nrc)fossi
,':, if t.:.'lC CC.::L bch,'-~),vioiJ.r (which
he clciirns t() DC the ilCJst imp'::rtt:1nt) ìs missing fr'~)!J the experi~ents.
Bc_rtcs conccdl8 h;JViCVCr, th,'l,t the process ~).f profüssìonE1iiz?ti'~)n,
the de.veic)pr.t,'~nt of norms, anc1 bE)lioí's 2vOOUt nC~s'uti.ati:)n itself ce,n bo
legi time,tely studicrr in such experiments.
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Gamf.J8 hE\VG a.Isr: bc'en USGd ¿xt€nsively iY1 the stiidy c--f
intern:',r,i 'n8,l neC'::tic Lionsl wh¿rc picrtici)J.s,nts UGu:ül,y rcnresent
fur :res¿8rch purp',Jsr's, er as trainir:g, k!;ive students experience
country they re pr",ien t. )le) V!J th war ,.'aning, such ¡;al',es ¡:my be ()~'ge,nized
they may simply be instructed to 2Ct in the best interests of the
t.ri\~; C()u-:itr:f, :-'.ctiii::S' etS t!icy belj_E;vC' thE: cuu.-vtry vi.:-)uld :?vct, or vrricre
ccurtries, and vr)).u:r(~ thuy may b¿:; 8nc:urar.~'..; tc pIa;)r the "Tolc" ')f
1')1' the bcncf t uf Studfnits due t,) tl:eir p'.rticular sui tabili t" f',)r
in the ccmplexitic:s e)f interncitiGnF?l !nlitics. Such ga,~os, iir;.êc.nized
hi'in,~~inr; ¡Jut tü8 C(jI'l'J.l.exi tics of in+;Grnr:.tional lìolitics and
nCFr,:,tinti()us, Ere: b2r no mC:.U1S limi t(~d to this end in thGir usefulness" 2
'~ihilc the mC)~"(; abstì'n.ct 2nd fJtyliz8d games cn,nnot T"irctend
thu,Y TJr:,,:i1 nave n i~ir~cE' in tho t'r-lÐ,;-ir;,.r. It
to pr:'vide eXDGriollCG in the p:ract:,CG of intcrDc,tìcnnl m:g,otiati8ns,
ki:id of g:in" mey be used t.,: elucidQ,t:è ri thc)reticrü mC:it:l, an-c,th"r
rcvcalin~~ tho s-~ructurc o.f ci)i:flicts rr:Jthi~r t'::ian the, 6etails. Onempy be uSoful in
to ShUVI its lici tiuns,
the )ry t psychol¡gic
PerhaDS f~:. Liure D(ISic cri tici~3m~)f tJ:"lS 2p"DiicE~ti-)n of gRile
psychological aspects
t~1C iidrE~:Cl2.!!:ìi' gn¡ .cs uf s tratcg,y is str:')ngljr linked Yii th the
prDbleü28 hn.s bs'c;'n the E1l(:u:úcrit t t while
It hGS ,)uon furth, r argued tlvt, in pru3cribinc the sr:me line CJf
but is rc,t:':or ccnCerl1ul ,nly vri th the IDgical aspects :,f strntegy.
c,.:'nflict (-.;,nd c/.)'~1pcrr::tti(rnt gTimG th8'::Jry is :r,()t,
. . . . . . . ,. . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (;
l. il. critice,l oVß.luHt:iori ~uid i.ìvorVJ, W
rl1Gthc_;cJ.s for studyiu(r intcrnrLtionn.l
T"deschi and Malai,'r)di (1964).
current psychological
rclntiol1s h;''-'s been i~~iyen by
2. 'lhis usefulness hI'S b cen questioned by soverp,l authors, (by
Singer, 1963; Earris, 1964; Haas, 1966; and by De Lecm,MacQucon,
"nd c)"s"r)rC'~c' 19(,oo'l "11 "')p v.¡-Viil h~"e '-"v 
''cc + (!cl +Iic "se r'fC,.l . '-~\- V.J C,,-I.i. ç;, ./ j' C .. '. -- f..L,. '._ .. :;4 v ç. ci.~., '.' (._" '- ~~.l U.c C ,-tJ- C \,fC'--¡"UD,l-';nl1ol '.;Y¡"lVq.-~r (+b--'. i'nvLs+i'c"J+-i....',  r )f '-'ct-i1. )1 eV('nt, \ i'nU"'-U c"'_'.J...-,"-.c, ::-l U. ,/ ,---_0 v _I.; _._ ~'- u t.-:""v dJ.1. '. r" 'l""~,,, "'.1. '-/
order t() avci,:I the pi tf_~.~.lls of cDntClTj)urary quaIi tative




pJ.,c;Y='/~~D"~.:n."t t., - ,,::~CL' nE it; clues '~-D'::iin.st ;'-t l)eêS'inner~ vibcn ,'=
8 TT ate r-;'i c ~ç;~¡.rn.c is ¡~.t(.;'lJ r.Lllf:¡.l;ysc,d O;'¡í ge.:T1E:-thuoT'cticp-l msth"),j.3 ,
~,)thin~~ is left to th0 6~~C 0 This, hOlH8v8r:i is net so. .lis
Sehciiin,(T has CX-'Ji~:iin~.
ii~i;vei'l tho most aU~3terü cJ.nd uC::)llIJnicßI thecTctical 81
is ur.1J.ikely t::") fu.il~;r doterminGte . . . . . . ailoni2: the
pr8c8asss th~t it lÐ~vÐs indeterminate will bo some th~it
inherently involve the ii~ractioll of' two or morc
d(Jcisinn ~cntr0S.
J?(Jr this rlJ1S')!l tL18TC is lik01y t,:'l bc, Lveii 'Nithin the
si:Tiplificd mc)dsl, 8')(:'C SC:),)C for rfrei:: ;:Lctivityf fur
bEt.rg~:,ining, f':Jr the rCê:~ding n.f LLl1:'_,-':rst;:v1dinr-'s ;:.nc:: r:is-
un(:erst8.r~c1in,xs7 f():. ~'.cc;)mc:dati'~':n E~n(1 coopcr,cl,ti':Jn, Ei-nd
for c~)nj(;cti;.rCS tlb()ut eE~ch cìthcr's -jr;ci.,s5.Ctl r,r,,,'cEcsses,
v~~,luc systcr:is, ;:.::tid i:'1f)rr:inti,Jns. 11
lSchalling, 196i, paffes 4B-49)
'.LJhis8CCJ08 Enr ;;frLE; 8ctivitY!lis (J,n ir1;)";rtc:~nt il1,',Tedicnt
eif such mixc:d-:nr)l;i v(; si tiJJ'î.,t:Lcns, fer it r;'Lrn.r:L ts thE fimct'j_~)nifUt '.-:f
psychr.) i c:?~l f'iC t ')rs vihi ch in r(~ al i ifr: si tUP'"Gi ~)ns ,:;l,ri. L.()W ;j~,:;rLcrEìl1;1
t:Lc;,j tu b ~_;f GC'Ylsic1cre.:Jlc i:~¡iY'-::ltt_ìncc;.1 Until rl.;ccntl,y, when it
becrwic' r;,ppecycn t th;:. t
,;r,;:::at dsal ne'iye VtfFlS inv:-il ved, be.ri;a.ìning
\vrts c,~:nsi(:;~vr,~:d :',nly in ths c:;nt(";-xt of le
and cc¡;nJmic CC)nsJ dcrations.
How:ver, T0ccnt w1 hi'S sh .J"wn tIli.s vi'~i.v. to tiC in t:rrOT. Hoffmau,
F",t. -r~ ""'j J"". "'n- (''''14)e b J.nst:,r J C"cl... ..Lh"rC:h.,L .../--
'pOstul~ltcd tbqt r~n im.p"irtgnt ::iotiVF:,ti ,in
in a -oarn':::ininr:; sit-:lF,,'(icin v/rs tüc; in:.~ivi'iu2,lfs C':)ilCcrri ;!ib;'.~ut his
desire to 8C1uFll -ir Su.rpass them. In substantie.tin.'" this hypothcsis9
status in the (~,cti.vi tv r81r~t.iv8 t. ~Jth(;r Hler'i!JcrE ,)f t,:1C group and his
Hcffman ct~~J-. f')u~d thet ti",'~-~ str8np;th r)f the T:ll)tivnti.)no::,l f9ctc;rs
invc,1 ved c:!cpcnd.cd n::t ~)nl;y ,:in the d C:'gT08 ,:-.r COI:1Txl.:n1)ili ty bctivccn
the ~jruup mcr:ibers, hut aIr:,), in ï)':Tt, nDon the im:.)'rt~-.Lnce ci£' the
........................~...........".........c............O......ø~......."
1. L fe.et :rcc'')(:niZt-:ct by Stc1/jy!(;I' v/rH) in the C'Jurse :Jf intervicwinr~
\~.:':)rkcr~'3, nnion (-)ffïcinls, ('_~id YU81noss DX(~cut:i.vcs, ~,r.Tn_s v(-~ry
much iri,)r¿:'ssoJ by iithc ~~2!,;.~::nai e,,¡louring of ma,n;y facts in the:
"'1'~u'a "f' h,t'" "."r""'~'S ""i,:i "x"ocu~''''s 11 (l9,IÇ,' D"'C lA'))..~.l.i.; ,I. u" Li. n'\. -''-\:-' c.l,( ç '- \/-LVC.,ø I+U, l.~:~b-' ./~.
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t ~uik t c the i !h.l i Yi. cl ~1,';~1 B , " 1 1inV-'J.1VSC. Dent scll (1960) c'mductccl an
eXDerj.::ent t,:) :lrJ:~iE~SS -Lhe eP et f t!lreat "ll -r,:(:L",;grtinin~' in a.n
experimental
~ cuid. Ci JDel uded thc.'Lt a 1):?,rr:ainin,c;; si tua tinn v,Tas
lri-o u r t c-l~J/l.~_iJ1_ .:lG__t~ q ;'l.:iiJilu..i..h u_J¿02. a.vi ~ilr___ .';"-._t;~i::.)~ d,r =; ~ i n c r s ~
e'c"'n,'m, i' c rri~".t+rT:ir. ,~,t l' '''c,U(;' rn, -;, 'F,h, -+ i' n ~c,'-.i',+r)i' r, C'l'I'CU'J'lst"JYI"'L)Q "h'jVe li' +t'j 0
-~~.: ~_C'." J i.+.:.:.,'2~~_~;"~..:::::-" ..-'.7.~'" , . v '-_ ...~-._....~__--:..._~':,.--~.._._~_~'-
a c-')molt:'x s"~;cin.l si tu",ti:,':n in yit:.ich the m::~nj_.fsst su'hstçt:~.~tiv8 -'T
--..__--_...~__~__.,,_.______.~__..._.,___.~.__.______._._., ~
uf industI,üil strife, Cyrie,x c.md Oo.kGshJtt (1960) have cummented
Speaking
th¡:i,t strikes are ::~s Eiuch s'Jciccl ()r even itic ph(:;nolTena. ß's
ecuDOITic ")nes; and Deutsch (1961) hrts eX-:.11t"::in;;;,j this noti,)n in
terms of ìlthre.::t t() fp~ce!l :
Il\,:Tri: CY'8vnr ~' l~":'r:J'cci~n~ncc si'tuc:.+-ir"n 1,1...;"" 'hi:-"Cr"'mc !"',!:it'n' 'l'ì''fi'c-::ll
t- v.:.i ,~ .,l- UC.', (.,'..... .. r:. '.~v~..! 1 ..,d..: ..,~.. .J..~'V ;___,_,. ,,' ,..t~. L~
- thr,t is, vrhenevur b,':~Tgain8rs Ei-re i:nELblc Ts,_;i,ch F1,::se-
ment dE;SjJi te thG cle;.~.2' cx:iste:ice of c: potential êJ..grCGment
thcJ,t ls(:ve the l:)~'Lrg2.incrG in n, better -::)usi tic~n tha.n
th€~r l)OS:L. ti!)n ef no-.agrecment - ':)r~€ ffri.y suspect th(-:,t
at le,~;.E.~t:Jne (if tJ.18 ba,i',cra,iners feols th2,t his fa,cc r~cJS
hEeD threFLtcned and tnr~t n.n Ct/?rcsi.iGnt vrJuld lead tu loss
'Jf fucc'."
Th8 aTf'Sumcnt hc'rc iS th,'":,t, in (:ffeet, irthrcc:t t,~) face" under ce;rtA.in
circumst,s,uCE-'8 '-.1n::,/ trr~.J:18f~)rm rt mixcd.-r.utivü S'ï_tii;:-:ticìn int::"i a
e:.)m1)8 ti ti ve stru,;crgle VlJ'lCrein :JcjJ2,vìcIUT is rer:-ul ':LtE)c1 ~.l,ntag:;ni sti Gally
ra,thE;r than normativcly. 2
prucess, theru a:re ne) real f :rnalized rules, hut there is ,', generrclly
help prevent such,." dGtcri~:r2-ci( 2:1 in the bargaining
.. '.oe...OQI!. ... .".............. ....".........."....". .."..... D. .... .0."
1. 'lhis view is sUPP'Jrted l:y Garfield ~'nd ',ihyte (1950a) whu
cummented that thU~3C wh lC,Jk f.2,t 'bargn.inirL;' Siin-~)i;~,. in leg,:;l
and eC;:jn,".':'Elic tcr::is fail t..j recognize th~""t L-argainint-; doals
in the .eITc1ti':Jrr. of pc e as \,vell ,3,f3 in l,')gic and cccniomic
interests.
2. ¡¡hile the escalaticm internA.tiunc:. conflicts may here spring
tu mind. 8..8 the most £~71arin,.; example, it sh,:)uld be ree"lized t.bs.t
thi.s n,Jtion hulds true te ru, equri.l extent in industrial
negotia ti()ns.
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EJ.cce'Jted gc.dus CDG:r:'QllS1:i lNhich should bC' fc)11,:.)¡g0d. In this ccnnection,
Garfield r'nd íniyte in 8 surüJs of papers, (1950a, 1950b, 1950c, 1951),
hove cont¡;ndcd th:-,t the bnrgaini,ng process itself h"s a ceremonial
function which seI'yes I:, IJ2oj')r role in bringing obcmt an eff",ctive
adj'istment Q,r;d rcsc)lution of conflict. This notion has been reiterated
by Miller (1959)9 'ivho, in c:Jnsiderinf; tho Ettitudcs of an industricl.l
union and Fir ncigcment nfter a nrol:inged but SE' tisfe,ct_-Ty neg,)tia ti'in,
re uorted thp t thes" atti tu::es of satisfrction reflect an ihsti tutioni'ci-
zntion of a set of rolc exnGctatic)ns.
That conjectures abuut the other's decision processes,
vnlu8 systems r'nd infrirmation occur in rE)al life situetions is certFl.n.
'lhe fir,st steps in b2Tgairiing involve an explor2otJry ))rocess un 'wth
sides. In the preli:rúmiry "fencing", the b~lrgair18rs size up the
pE:ople 2.c1" )SS the t(:~bie cineJ. try to sense tl"lC relativo imo~)rtance of
each issue to the )thcr peTty.
"Out of this process cOlws the vmrkinf.( consensus which,
in its minimal forn, sDecifi8s the p:ener,ü rules to bc'
observed wi-i;hi.n the intcr~cti()n, establishes the identity
01 each '-if the partici"pqnts, E;,nd dElimits their ,JTGaS
:)f choice of linos :Jf action."
(Weinstcin Rnd Dcutschberger, 1964).
Iklc (1964) has l)roviC!_id us with :i set d' pcJinters fer sizing up the
bn,rgaining reputr,tion of the 0piJosi tFm - Is he a bluffer? Is he
firm? :Ducs.he t:l,void tests of strength ?l, and reminds us th:~,t the
c;pponents vÌ¡,vrc;f our reputciti'm is equaii,y iElp:irtant. A reoute,tion
for nJt bluffing works much like 8, C Jrilrrl tment: it crcn.tes r'" vfJste':~1
...............................".........................................".....
1. ó In.~ern2,tio.ngl n0gotj_~ tions are akin tu these '.,if in':~u8tr;i in many
wP"ys, pone. t;:sts )f 8 trenr~th, hI uffing, riropagandr.., c-.nd other ploys
r~re commonly use:!. Spanicr'lnd Nogcc (1962) imd lbg"e (1963) !i2ove
s".gls0stcd th,':t such "gnmosmHnshir)!t hi:s en th,::~ mRj::r practice of
disEtrm8.ment dC;-Jates - "-rhe negoti8,tions were chE.racterized hy p,
richni:; ss of FinnEuver thr-,t 'lVrI,8'.1,t t imL S cr.3,S S ::"11'1 r~.t timd S
extreG81y subtle." (No,;ee, 1963, 9a?8 521 CR, 615 ilC) - thcugh
Jensen (l963) hns disputed this.
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by the long-terrei dr:Ti(re t'i y()U.I reputatiun
your threa.t, thc'n the disadv(Lnt~.,.gc of cELrrying it uU.t is :)utweighod
intereist in bein" ccmnistcnt. If the!PIJcsing p,"rty te.kes yeu up on
YCì.:U.:' fnilure t::: d; 8:).. iCncivring this, your opponent ilG.Y not chnllcnge
1
;your thrStit. -- S~.;;c :Jndly, in ncg;)t:i.:'"ti ')n, it is an C"LdvP,ntag.eous ploy
t VJulJ be caused by
to iQû,ke ymr CYlcnt believe thi',t he might
terms since they will nDt C::iilC guy bottl.:;r
just hS well '~ccept your
?
for him.' His expectations
~18 tu vv'hcthur ur not y';)ur pusi ti-':in ,¡viii rer;iF'"in f:Lrm dc ')8nds net 'JUlY
In hts imrtge ,:)f y':n¡r cust))Yary buh~lviC)ur e,nd Y'~';lr r8putation for
firmness in the l)r:st, but çJ.iS~):)n Y'Jur intGrest in ~\T()ur future
reputr- tion. 'l'hC.è il'.Jre you CCln c~)ì~vìncc ycur
ponent that giving in
wuuld ülDoir your future beTg:ünÍ"lg streJFth, the ::nre he will conclu,1e
that it is in your intf;rcst to have no ngrce¡;cnt rather than to
18ssi?11 y¡,;ur demrLnds (even if, in the pf~rticuial' instance, fscJft8ned r
tcr::is Yi'Jul.! !,)cttcr for you th,~:.n nn agrC-E:IEunt).
b::irgaininc rt.put;:.-~ti:in can serve ,''cS ;: cumrni t~'nen t to Y'Jur l1sgntinticill
In sh,:)rt, vVrL!=:.t this r:':c-riiis is thE,t t.he inv;)1vment nf Y'_Jur
iy)si ti'JTI. rrh2 mCirG y'iu enj ~)y c:. re ti':-T~ ()f ëilvrnys rcmri.ining firm,
the EL::ru cC;d:,1vincìnr;' t, ì the: i¡yu:)nent is thE: c'.-~;mmi tinent. In a similar
way, th8 rr;,?"int~).ini!i:,; ,e,f n reiJutr\ti';)Ji,';f strÐngth is equ£illy ir:rportant
you know that the other side i s acti,ins will 8 governed in part by
i.n preserving (~'ob!?Lrgc:'.inin.7 rcput"ti')ll. If Y:JU riTe:: the nCij,::)tintoI',
his nnticipations uf your rcacti':)ns. Hc' l)rstJs these r~;nticiprTtions on
..o..."...o...elO....,......."... ."'..... ....... "Ð.... .... ..... ......."......"
1. A g':.;'vernment acquires Cl rc':)utri.t5.c:n in I'uch tho sa:n.6 "1¡lni,Y an
individuRl dies. On the basis sf its previous p~rformances, other
nFLtl,')ns l,i,rill impute t:_') it (J, c!_iTJ1'JIir:.tic style, nvitives and:Jbjoctivcs,
certa,in c.~.tti tudcs t:)y'arJs th¿:; use of f;-)rcc, rind ,-,they 8.ttritn.:it8s
nfi;fìViíür"
2. "It is vrhn.t Vie think thi:-: v,rc.ìri~1 is like, nc,t v/he'Lt it is r(-::£~lly like,
thr-,t clr,tl:r11ines mr heh,",vicmr . . . '. 'Ne. ,2ct accrJrcling t.e the WE'Y
the i.N~)rlc1 ;:-ippears ti: US, n,)t nc'ccssarily acccJrding t.',) the way
. ,i. I.... "le ~Q(~(Julding, 1959, page 121).
~~
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his ìrnage:;f yuu,. c'Yl"'~Frnin.:; sucü r'ttributt:is FlS your ntti tU(~.8 t(yward
rJ.sk-tnking, y:)'ur tCYh.iL'nc;y t,¡ :'::luff, :rour Gvr1.1uati':'n f ye,ur O\liIYl
strength nYL-' hi:':J, YCqir tbxijcncy tu h fA,st tri a )(~siti0n, and so
fi,)rth. Nntuli::_!_ly, Y'-.)ur r)ppnr:erit ¡pill aSE.HL1t: ,:1, certr',in C ,.'ntinui ty
in t~icse ~~ttributes SC' his cstir:1FLtcs ~)f therL ll,~Ttly nn yenI'
-)8rf ('rrrip"Y1C ¿, in pr~)viu:J.s J1',0p.(.;tiE',tiiJHS a K.YJ)winfr thi¿:; yuu v/iii :=LCt in
every n(~g'ctlP.ti,~--'n n::t "jnJ.~i S ,?,s t, .')bta,in 8. f~~vc):)T.(-:;'blc :ìutcome at
t timf-;, but f:l.l SG S ,I ~J,S t ;',ruserVt_j ,)r i:j~)r )VL:.~ :J()ur ncgc.Jtiutinf!
strf;n;;;~th in the future. ics Ikle (l961 'q ~'. '77)Lr, t)'~~6C i, hc~s 8m)hc~si se(~
!!'rhu fF'ct tlv:~t tliese tVJ,i c'-"::;si(~LeT':~ti .H1S frsquentl:¡ c(:;nflict
f.~_è1ds a,n inp;'jrtE.u:t cc:mr11i,c ti(Jn t¡; the nG'g:.':1~it":ting procoss. 11
(It is tc be noted thnt this h S relev"ncc tu rei teratf)c1
pIQ.:~Ts )1' E-?x:')E:rincrits.l :-'~',rc!.~-'lÜS nJlil. lcnJ.8 oreditilj t;y t') tLG i(ü::p~ of
sequenti21 dependency ~f on JiOCB in such Cs LCS).
Iklu continues th? t tlic influence of tha bArg2ining
reput,~.:ti;)n crtn 'bf~ 2cbstrrct(;::;i in the langua.ge ,;¡f _~n,nL; theory: E~n
tcrT:t~L ')11r(,1 n.C(jutL ti',Jl). is n(~~v(;r ,'" sGlf"-c(Jnt,'.-:in;_~;::-t 1';:tr:.D1SJ!, but is an
inst,~~ncü v8&;ucly re,lc:.ter! t,'; !:in cvcr~"c)ntinui~ig lIsupergi~me".
Ji.l th ,uif,'f: cc:'Cü inst,:'IYlce .Y clè.s its (J'J"in pe;yuffs, the tC'cctics used in it
affect ths thcr -orLrty's c:JICulticns in su'!~sCquüEt instnj1CeS, and
hence ir.ifl uer.iC(~' sii;:8eQUent '-'r:'y. '-'\f+'o 1¡.--"~ ".' .. u . This tr supcrgar1c", says Ikle,
C)IIeS t:i Rn Gnd ,)nl~i u.ü,' er sxcüptiDnê;,l circu::':.stcinC8S : a, lŠ\"lVernment
Wh8se L'xistence is et sta_kc and "lNhicn expects n:) c'.:,ntinui ty vrj:'ch its
( ~ ~,\ c; q tj' ~ ,,~,J...:e) ,-,,~ .Lt: \..'.1,,
successor Il,':\Y c,)nter:i-nlt,tc t~'lC IGsintr sí tuati,)n (but n()t the -winning
~')f the s rg~:liIlC .
.....IlO........~....~...o...........,....................,...................
i. 'lhis encLrses the vi"w 'Jf Prui tt (1962, pagn 17) who sreW
intcrnnti'Jn¿l,l r(;'.L~l,ti,.~)ns ;:18 l! ~1 sj:J8cit::l case .)f 'intcI'-,':¡,ctc)r relciti:)iis'
i.e., relationsbs,tvicen sc)cip.1 ~i.~its (IC:cct:_.rsT) at any 1evc'1.
J:iJ::, r(,i"-1.ti,~'nshi:::, betvF()Cn t~"V() e"ct,,irs cr-i..n bü tr,';C',ted s n. 18Tiscr
gO.JD8 c-;llf-Jisting ,:'d' ElFlny individuJ!l subr?'r:,~nes, C.n exarriple of the
l;:Ltter being nege:,ti,'"tioYl :~)n a single issue.
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H)'7~c"'rc:r, jn tbF ".:'rcls ')f QUrU1C~.t (1961, p:-,:~;OS 71-76) :
"In ap'¡Jlic:(ti-):is,f ;:c7::,Fl8 thüory c...... m::;(:~.,ls i-)f thin
kincl aTe Qui tc f:::,r rennvsd frcirn tho realitiEs of
inte:cnr~ti::)Lc'LI relp.,ti.,Jns .. D...."...... ~ g,~rninp; rní)':-~.E:;J.S !':,nd ()th(~r
:~18 t ~:-::'-"
str~'.tc 08.
lQ rJTC thus left ~,\.i th -nnsic3..iiy tw:) uses
L:'c;:rticular hyi)()thcscs ::~b;-)ut m¡Jcl(;l~~: and
the crit!ilcgues D~ssibls Jute ~m6S Rnd
It is n:Yt¡J,')ssiblc ~ in gS:Tlcral ~ tr.-:, proc~--cd
1 t re: ,'i.Ll, ty " 11
49) h::"cS cuncu.rcd with t.i:is vie:vrpoint, stating
(1) t)(2) t t¿;,st
from me
Schc 11 in,;: (1961 ,:n(~e
th'.t the ther)retical e1 is usually not a c':)E1J;rehcnsivc s:ìecificatiun
,~;f Ii.'iw thE: partici')2.nts bch!-;.vc, but, rr'cther tile frr-L~~18w,rk '.Ti thin
'which th2~'l ~)u.suc cCTtai::. r)b~j(~:,ctivcs t,-cc:~:rdini::' tri cC'1tc,in criterir~,.
Whnt tt.C nl:;clG'1 lC'2,(js t) in tcrr~s ;'J~ i',cJ:-,~~:,yic)ur ;':f t~-lC pnrticipp.::1ts iS
usu.slly beyond tht) rcr.~ct. c:f strF!ight-Ïi'r':'.i~~rci c-:l1('"lysis. Schelling
qualifies thi.f3 o,;)nclusi,:JTI h(J-v\~evc)r, by sn.:Jring' tlv.it the: r:rêl.:1C i tse-lf may
T~ìt.: c~ frui tfiiL. \1(2;,;/ dcv'C;'lc;ping c\ v,'cirkinp: ê.:~,cqlUl.intr:Dce w:i th fl
thc::)retic,~.?,l structure.
In sU:.jr'F\r,\r, thi::n, it l.1SY 1.:(: seen that there: are indeed
mêU1J 1 cgi ti~:.lr3, t c
.icctic,ns t~) t~'ie current usa~c ~)f 2'x__ijfjrimFnital gnmes
in psychc)l()!'(icn,l inquiry, but ¿1.t the Sr.lE18 time, th(j ga~;1e-thc':ireticgl
Iil is r1n ttra,ctive riYl::i i:L)tcnti ly lJ.s8ful cnE:. flhurb is much t,.)
b2 1 (;cvrn,_ ,-, iut t;~lt~ cs -i:f inter ct:i:in in th0 f:iyi nr:; :.:f
(;xp0riracntè?1 f~n ~l~;S, (n~)t lO,rif3t in the i~,.Tin;.:.r )1' i terc~ tød 2 X 2
r:'i.;"ü S ) .
In VitJYl of tt.8 f:)J:ügcing discussion an-::l critique,
lL,.'vrevcr, TV(; Elust c:d.nir,~lude t1i;..t, ,:~t ~()resent, it SCC,:'"lS desirn,blc t:i
,ttrJoill this kni:ywle-de;e 'b,Y r; study )f such ,-:::~n,LlCS in t'~icir ;.iv/n ri2"ht
-_._-'~~-_.. ' ,
pnstp")Ding f ~)r tbc tiLl(: hE;'in:~,r tIie q ues In f h)~ re: cVant thi s
knu\vledgc 'br; t tin underst inr: t,;f mix~~'l-I.1,;)t.tVG c..,nflict~j in
rc~l life. T(1 2sk this Question in c(Jnncction with every expùrimcnt
m2Y 1 L ther t ~', Un-1TJPTr2nte:d c:jnclJ.si ."ns, (by ill ur;i cal extrn.pnlrit i)n)
()T t:.) (:;t prem:='.turc disc";urFLgcnc.nt r1~T=:. rejection nf trlG r~',"!:nc-thecretic,?i
De thc)c1:Jf E~xp;::rinr:Jnt2,ti :-)Yl. ",~rh,r1 t is ',Y:'jI'se, i c: thr:t, vi u\i.rin.:r thn
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i,~.'o"b()rFLtur~v mc,th,:;,:l in :,crris ef s=_i:iul t.lJn '.)f rç~a,l-l
cunflicts lL8.ds
t:.) r1üsi!:-tlls y,rhich e.rc n.~t ,'widc;:. thE) lcr;'ic ,.:,f ~.: s;ystcrr;Jitic
invi=:stirr:-tinn. '.riiO vr-lu.e:.)f the lr:-b':iT,:tC)r.y' eXTh rir.cnt in the cunt8xt
of the sinplc 2 X 2 f;r,.rc,; is in the oppeirtuni ty it frivcs for buildinr;
a systematic t~1cC)ry .:?1~__tl1i)J-i:3i ti~u.tiun. Vv1i,-"t rel!.;ti)n th, t theury
nri.y hB.vC t,) r(;(~l ~LifE' c'~Jni'liGts 'DIY t:imu cr'n tell. It C:':Hi not be
r:ichicvcd until the c:;nc8pts ø8ûrgin;:š f'rcf;i thE: dC8cri~.;tiv€ thc(Jry
:)f the 2 X 2 Wè;Cie: hr:,vc bcc ¡;:ie stfchilized es conoepts of proven
thf30rEjticCl.l TJ~;'N8r.
Fir:c.l,iiy, ;phile l1re,C'ilìsticf1 sir:uin_ti-~)ns 'Jf c )nflict in
the ir'b~'rat(_1ry, s~Jch as :~isar:~.~iment ge.xJ.es, !!rer~listic!l simulritions ;")f
nuclcar ("tetcrronce, nx(l ,e"f~.,JCS vvhic:h simulrJte r'-:)r"icifist ros:.stance",
,'?cre ali- valur~.'I:)lE; for ,ç:.e.'.~r~()!istrc~tlng si tUê1,tiuns this s,r.:,rt, the
1)r~:seYlt f.'uit:i':ir C:)JlC:JTS vri th tIie sentiment t.'n::\t Ei suhstantial porti~)n
c'f c.xprinentriJ.
forI'l'cts1, '",hion
E';2.:l1inr-~ effort sh)ul 1:)8 ':-tc:votL'c1 t:) tlJ.',,; si:úplest
,~~lJnt~ c~'_n ,n.ssJJJle thu sy,stbiintio build-up
'if !l thc~)ry.
..0......".......£..........."..................................,..........
1. -lh:;Lt is nut t.-) SElY, ÌFH'l8VCr, ti1et in adherinr; t,--¡ the Sil~'li)lust
fcrinn.ts, r8scClrcners sh,mld thcreby he li':J tod t:: the invosti,:rdior:
(Jf,\nly onc CJr tvvc specific i-r~¡.iies in Drdcr th;.'Lt TcSB2,Ych in the
C,Tce might be CUDul ti "'v'-e. L.Ss8sSDünt -':of con:!(irabili ty Hr:ionr;
experinont.,:i e;::;::c stuJ.ic.s li8V\J "heED niJud b;)r ;" twü..~dimon8iJna._l
ge'Jmetric cl~'1s8if"icßti()n systOL' (Rapop::Tt: rind GU,fer, 1966) for
2.11 2 X 2' tJ~E'nes !I'Nhich ic,:~k tf.:,c sr:,;:icl! UD tc¡ n linear tr(-~nsformntiun
tc, the two plcwcrs. HCTris (1969) hes ~h,'wn tInt lhprip(;rt and
Guyer' s taxon~)iny is G2.sily c'~:4r~r;ted tn th(~ classificE:.tir;n of games
,:)n th8 l)A.sis uf f1.,n,y intcrvEi1-scale pT:)pGrty of intürest"
P!lR1.l 1l'£IR.L:8
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Having ç?'xp;~m.in(~d the fi.gUl1Ents presented, it is cle(~r thEtt
the behF~viour gc.~nc;rr..td::L í-xpE:rimcntr~i ¿.~runcs, riJE'l in JJhrtìcul~~\r
l~y thE; tw~)-p(-rsr)n Yl'Jn-ZeríJ-suO tr8.: 18S, c~';nlL)t l;.c ac1cuu(~ t81y d.en.l t with.
ìvi thin. thE:; fr~1n(~'s:.)rk ,:)f nnrmrt ti VG rR.t:i ''",nnl oecí si ':ìYl theory wi th::1U t
dJ.sreg .rdini'~' 8':)i;0 ~)i the :Y':)TU intcrestinrr fi-Sroets.
One '~:f the mure inter8stini:;:~ (a.neJ. 'If'tant) features of
these r2m8 S LtuatiJllS is tne fr~ct that the individuals involvef
have SO'J,e form of C()nt2ct wi til cach c",ther, (even if only thrcur;h
kn:Wflec1,::,c ()f tho other pir~y')r' S c!iC)icos). ~.rh8re ~~rd o'oviousl;y.
Inri'-:78 inJi'iitJl.i,-:il differences in the chr,.r,'''ctcrs c~n:':~ pcrs()nali ties of
th(1 pi.':!.Yt-;r~:;, tLl1è, even tnc:u,,-;h ìNi; mr;,.f t:'~;L-eTtly, or tCJtc'~,lly., unoiN8.re
ef it, these inc1 ivL::.urLl rLi.ffere'''Lces riust t'.' 8;')m8 extent n.t least
affect the V'iS-Y ir. vrhich tii.u inJi vidücl s pl::1Y tlltj t-:c\d8..
Wc :m.::-~y, :.ii' cuurse, t(;Tl.d t() jiscuunt these differences.
liiuch :)f one f s life is spent in '-uhe,t n,fy;)en.rs to be fairly well
coordin~tcd interaction wlthithor people, and the relntive smoothness
of c,)purati :'n in da,y-to-:JJty livinr; reflects the fact that 9, porsm
is in SC)ll8 degTGC fnvarc of Yvh¡::~t e.nuthcr person dOE~;S, feels, or wants
to do. Asch (1952, page 139) has said that :
HT,) ,'ct in the SDciE:l field requj.res n, knc)wlulge "f
s(:icia: f':i.cts - C)f lJCrsons n.ne;. r;r,:ìups. Tt tp,ko our place
i¡Yi th others we nustpercoi ve er;,ch othc'r! s existence
Clnd rc!',ch r' meFtSGJ:C .)f cUi.nprohunsi(,¡n Df one siicther! s
need q, emotiuns, ani thi..,ughts .11
rThis mea.8urement,Jr 11sizinc-up", ef ()thcr pec:;ple,
im.1L)rtEuit as it is in uur existence, is lari~'roly aut..il~1F~tic _ CHie of
thE thinr~rS we d:-) 'Ni th::)ut knowing very much cbcut thu "principlt:s"
in terr("lt~ of v,'hich vr8 C1:H::rr,;,te. H.Lg2crc~lüs8 uf the dUf,r'T8G ()f skill a
pf~'rson mn,y :L,.ve in L'vc\lun ting .)thcrs, llE~ d~)tjs so L10st of th(-.: time
wi thout pp.yir:..i:' L1uch 9~ttenti;)n as t':,") h":w .~lG goes ç'~bout it.
How people perceive or know their hUJ2w,n envirom:ient
and hJW thesc processes aT!:, :related tu :tcti::n (iye li ctlc understood
in the scientific s(;nSGo In thE: nns:.i.l,ysis ~)f interpersunal behc'.l,viCìUl
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tbjs l¡.;,ek .-~,.f t::ii.)i¡tJ~:,jgr: i~~; st::~,';nrrl.:v- felt~. :Despite this) however, the
pr'~)blelY, c8ntrf-Ú t, t c whole ',f socircl psychulo(;y, h, s nut been
di,oectly cme' systcw,e.ticn,lly et tt, cked until rel'üi vely r8cent times.
l'hi18 Al1p:irt (l937) ,iw' ot',crs hr:ve bccn strc ssiu,J( its imp')rt'mce
En,~;!~iisli until thû nI)D'~;arn,nco ;)1., thr-~t by rllfJ,g-iuri and Pctrullo in
i.ur sume thirty ,ycEtrs, n-) b;),__~-k hr:rl bUen \vri tt811 ,)n the sutj0Ct in
1958. Until then nC;'irly nIl contributions cunsiste(' of occ2osionFü
journal '-rti. cle s or 'iri ef di scussi ems in texts dcvuted to') thcr
. co" _.~. 1lci..ULS.
vVh:::i"t is persun percuption rr;alJy ,--,bnut, ::.ud w1in.,t (~_.; we
118an r~,y the term? Thr.:ìugh inforl'intion (:;P.incd vin, -;)81'cc()ti..\ci, vre
V¡rk~n vrc speak r.,f i):"rS;JTI pcrcLDtiun it is t(.; our ()bsf)rvr~ti'-'n,'. eif
infer iJrc)liertics t1ncL p()tentiaJ.i ti8S thr\t D.rE:' not imJ:Cc',i,:),tely giveno
these pr:mcrtic" ici pCJ')¡ile (intentic;ns, Elttitudes, emotions, i'~GFl8,
ahili tie", tn1Í ts, ete.) th'it we mostly refer _ things th!',t are
psychol
ac:tions ,:)f J;iersons, but viie fnrmulr;,t8 thE, nctions in strictl,y
inside tho lJCTS~)n~ V~"E; maku these ubserv,'::tions Q8 ;N(j f()llCJìM the
C¿;ll terrr::s. rarely describe n, persons b()dily movoments
r-i.F;,?rs si 'ie,
A,P such; rather we dLscribe the person ~s frienily, fe~lful, hesitant,
S'J :.ìH. On 1:);"".Sí8 tlint vie kncY0J ,:;r ~Lssu;ne 2. person
is ca:::r:ble :')f 1.~,I8.tchinrt, pl'TCGiviflf:~' re:'.n8übE:;rin,~.~, nn:l v¡;a,itil1p; fc::-r
himself t'nmrds us, with intentions, attitudes, and feelinG'S.
;)pportU118 circUEista,jlCCS, wc CE;.n eX'pcri8~1ce the pcrs::)n c:is dirbètine:
...................."....."...............................0............
1. Allport (l93'7);Linr1zey (1954); c,nc: Lsch (l952), have all dovoted
chRptcrs in their texts t~ this prublcQ, nnd the 1958 cdition
')f RCi",'l.~ n('."s i'n S"'''i.'~ i PS'Jc"Q~11'J'Ì"r 1~y jiITroc"''-''l'"F 1\Tev1C'-)'!1) r.:'Y,,:i
.~ _~_,~o..L "" ,_ ..,'- ('.... ." 'L -' '..' \. l'~t_ U '_'_ '-'", .J..y, -4 . \. La 
I.. , fL~_,".Ht:.rt18;y al,scJ c-:ntc-'.ins a soction en person perception. I'\,1cre
recentl;y, new texts c-implstely c'evot8d to s,c)cial perceptiun
heive 8,ipear8d in print - for examplc, th,?t by Trich and Smith
(l968) .
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'lh~ÐO c\~'¡iditi;:)ris of pbTæption feTm thE: öasis f~)r the
inter:.cti)n betweeri ()n2 pcrs('TI Rnd an()-bhGr, and in this c~se bc)th
of the envir'-.illLK:nt" Er~ch (jbSerV8S th:::Lt ttE) other directs himself'
the perceiveI' or/ teie perc(;ìvuJ h;cve phenuL18nDlcc;ic,ü represent"tion
ti)-" n.rds hi;-:1 ; cc:,ch ceT: m:~: :(l; kn )\ivl1 to "LDS r_:t:hGr that he is sensitive
tu thE: 'Jthsrt s clir~,cti~Hl t :'ì:1arcts hi~Jself. Th,;;sc~Jpcl';:i,t:l0ns provide
the b?,sis for vihs,t h',s been ccúluJ the "mutually shn.rcd" field lJf
intere,cti)ll betwcer; pe; ple - Cl ;;rerequisitcc of all really S,)CÙÜ
processes. ThuE-:, by his ,~)wn presence- a.nd beha.viour in the situClti'ln
the percbi vu' ma,y
1UCrSGD.
tor the perceptual chnr~:,ctcristics )f the other
It is clear fr:q ell this thn.t in 5erüin;' with the
prnblçDl ,;,f pl.;l's'n perccpti:JYl (and hene-::, indírt;ctly, with riYl..lT inter-
,:=.ctic1n process) thE. ccctuF',l D¡:;r8':~)n(11iti",s 'yf t;'j(-; ìnd:,v'uL!J_p..lsmust be
tF!k:en into aCGciunt, s-inc pcrs'IYleli t,Y :nust (:' viJusly r:.,ffcct not 
only
hoyi¡' ont;~' perS\)~1 pcrcui ves 2.Yl:Jthcr, bat r:l su h')ViJ he hiMself is
i)crcci v~~¡J. by the ctlh:'r P¿;TS on (()T pt~r SJ!:s).
S(JCifi,l psych~)i -)gy, a cc)nsid8rc~,bli; ,J.11 .)unt ,'"f rusüarch r.ir's bi.0n undcr-
It is not surprizin,¡ therefore tiicit Vii thin the fr'imework of cxpurimental
taksn in tnJs-:~ 2I't;~)"¡S VT~L2ro intero'ct:ion c '!,h.:S t) the fGr8 _ viz: risk-
tEd.(in~?;, clECisi';u-Lia),cìng, and 8:;10,11 gr')up behE\viou.r. Gentile and
Schipper (1966) luoking 2,t thc- beh;,viour of college studonts
preselecte5 cm the pers:!Uali ty variElbles nb,;!' ;"chiev(;~t 20nd
'"C'Y'i f,,,,,t cnxi' "tlT f 'uncj +¡" + n'i' tl'('l' "",~n"",c' ~ ty vc~" c'bl~, nf¡""'''d a
~.;r'~::~_~~ '.,' _d'__ \,.i v ,t .i~. !/G--wc.'_JC_.i--. '~--..(~. v ,::.. L'H":-,
C;llsistent rolntii¡nsJ.iip tC) pr()babili ty 1 Gc,;rning, dcc~tsi.-,n-m.2.ki:J.g,
;)1' risk-triking behpviuur. 'lJwnscnd e,nd 8lCtith (1964), hCJWcver,
cuncerncc1 wi th the "()recìicti:.:n ~)f dccisinn-:ngkin;r i:.iE-;haviour, RdministcTed
8. b20ttery of pcrson8,lìty tbStS (inoluding tJw C81if"rni? Psychological
Inventury) t'i P, group of 66 SU'ijbCtS and f.mnd thp,t in predicting
'gci'Jdness ,;;f ,'~: 2'ci sinn' in r~ì, i.;..cni;r~:il si tuetir)n, Intelligence, lack
. . . . . . . . .. .. . . ~ . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . $ . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .
i. r:Phi S P,Sl)c:ct uf the pr,'_-)blE?Ll CELl (-)f c, 'urse be ox'")crincn tr'tii~)T
ìsc1 at ¿-";,_:: lìy Di':\(li11/-~ti,~, ~"'::'rce--ver 1:Hìhi"l~.: .:i cnG-\vay vision screen,
th'"'UE;hcc'l',;guiri ~2T:(ì P~tr~ilJ Ci95Ð) -hn~~ pjinted nut th(,t s11ch an
expediont r1ç',y creats nOTE di.fficul ties thrü1 it st)lvL'8.
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t:ii:t ti- t results ~f
u.nd l)(;rs~)ni:il~.ty fr",ct:-rEì ~'.1IJrjt 81ci~riX iYlv".Ived~ Despíts' the fElct
;r)f D'ìl1jn:-lncc~ (.\lL~ C:JTH:,uJc-nt.i(.\u..'?-rJSr~', !-::.".")DCF,...:cs'c1 t') be tL,'~)S8 c")énJ.itiv0
ir study cT8 i'ill~:J1. wi th sip;nificrxit
corrcl t:ijrH3~ t
'J 'i~(51u(,~'2cl t!'int :
n:--,llC ~iust ni..)t nc:gluct the feet thc"t c:)rrGlati~_lns cc-i:n
T.ìC 8i(;Ylilicr~.ntly ,jif.,c'CTent fr'"0- zer(::, ¡Jut CJf li tt18
prc:.ctic::",L ne in di(:.~tc n~E',~!icti 'lD.. It is the
:'¡piniJn Cif tho ~;.uth,.Jrs t~1;-,t in vv't=.:ll"-c'¡Yltr led, stU(~:ics
usin..~. nc:rna.l, t~ -r\vcragc-intelligcnc8 su.h,jc~cts,
(v,~h(), by tl'lG , seem t ':~,h(. th¡:~~ LF)st iDIJ:)rtan t dec i si,;iD
naK8TS in lUT S()Ci2ty) hi~~ c:)~rciRtirins C insistently
.~t;,tFtin,~,:d ~Jctwcc:'n D:.:rs i ty v~n"'.i(; cs c:,l1(t d,ccisi.:)n
nnking are mc~st ini~)rDbELbie i t n.!'pC'~'ors thn t
n:¡T' D:,; c in n:)r::a.l si t!.l,ti)!.1S t r'.ct in a
r::?ti ;'lr 1,.; c:il, r:.nd ;',;-"nJ"1-orieut01.q, wey, p'nd thus
cleCLSi.GJ'es vihich ar,. littJ.e influenced by perS')nali.ty."
tlic~ ¡.E.:ctS -'if peTS :,n~~.li ty "l'i. r:~sk-.tc~,kinrr, b(~'h!\v'i':')ur, fnun.:i thnt
On the uther hand, Gr\:'~!'.:r,jn ¿.n:i l"il,y,;rs (1966) investig'e.ting'
subje,cts .:1.i in Exhit'iti'~::n, ,C:3F:çr~?-:2,§i:Jil, "¡T' _L..:r'Ji~1D:.ncc, \A,S
Cli:0aSUl\..d. the; ~.'ri.;::r(_ls _eL~rs :Prt:.fv.cC'DCG Sche:,:: ule) t t :i
pruf\;rLcts :'i.i th hi"i;:i .pay ifE !;.nd 1 
',",,:'i i;r,;;jFthilit;y or v¡innin;:T, vv;iile
subjects ~'LiL~h in ;luto~,~::.Y
or cn,lur2~~'1Cc
_._- -~'-'~'._"" tun~'IEd prefer bets wi tii
l¡'lV! p2y.~~'f '::nd hL::,~'h ';Jr' l'.ili ,:f winninr:7. Bl:)ck ;:~.-n.:1 PetGrsen (1955)
inVC8 tt(ç:?ct thi~ (~'8n\-~'r£:Ll h~yp;,thtcGis th,~,t p(.:rsoiiali ty VF.u'i
as werc:
rcl(;v2~nt fer ~!Ll un~.I, st,':.iidinrr li'.,cisi'jl1 cJufidenc.c e"nil 'lucisir.'in
tim(~, ;:ind fJ1J.nd niuClur ~;\.f ü,:.rs',.ni11i ty c,;rrcln.tcs .)f ,~1L;cLsion in 8
psych '~hysical situation* \'I~eri'" pr (1',0,-- r-'\ f (."')'1,-1 nooi +i' VG: n t)r..e 1 ': 'c' .; "DS
' .I..' /)./! ..,IA..'... .i-.0_'- v..-i '.." .'._
E;t. al
between l~n:ic1ershi.p, cTlvir:1Yl:"i8Ylt, :'L1Cl ;L:'cj, si;)n-L1P.kLnr~, ~'~Thile Gil:by
(1')67) discov('rc',~l, rt..12ctions..:.ii)S 1.~'Lt1¡VOE.~n d,¡mine"nc(:;-ncecls
f:V!.;:C. ..Ll. '".;
dC'cision-T"s.kin:~7 abili tYa ~..,:::,ny r\ttCEl;lts Lt~-;ve S~ b b~ ilpde t,) rEl12te
mü,r~,sures 'f pÜrS()Yl;:'J 1. ty c: .')T(ì,ctcristics :)f in:ìi viducls t their
be ..,'=i..ic;rLr in intcrf:~,ctinf? .sn~;,ll ijr1JUpS, (c"P;. Pepinsky ,SJt ri.l, 1950;
Oss()ric, "cr.d ary, 1950; H"yth,rn ct...l, 1956; l!::.rl,yl:cc, 1959;
lInf" " lor.9' '1"" k, ~,. 19"'~) 1 ( ~6'),;l.' ..lmari, ./J, u..C t''cn, . 0,, " ./i8 T::ot:srt 190 hr:.s p')intcd c:,ut,
...............~....~..G.............,.......".........................0..
1 0 F,;r ri,n. ()VerbJ_J. Vi2W .:!f such. (;n.rtv. w,~rk, scc lvê'.nn (1959).
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h:)wever, Di~rni.:f icn.nt 1 t' .G'.-:irre_ ;":. ;1.'~)l1D !lc-""V8 n:)t l-;,een hig'h, auel while
somo ef thi:'; directi,Jnnl trends he"vE; bE:~c:i c '~nsistent, '~:;erscrnaii ty
variables hêlVC' YlJ;t 8b'FLlcè t::_. ~1CC Hint f'.~:r n large n.J~l:)imt of thE:~
variance rC21,_)~tin':r:~K!rsona,li ty to inteX'cl,cti,:n in s;rc1ups. I..i th'Jugh
To()bert i S (JVvn 7tt:rk reve~:18d thELt 8~~~F~ti;~)nally stable, rf":ali ty-c0ntred
indiviclu2,ls (as ;¡i(~e,.su.cc'; by the Guilfl:)rd.jZimIDcr:c,an l'Ernpera;nent Survey)
nre less likcl;:r to enter intD cnntenê.ia; rslr:ti'J'iships in the small
;:.rr;')up, I/iihile 8IJJ)ti':)nally unstable inclividuc:.ls who tost reality poorly
ar8 mu re likely tr: enter int" such relationshi;)s, ho cuncluded thnt,
in p;ene-ra.l, pc:rsunnli t¿r r18R.sures E;T8 YlJt stE~ble predictors ~)f
b:::crv.;vìour in smE-ill :',;rcjups.
Nevertheless, tlie w"rk of Lieberuan (l960), IV;arL!we (J.963),
Drymal (1966) ~ and uthurn, looki:~v.r (l t l~H)rlavi()ur in ¿!aniC si tUc",tir:ns,
has sU./;t:çestecl th~~~,t f:,'_cturs ')ther th;::"n those or'~.in8.riiy c()nsicler8d
relevrint 1)y e;Ew:ie theorists exert an influence on decision-making
in noO ga28 s:L tU;~lti,,-ln. The aivil:ysis )f 1.1arg~-iinini; b8hPvvioUT -INi thin
thG cnritcxt of tVir()-p~;rson games h:s been the subject ()f considerable
research in recent YE)8,rS; and in C~)ntrFLst \yi th the early c:-¡nccrn wi th
ocmi,):ric and liilthematical c:nsider:itions (JlJcKinsey, 1952; Luce and
Haiffa, 1957) the more recent investig-ntions rwve emphasized the
interperscnaJ. asnccts c;,f the r;-Li.UC si tunticn. ¡:iihl~8e studiE:S, vibwing
ba:cgo.inin;::: .";,8 :: s-(~,ecial inst~incu .if social intGrA.cti c)n amenable tu
8.naiy~~is '\ri thin the fra::IJ(:wc-:rk ~'Jf exi)crimcntal s'::cie~l p8YChCiC)(~y, have
investie:rritcd thE) oc)ssiblc üffects cd' several non-n.:l,theL'e~tical,
non-ccunonic (in the game túc':)ry sense) fact~ rs. For example, Siegel
(1957), Crcwne (1966), fin:1 KahD,n (196C3), l'YikirLr Dt "level of
aspiration!! in rcl,:iti.~)n tc1 ~~"l.n exp()rimf~ntal bCiT'g2.inin,~; si trlEtiun f:HU1d
d.efinite rclati, nDhiris between the ÌE)ve1 of aspirrition ef the
subject and his 1. '.~l '." . 'Î . t"'n., ~ '" ;,. lr'~i.' ."). --1 rl.' ,( D '~)en(Lvi\.,ur in J1G gr.iL1U, ~\.cL ian c,-_n\.~ u,,,,ing pcJ:;c. 159) thst:
"tne level ,,)f
norm,Üly vary
i.e B, cri ti 0("01
l:'iehe.ve in th0;
aspira ti nu:)f a sub je et t \vhi ch
cc..nsidcrabl:r frC)~n individual t






KrRUS.9 (1963, 1966) Hnê, Hnrsmi,yi (1966) c oncern8d th¿msûl ves
wi th mutiva ti "nnl !nd ,"t tti tudinrl f' etors. Krau8s (l963) hypothesized
th.~it ~~v;')_ere the SUbj;0'Ct r S m'Jtivntiìnr'Ll t¡.:n6 p.tti tudinp,l orientntions
vrere in c nflict, (thc.t is, C~)l:.J.-,-:eti ti VE:-p()si ti ve or cCJ(rpurri.ti ve-
neg~,ti ve) , stren,:th '()f invc,l vciiont w"uld cl etermine the extent
t which thc fitti tudiwü urLlmt'ti'm w'iULi e,ff8ct interaction. His
resiilts pr,'Vitlc evidcnce for the in::enemlent effects of both the
m0tivF!tion~1 and pt titudin~Ll factors, a lr)ng with the nredict8d
in"crccti m. In the further study Kr'êuss (1966) pustulgterJ that
c:Jnflict,n.n C Jnfir:~J;:4 his £-!,:~T="il.,r findin th'!.t C Eflìct LifltvH::en
inter!iürS ne.l c(inflict creates a ')()tenti21 situ~tion ~f intrapers~nai
beh;ivii,ur ;!tti tnc~~e les,:is ci t;'icr tCJ n.tti tuc~c c
')r tJ ')
reorientri.ticn )f beh8.viuur S() ;~s tr) restore ()alancG, while Ho=TsDnyi
(1966) c -'ncludcc1 thr:t r:::Junrr t:'lii the non-economic Ilc)tivati\Jll2.1 v::trial)les,
striving sftcr soci 8t~ltUS mi V!'ll 1,e trh) most important. i'hioaut
c~nd F(-~uch8UX (1965) EJXC:1.min8cl tliE effects of stress on the mrtintrtinance
"If c, uiixcd-mLitivc Oycitlic re1c,ti',nshi ,), while thc effects of unilatcral
and bilEttEre,l threat upon the E1.bili ty ,-)f 't)erscns tu reach ,q¿:.;recment
in a simulati in ga~ic hi',vU Od;D investic;cited by Deutsch ;mc1 Krauss
(1960, 1962), Bor'i'i (1961, 1963), !Cnd Shci!lur, Davis, and Kclloy (1966),
all using E; r~~,"~F:C dÐvc-lc3Jc-:t by :Jeutsch; ;:).~;1d HIs:-) ITV n,qny (:thLrs such
A.8 Ivis0ker, Shure, ~..;nd ,Mi)cre (1964), Kciicy
(l966). Thc EXTJETi:ncnt c mducted by Deutsch and Kr8uss (1960) W,'lS
(l96¡;), -' , and Hurnstein
in a t"lv:;-pcrsnn c:xpcri::Jcn tal il(Clrgain:tng g(J.28, y¡h~-;rt thrc;(lt v/as defined
cnC8J'ncc1 '/ii th the offset )f th,c availrioility nf threat ':n bargaining
as the exprcssi()n ,~)f rui intcnti~'Jn t~-i ,1. s",nüthinòt (LE;trilL1Cnt::;,l t,:') the
interests :';f rLnr)th~r. 'l'hrcc eX(Jsri¡:ientr-il c .ndi tiuns \vere employed
No 'J.hreat (~ ei' '"11"r --,\-- ~.', ,'r ""'l 1 ''~,l.l. V v lJ.1 '-''c)' " ,-,,I '- '.'; thrcfl tün the :)thGr); Unilêi teral
.thrcat (~)niy ,-' ne uf the pl::iyers hc:d rI E18E,-ris "jî thrct"t t 3.vailnble); and
13i12terEl r:2hrerLt (bcth pla,)Tcrs cC)ul:~ thr8c1ten thi~ GtLlor). The
rosul ts inc1i Ci' ted th, t the c1 iffi cul ty in rcachin'i Pen ap;reomen t and
the ;c,L'JUnt;)f (imaginp~ry) Ej,mcy l'Jst, individuf',llY as well as
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Dall,,,t.;vc,ly, V/è,S .,'rs:.test in the Bile.tGrtcl 'lhrGat cmditian an()
le8~st ir: thü N,) 'lllircat o',indi ti'-)H, (the only C 'TIc:.i tion "'vilere pln.yers
¡:-uide ,~-),n ~)vcrp..ll pr,:'fi t) . In the uniln tcrr~l t:~ir(;.:r'.t c(':ndi tion, th8
fcycr with the thre'it CF'.')E'bili ty did ttCT th:Ul the Dlayer w.L th'JUt
it. C'-Jf1Ti riD;" th~-: Eil t,,:;ral ,Cty:uJ Uniluterel llnr0ri.t conditions
VGr, 1)cutBch ~:2T:i KrD,uss fuund tHe r~~sul ts i:iJ.icEit(;c1 th:"t when
f,~'-cing player ~vhc) hrid thrct'tt c;:palJili ty cne Vl.'_ì.S botter off not
havin.; than llivin" tho cèi,pací ty t') retaliri to in kinc':. 'lhi s finding
fits in with the results cf 1í85'kor et ctl (i964) wh,' f',)uncl that
1tbel,:è;riiners \lih', rC(ìist t.'.1C use of thr,_,rLts sh")vi the most f(~.vourahi8
j cint outc~l~~cS .11
Borah's study (l963) first rç'p1icatüd tho Deutsch 20nd Krauss
eXgeri=nünt eXl.d iniicn.tt...c1 th~¡t the t:,:Lrlicr r€'sults 'were probably due
tu the SD'J.rious effect :~)f thE IGngth (Jf ~'i l'inp;er p:;:it.hVl2,; 8,n:;J thr;)
"l~Lck of cur'1¡j2:.rc".bili ty oatv\i8UYl c,\n;_~,itì,Jns~.. In a soc. experimcnt
Bure,:'i f 'und thr't the in't-r ',ducti :11 ,'f an t.~18ctri.c sh'::'ck _ v\rhüther
interpr€te~ 28 a Qea~s of c'Jercing the r1ther tC) yiei~, internrcteri
!:"J8 ~~. means r.-;f threritcnin9: futurE) un easa,ntncs¡~, :.Jr f;'iven no
interprct~tion, - did not si~G,'Tificanti;y cIIL~n(-:;c thtj '.)iitc dues for
the ¡-~2crgainers.
MCGker, Shur2, f'nd ¡¡'"re (1')611-) utilized f' cum')uter for
rcal-tiBc exporim.ental c.JlitrDl and t.tSSuss~unt :Jf subj,,~cts at cri tic;711
T-icints ,:luring' bci.rgaininc' s~l_tU('LtiíJl1s, in rui invest.Lgriti,:)n d8sigricd to
stu.dy be..gC'.inin¿~ and neg ti;...tiDn t(:haviour, espociril1y thE. dyn(~r:ic
. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . '.J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cl . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . ..
1. In additLin t; BurFJi's c:riticisn, the Deutsch-Krauss experiments
h2oYE, teem cha1lengGd by sevürrü authirs, (0.,,;. Borrih 1963;
Kel1ey, 1965; GiÜlu rend McC1int.,lck, 1965), who hi'vc \Jointed nut
various è'ifficul t:Lus surr'iundi.ny the D8utsch-Krnuss results with
res'oect t() thre&t.
In c'cvising a new test of the threat-dfficicmcy relr"ticnships,
FrlIrnn and Cohen (l969) atteri,t¿d t) (',vnid, r,s for rlS possible, the
pi tfn1l s Join tod nut hy these 2outh)rs. HT/icver their hc¡rg¡üning
(;"me (similar tci the type used by Sie¡;el rlnd Fouraker, 1960) still
pr. iduccd data which str'mp;ly supported the. proposi ti,)l of D¡,utsch




~r~tt;;r£1.ctiol;. :'T'c),.ç,':O thrit t("V:8S -nJ ,;_(;.~~ Jr r:ii.Y(JI-i.:'1ctivc (n'.ni-zero-sum)
c:Enputer-basc,j ex GriE1G:rtE~l ve11iclc vrhich '/Vculd provide unique
opp()rttL'1i ti.cs tc: s-tudy 1;8.rg'e.ining anJ TIC-g(ìt.t::i,tion bchaviuur and to
relate it t s 'cial-psychulog'ical fu,ct~)rs, (reI' example, threat,
pr:\icct g:nil was to dcyelDp n g~enerEli
trust, c:;")JJcrriti ,ìn 't stn tUB, J.Jower), psrs,'..',nali ty variables, pnd
ga:.18 strategic charrtcteristics and tactical Lì:)ves. Apart frc)lil the
renul t alrL::1dy Eiention8cl, lIc.c:kcr et c.l f-;)und th':.t a significantly
l.:¡i;,rer mean j:')int 'pe.yoff \;.;:18 e(~rned 'by thOSE-:' pairs vih:.: used the
c,voidcd the U,SE.: of thrG-Gt; e.nj th'-'.t this 2.l)pearec to be prima.rily
threat biüc teru,lly than by those pairs where 'me or both subjects
rfJlatQd t() the; p,::.irin;!, c;f SU'~¡jLcts with prega;;e CooIXH'ati ve
di sposi tions"
"Hcither tDrm spiralling hostilitj,es, Pe pusture of firr.mess
and determina,ticl1 eXDreS8Gd in ;~, c~';ns:i_stent and rapid
rcs'u()ns() t.-; throat vri th cCJunter-thrent me.,y c:,--ntain P.
bE:lligereYltpla,ycr. Lack of res'ilutí:)n, P's exp:ressod in
c1e:lay Clnd c.:scillaticJns in cmplo;yr;unt of c'junter-'throat tu
an Flgr;ressur, ,,:iay significantly increase the likelihood of
escalation of cunflict." (p2oi;e 123).
Gallo (1966) has investigated the offects of increased
h,'),s cn.itlincd s:m18 nf the im-;:)rtant thscJretical issues involved.
incentives uJ:)(:,ln the use ef threat in bargaining v.rhi18 Shubik (1963)
cxa.Cined bargaining bü~-laviCìur in rL tvro-lJ8rs:)TI è)~Ri"re undi::r varying
Scodel, 1'!Ine"s, Hatoosh, fend Lipetz (1959) and l.inas et al (l96o)
cumr::unicHtion c1ndi tj.cJns, pciyoff values, è?nd ():ppol1ent strategies,
while work of Cl similri.T nnture h",s been carried 'Jut by Daniels (1967).
Deutsch (1958, 1960) and lo(Jmis (1959) l'elded harg'aininrr behnviour
t'J the variables (,f trust and suspici:m; while Soloff')l (l960) and
KC)Eori ta, Sheposh, rtnd :Brauer (1968) hcwe investigatc:d the influence
of P;)\iifE:r relati,')nships and the USE; :'f IJOwe:r on bargaining stra.tegie s..
Generally the focus in tho majority eif these studies has
been on the degree t.c' 'which fL IJurson vrill cC)OperE~t8 with or exploit
an Jpponent il'1èJ;I' varying stimulus c mcli tions, 20UQ in g'em;nü these
inv8stig2.tions seem to indicate th~t unless ci)operative strategies
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a.rE:~~ f_'s-rt:n"2,:t 0hr'~: S ¡is C;~L ~;_i (/X' )C:rj :E8 h t ;.1.1 .~n 8 't~ri.lGt i ;~inS~,r _'_n ter.. sub j e et
c:Jmmunicr~!.tì:)ri-, subjects vrill ch':'Js¡~ t:.) C,,':ìLt¡;vtc- vd. th unt~ c~~n n.:hcr and
\\'ill pl,':lY in s:ich h_ "'1'.~_y ELS t,.) DnxiLi.ize t.he d.iffcYCflCe betwGen their
;')ípn t~'1eir n8.rtncr i S P8,,~.,T':.:'ffs.
1":.11i ;,v,iinr~ the: rCCt~n.t trG~1::i t')l,'Tr~rd vic-winr; GC,~JYl,Jriic
barr-;p.ininF": fJ.S F" i')rm )f sccinl j~n'0(;racticn, it hc""S been .Jnly Yl2.tural
t s8sk personality ,:Ltt:i tuèlinc:cl c"rrelc1.t8s of :J(.'_rgr~,ining
bcncf",¡i:)ur, and such Vi,' 'rk 11;; s b ,~en e.ttemptc:d by a nULlì\~;r )f investi;.~-:ti.t()rs..
Usin,t7 ;.' tvii')-pers'.';n (:'PXi1C of -che Prisuner's Dilewi'7::j, type, DGutsch (1960)
re;:YJrtü::~ that Ruth'-)r:i. tar inns (ris rr,G2,Sn.rLc1 by th(~, P-scnle) tended to -;:)8
1888 trustin(~ :',;f the -)th(;-r play(;r and tc' ne.kc L1.)1"8 unc':~',JperC1tiv(::
Ch;)j.C8S. j'.rlaTICJVIC (1963) f'qind th":.t pc.Lssive-ctupendei:t pEJrSCìYlS vrere
disposed t.-_~ respond t') unc(;nc1i tionr311y couperativE hchaviciur wi th
c o'p¿rnticn ~n tlieir ()wn t. Lutzker (l960) rcportod thnt
intcr:rati -:l'e.lly f)riented sabjc:cts c,s ccmpar\::d wi th is(.~lQti()n.Lsts
v/er':: f:',)...'U ci)C)perEttive in i= tv"~::-pers~-)n~-'d::irn(;, i-:nd this fincLing hi=JS been
(; nfirmecl 'oy McClintuck, Harrisun, Str8,nd anû Galla (1963). Oskamp
i':LYlCl PerlLl2.n (1965) fuund n c~n8istent relati::niship bctvieen
CD(jperatic;n ênid friùndship, El,nd a sim:ilr,I' findin;-:: vyp~S I'oport8d by
I/Ie.rl")lNC ;:uid S!,rickir~nd (i96¡~) in rtn unpublished paper.. In a fuc.,ther
stuly OskmlJ) :,n:1 J'erlnan (1966, page 226) fuund the level of
c'~".':)pi...r(:1_tion in f' mixc(l motive gl?JYlC trJ be e. currplex phencE:Jen()n which
WE.tS sf~nsitivc tc~ ri numhc-r eif situRti()n~1J. influences. ITheir results
sh~)¥rE:;d that ull..lc.r SC)D8 circumstances friendship Gay load. tc! hi,q~h
er; ;)ürntion c;,n( di81ikinr~ to l~)w c,':~per2.t:i.::in, but tmd.(::r other
circumstpEc08 very cl 8e friendship rnay alluv,r e. str)nr~ly c:'Tipeti tive
ri v~,l:iy to dcv,"l
Marl~)vie, GE::rn;en, anrl D()c~) (1966), s2skinr:- to crjntinue and
brr:'£1,j,::n th¿ l:l.J)hc,sis in the s cial 8,S'.;8CtS :.-)f the bE'"rgair..ing
Si.0U2,'cicn b,Y CJ1.cun-tr::' tinr~ .;:n tìV~') vf)..ria1:)lês DRsiC to m :st 8(~,cif?i
rsln.ti :!nshi ps (oppnnE:nt f s pcrs~.)L.êl,ll. ty, and eX')f?cta tic)n -)f futu..re
... .J. '." t .... \
..nG,_rac i,,,.,,/, fcnmd th::,t 'JirLt.;n no pcrsnnn.l inf,.:-rTflci.ticTI ri:,:;ardin,:;; the
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other playür was availablc, Fmc1 this)thcr plei;)ed a prf;chriina_tely
co::perative game, t'H,ru VifLS e grünter tendency tn exploit this other
when not expecting' a lcèter confrcntatLm. H:iwGvür, w:,;,en personal
inf, 'rrie,ticm 'lns available regf;rdinF; thi) ()thcr, the rolü nf the
confrc,ntation vari'ible (expectation of future internctim) WflS
reversed
"Specifically, when the other perscm is perceived to be
egotistical and self-centred, he is riore likoly to be- -
exploi ted when future interaction is anticipa toc1 than
whim it is net." (JVarlciwe et aI, 1963, 'If'.ge 2Il).
Ariith(;r pcrscmality variable tli"t nay be rolot2d to
gamc-playiu;r lwhaviour is the measUJ'€ of "flexible otiicali ty"
c';cvclop6d by Bixenstine, Potash, and '.hlscm (1%3). This scale
mep.sures the extent to which an ethiCill hercJ is approved on reasonably
workable grnunds (N) or on the basis of rigid p~ncl unreasoning
obedience to ethical V20luGS (F). fhe actual measure iB N minus F.
Bixenstine et al (l963) fc)und that subjects high in (N - F) made
signifi can tly more cOlipercüi vc choices than thclfe, who scored medi ui
or low in this measu- e. In'" fellow-up stud~r (Bixenstine and Wilson,
1963) the relationship cf this vari20ble tJ behaviour reached Jnly
th8 0.10 level 'if significEmce, while a still later study by Bixenstine,
Chambers, and'Nilson (l964) failed to dUllJnS '.,ra te any relationship
between this variable and behaviour. It is t.-, y,~ nDted however
that the latter tW) studies were quite c'implex 20nd that the second
used an assymetric game.
In El previous study (Mack, 1967) I have already shcvm that
pcrsnali ty fact"irs operate in the extreme Prisoner i s Dilemma. The
reinterated prisoner's dilemma game wn.s played (in true form) for
300 trials by th:ree greups of subjects, each containing l2 single-
sexed pairs i a group 'if high-d'Jininance pairs, another of low-dominance
pairs, and the third of mixed pairs. It vias found that high dominance
pairs, but not low-dominance pairs, locked-in sooner than mixed pairs;
and that they had a larger proportion of coripotitive responses and
of locks-in on the competitive choice than either mixed-dominance or
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low-dorcinfLnce pp,irs. Si:ri;p,t (i9bfJ) hC's nlsJ investigatwl the
effect (if dmninancG-submissiveness (as measured hy the lVI.M.P.I.
DCllinance Scal c,) 'm C'JUlpC ti ti on in a LJixo(,-r:i'ti ve gaDlé). He concluà cè
that the jy:rsonality chare'cteristics uf the SUbj8ct and thosC' of
hiB partn:r r:in:y in1;~~r2_ct tr) influence the: subject's game: stratety.
On th'd results ,.r ~Yl i'~rl'¡ ~I' S~'i'~UY '1" 3-,DG'rSnn '~'0rnc~q(... ..~'_. ---y ,~ Á ., t '.' ~._),..,_.. '_,
Rat)op ¡rt, Ch::ll:1i~1rLh, .DWJT8T, t:.ind Gyr (19f~2) COll:;i,::n tc:c1 th.'1.t
If/I'hu mUT8 SUbji;cts ~)nc runs v'ii ill the Pris(:,ncr f s Dilemt:p.
tYJ)8 g~'imc, th,;) mO~.e(j 'Juc bec!.)mcs Bl,rare th:~.t pers'Jnnli ty
factcHs hr've much t' J with t:18 subject i s behiwiour ...
......... In c;:'eneral we aT;: led t ~ suspect the,t individuf:,ls
lH'Lvc cooperative 'Jr n:in-c()operative p,:ttE,rns ,,:of behaviour
th¿'Lt mit3ht be rel,:-.ti::d t'J mea,sur:.Lble pcrscnali ty patterns. li
'lhis suspicion is the subject LJ20tter ,:: th,e i.nv0.sti;.rpti"n
reported in tnc foilowing chapters.
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-iiCcou.rTr UP 'llHE ILT\r;.;S~rIGllTION UNl-;R'lAK:t;H
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'~T' l'xnn""T"" "Cl." l' "~ 'l-\lI~I~" "",IT'...:.i.ú .J 1. .Li: l:/ll:¡~\ l.itJ.J _._ )~~:~,~~ t..l'~.
,i "T
Dc Si)j. t~: f~cL thst fi~din¿s relating nors ty t,)
bc'hp.vi-:UT in çXT.: ::LJ ti:u'g'-!.ining si tUtt:i,:.-)l1S r=trQ r(~lati vcly fC:iN in
nunlJt:;r, there ',' o"n'.Lns 8ubsta~tin,1 b~dy of c~nsistGnt evidence
indj. c(:,ting t rc:i.~:i.tle diffcI'~;nces in he1i2.viyur in ,c;uch situn:cions
o.rc ,?yEß()C~~,~"t'.;d v.:ì th t.i:-1C' -¡:;Ul"f:oilFLli tius \f thE plS.YCl'S invulv8d ~
p::_~cscnt invcstig::.ttion T,'V2.3 initiat(::d t; ," invf;;stig,~~te
this fincii2.lg ':i_1 P,S l\rn;:~.d f": fr,:/¡;t as p'Jssi'blc, r'Lttem:)ting' to rclrLtc-
'Di;_~rs'.\:n.2cli ty f¡'.ct "'rs tc.) b,~.l_=-""gA.ining bcheviou:c in a siElDlc cxperimentril
t!::-.:.~"ie ;:3l tuP"ti '~~l 0
i':ih.¡:~ rjl'-,T('_Pc.rc"'ò¥'. 1-~r,yi'1'rijn~ Y1:7 """j':'ll~
..:~:...~~~.:.:~_:-)~~-~- ,'~:;.:-_:.;..~~~.'.,". ~~.~.;:;:.~~~
1l1U v~i,lidít:I" ef grLIJiniS 83 n, rc'sceTcri t :chniqi;E;" in
psych()logy hp;fj ~ (J,3 e...,rcn.dy st,?,et;(:'d, :::ft¿'H 'bG¿:;n att::Lcked in th0 pa~~t,
n;)t 'r:l b;;r psych',)1ogistE, out r\ls' econui:Jistso lUnl. ng the r;i()st
'ersi~:t~;llt n.r "G.L,,;ir c.riticisr'lS ,.p
'-..1 theory's upplicRtion is tLnt
the gn.Eic tr~~ little ur ll') bcaririg c'll ree"li ty, t:~nd~ a.s E1Ti entirs1y
artificir:'-l f~it1)-f"~i ",'"(, C:_;.Ì \iily pr,-iducc mi.SlC"ldiri~)' rc~)ul t.s. Their
ar gU.:nen t i 8 ~:;.s l)J:" 1 b~~scd :)D thr8S sain fnctors : firstly th2t the
~~,phcrc ;:'1:t;tG:~:ipte-d b;y 'L;hc cxl)€ri-:cntal s~Ltu;"ti::n rc.quires c'"
gT'8tlt dcnl rJ':)TC' 1.oo.gin!\ti.:¡l1 than the suJ)j(::ct CEn provide - th~;"t iS,
thr t th8 ,subject ifJ r:-:'cJL;rç:1Jl:r url2t::;lc t,:) pl.n,y ad8q'catel;y the r,:)Ic t,bc
ex ¡eric(~nter r(j(luirC8 of hin~ sec()ndly, th~it the exnerimontal
si tu~itt,'jn lE:ì unrcr:J. in tÌ1C sense t~:l:::'.t it gene.rally rC~~Gains C()nstF3~nt
fer the durrtti.':Jn ')f thf.' ,.~S::~DC ~ i,,,rilOTCJL8 ir. Tt:::al life, the si tU2.ti'~)n
is c-:)nstE~.ntly cL:i.:iging - less deF;,and f':ir g :.:ìds, inGrcrissd rF~tes of
interest f'::ir l()t:J'~~j, !~:,nCL:. ')n; thirdly, th::'.t the ~~~~r:i::)unt of inf:Jrm~:3,ticn
:~:.vr!'iir:"bie reg::'.rùin(s' the ,')thcr plc:\;rcI' is als,'.:' unreal. (In í2xpc:;rimcnttLl
griniing the sub~icct n:-Ls n 'L1all;y cith'.T cur:liJlctc kn'1.;vledg8 (if thE;
()th"r's pay ,ff¡;,:r:n inf"T'y,ticm ('ct reIl. Critics conterj'\ tha,t
bcth these sitrl.atiuLs arc unrc:t:i.l) c Given those c;::JTIstraints nn -che
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18xpurirm~ntr',1 ,LJ-l,'r,u",.ti.,,'i in ::.:Jcli tiori t'J thnsc Tl0quirüd for bargrLini!l¿;- 7
it c,:~~ri be seen t-~-: .t the c:ev;:.lopment of n Gatisfr-:cto:ryb:rgrLining game
is in itself difficult.
~Chc s:'omc: c'2:pi.~)ycd in the-) l~)rcscnt i:nvesticnti',')TI is Ft,
vexi:3,ti;)n tli'~ De:uttJch ¡'H1U Krauss !trucking Gnme devised by JVI')rtr'")n
l)eutsch (1960) in c')rrcbc)rrJ.t.Lon viith U.i\lIiiKTc.1USS" Deutsch !::nd KrFLUSS
d.bvisecl c.n iY'lgc'nicjus
-DerS~)n expcririente.J. gaii.c which ansvJcred 8,t
l0nst fJGEle 'lf thc earlier :'1Jjectic)ls to the use of game si tuations in
;¡a.rgrtining sirüuletion, ¿~~nd \,yhich hri,S been used in nur.8rous
expcrinF'n te,1 l~,ttr;r"Lining' studies since, (f -'r example, B'Jrah, 19639
SJ:i,)mer, D::1Vi s, c':.nd lIe,", 1966; Kraus¡" '1nd DC'J.tsch, 1966). In
this gALiS, subjects i;;,:ere: ~-tskeJ. t~) iL.ID.ginc thcr:stlvt:s tÇ) be in ch::i.rge
of t:i trucking (r:~);:-'cd h(.lUl~:',(sc.1 cor:pany, cerrying ilcrch2.nclisC' over a
r02,d t,) n dostin::,tion. Por each trip cnrc,plcted they L1ide 60 Gents,
niDus thcj,r opcra,ting GXpei:s8s which viers c,:--.lcuir~,tcd at the I";.:1.tb of
1 cfmt llCl' secund. So, for eXEl,,)J,plo, if it took 20 secCJnds to cCJITplctc
a p,;-.:,rticulr:,r trip, tr-,tJ plrcycr's 'r-)I'c,fi t yt::.8 (60 - 20) cents - D. net
profit of ¡~O cents. Lach subjc;ct "H.'i-S 8,ssignsd 2. n2yme, liCL,:~f:; or B01/l"
j\8 the 'r';r:;.d mri,pf in'::ic8,te8 (Sec IjlI~.~UliE 1), hoth pln;yers stn.rt fr\ìt1
st:~::~,:2.r:c:tep~)intf3 ~nd gn t different dÇ.:stinRtions. For pn.rt of the
Wt"oY, hu',vevcT', t~'lC;Y h;;,ve ?l. c~,\rnr.nn :route. T1his is thE; SEction of r'''),~.~d
l;:J)el.Lecl !IT'll' laric r"')~"d!!, 1,;/n.ich is ,')nl;y onc i~:tn6 wiJe so thrLt tl,V',~l
trucks, hCBding in ~PP()Sitti dircctioYLS, c~uid not pass 02Ch c)thcr~
If ')n8 moves btlCk, thc:Jthcr CE1n m~,ve f')I'ward, ':;1: br;th can mcve bp~ck,
nr b:Jth cc;,n rCll:i.-.in in TL'.si t:i.on, blncking the; rOc'.d. F.Cher8 is another
.. .... ~ ...... .0."". e ~ ... ~ .".1'. ...... ...~....".,,~...... ~.. ~... ........"...0 .."'''
le' ":rhe' 8sscn.tial fÜEiturcs ef a b;:.irgciin'inè; si.tru::'¡,ti'Y¡1 exist i.vhcn:
i il B)th pr:rtics purceivo thcit thGre is the p\)ssibility of
re~~t.ching t' (1 '~'gTeC;TJ8nt in r;hich (;r'~ch ~(ì(-~,rt.y v',:(-;uld be r)ctter c)ff,
or nu lNnrBC uff, thn,n if ri' c,grcenGnt "í?Cl'C l'G,?.chcd.
2. B,)tb IJr~rtics;)C:rceivc' th ~t theTL í':3 lTor¿ than:)ne such
r~grG"J:=ent ì~hf:.t c'.,ulcl be ren,chad.
31 B':.th pgrtic'8 )Ç.rcei\rc (;~:',ch ether t hpve c:Jnflicting
prc~ferenr:es or uppusüd interests VJi th re~saI'd to the different
,~J.grcortLGnts thet might bH rCFlchcdol!




11 al tC)l"nr:,ti VC
8n: , ,.-Ce 'J t:'j TC::.'"Cüt.t,l() c1cstin,i.ti,on 'Jll the l1',p - the
,.-.,,¡', t~ 1\. ',,'t1:i:3 if the pJ.eycTs DJt cr,:)S:3 on
this Toute ~ Sl;'bJ~::ct:;s t~.r0 tulc~ thqt the;)" aLlYl expect tD lUSt;; r;,t least
10 cents ~¡'.C tim(l use t eel tGrnr-,,;t.(:; T'-:utc.
'lhc J)cutsc:::i Ed'-id Krci.uss study WG,S c.:.llcerned. :Ni th the
1effect of ~~rn',. :;~;t ')ll in.tcT'pcY'i:onnl bargaining~, t1.nd tCi provide the
thrGRt potential, t¡ 8YS~OU of gates WßS intrciduccd into the basic
si tutiti':Jn c)'itlined r¡J (:~vc 0 .it i:;,i ther end of thE.' cne'~~12Ln6 section 'if
r , .'IVgS Et tc under tli() cintrol ~f the plrtycr t~ whcse stnrting
-¡Joint it ~r~~,s ni_~2:rCr~ By closing the g,r'cte, one pl:iyer c(1uld prf:;vcnt
the other fr-n tr-velling over thnt sucti;m ))f the il'1in routE;.
In the present g2.ric hay/evor, e, gar:i8 rnatrix Wê1~3 'prescntcc.l
in DlpCG:)I !:;o r'YJ.d r.:lr':-p ~ '1\'.0 1.dGEl ef 01'8Si:~nting thc~ 1ìtl,rgriining
situcticn in terms a 3 x 3 JT20trix ca:'lU initially fro¡;i the work
uf t(":,n ,',~,nd :"'.'-';I.-'~"C'i. -". Il (.c.:,o?) ".ut "n, ','X""C'" _.~ . _ ~~ L~ l'..;\.,,;.  0 L. \-,/U' , u :.l... specifically frQ~ that of
Gallo (l966).
~ün ~J.~~ ricRcrsie were inter8stcd in developing
':Lire cc)rrLsTJondcncc bct'\vccn th8 Ch'-lTcicteristics of ror:,l-wcirld
mixc'd-LL::tivc' s:í_tu::ti()ns and the; gn;..rie- struot~ires which Viere treatüd
El.S their flTIEcloguos. In ()rdc;r t,:) find c:ui Cl))rnpri2.ts, straction
(if tho c~ilE:IL::ias cr¿:,,~t~;d by :=31~ch rcal-V!()rld c,.-.nflict si tus.,tiuns, thc~y
investif~'8,tcd b~;h8vi~ìur in several i'ìn-g'oing soci:?;l settings. tl~leir
tentFltive anSìxor tf') the pr-'iblem l'/ri.8 in the f,:)rm (Jf ,'?L game mE-itríx"
, ' ~ )Callr) \1960 , n.lsn -intureRtGd in the effects of thrent un
bargaini~1¡:- in exp:..,r:L:1i()ntEtl 8 t tu:::, ti ::-)DS, in ci. 1 ()~(ricn.i r:.nglysi;3 of the
structure of the Deu-cscli ayid Krn.uss ~Irncking Grunt:, indicn.,tod th,s~t in
the no-thre,q,t cnnc1i tiun, I . . h d '7 r- "" ,~ ..! th'
~aescriL;e ()n pages I) - ¡b ()~ is thfJsis),
pi;~.:ytlrs arc ,-:ictuall,Y .fr,~ced '!I'Ti th unly t.óruf) besic deci siclL.s : et 3.YJ¡j
givon til~le the pIn.yeT li:.USt decide í~i tricr t.~-) g:,; ,j')i,vn or stay nu the
short '¡nl-;-.lcl.~lf: rc:ute; t'::J wë~it cl.t thE; start or back u,";, t the ste.rt on
t~ie ()ne-lr~nE- r ;ntc f;:~) tl1r1.t t:1c~jtht':.r)lElY8rt s truck can (18 first; 8r
t') te~ke t ternri.tivc T'_Jute t'.'.i t'..8 goal. (rhus, by this ¡::.nal~)"sis
........."..O...........D..".¡¡..~.........D......................~~.........
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BEVERL Y GLEN CANYO
FIG, 2, The road map used in the game,
" 7i3 .,
the g-;),:-:1G (,.--.. l;c r'''.:JJ:C8S1i.t8cl 'b,:'l' a 3 X 3 l;iatrixc The garae actually
used by Ga.ll(; inc.oi-'r,orn,ted Guch c:" ga:-.18 IJL1-trix (See I.il:/rRIX 7), used
in conjunct icn HÌ' h a road cap '¡¡hi ch had boon suitably ar:endod to
identify w~l~li the 10CI7"ilit;y (Southern California), (See PIGUR~ 2)",






























































E:7f-r.y Qttc 1,,..; -~ S?,c1 e C.,::"ll) t keep t~ll:; 1J,~h'~'"vi()uI'n,l I:L1 tcrne.tives
id.tjntic(j,l i: '-'~;; Cl c' blc-; in tüe ':)Tirrinnl ;'rr~~Cú8. L;:";v:rcver ttie fE~ct
that the ~~ g210S ~rG L,)~ic ly Gquiv~i8~t does ii()t aut: ;naticaiiy
CY:Eurc th~.:t ;:l1c,f ~/i.ill;~ic ri,ctuc~lly cq l.li ve"lerit i.n ter8S cif muti ves arid
bEL.;:~vi()ursl)r;:i::t~J.CC,:', ß.ii~CC (-;n,me-)layinrrLchElTiiuur Ct'1n DC influenced
by such n()n~-~c:gicFl1 f(~ctc\rs 2~S r1J.:~o :jf :pru sont"tti,)n, tiuing, etc 0
Gaii~) the-ref ::irL undcrt ~)-)k (-, pil :)t study t d ternine yihe ther the
nE~'W pr()Cec.~ur8 IN iuld rcplicE"te the 8arlier rcsul ts )f Deutsch and
:Kre,Uf33 c He f,~)1ind th,n,t his rCS~li ts indic:'.ted
11~ .,,.") 
i..tr.: rr¡ "',f ""l~.'"tl -~'¡i:-t "ir¡,-- ~l.'n pln'"'e',. 1:''-''"' " .: "-' l)~C!'J .~,' '. ~ ,,-,,: , ,---,-..'i-)
thr~,.t otitctilLd by J)(;D.ti.=ich (_:~,nd Krrtuss."
corr(sp )ndnnce to
The h8h~:"~Yi ()u.r(~-ú il,l tc::cri.FLti ves h''l1l:l. been kept ìdC'ntical t,'~ thise
r'_v~iilnhlt:; in :; ,t:' r"¡~r:-ir~inc.:l
J Gr:iJ,l'J d0Cid.t'd thri.t the revised ga,'_-re
vrn.s ila :;'uitn"hle vcJ-:iclt: t;,) ~J_8t).li (1966, p~~.'(e 16)"
In t118 SC'll v ~Ür",T(;f_~-ti.cçEl,ti',)n the rc:;~d nap is :;;-ji tted and
tne i_s;:,,(:if: Li:l trix i 8 ;.,ir¿~ SC:rit Qd
.:'.nL. In n,í~~(:.i 'in, t.h.t. g:li'lC 18
Ilh2,ck;9T)~Jlid ritrT",;'sph0I'()ii if.: mr)ve:~ f1' ,;:1 re)
hpu1cL(~e tc ra:Ll trnnS1'F)rt ~
In ttis ne',;;' V~l'siiyn ',)f .the gClrús, (,,;\c1:. suf.j',;ct i~1 r:.skcd tu pla:v the
1':)10 of ::jV'."icr of ~'" nnnufn.cturiJ.1g c ;Ini)o.ny. rho C(XD:J::~,nies hf:ìVe each
gain(;'d c:..n tract t c'.clJ.vc:' i tG '~'~Jd8 t;) r-~. buyc-r in the s:)uth
():f .EiY'.i(;l :¡,nc1" Prcrf:its en the c',')ntrt.~ct depGn;~~ entirely nil h,)w quickl;;r
the g:) S c:'TC: J.iv~;re( - tile quick(~.;r the (ielivcry, the higher
the jJrufi ts . Only suitr~,bi8 í¡1Jnys ,:.)1' tr;::~~18'pc'rtinf!; the g,:v:ds are
availn.blc~ : ~'rciirhtli:ne:r, vrhich is a fr~8t, efficient c':ntn.iner
service; c',ncl i\i n::irl;-ir~,i G :'d~3 1:ira:in which is slo\ê.;cr (l,nc' loss relin,l:ile
V/hilc it j_s thus ti.-.i thE: finrincinl lVi:J.ntr:.ge '-)f 1),.:th c,:-:imr;t).TIi(;s t()
S blld thEi r p; ~)i.S bJr Fr(:i(-'~h_-tlinc r vrhE:revcr :p;)S s ibl e, the-re E:i.r(:."
nuv¿'evur, ne I; EY.L),;./!;'1i c 'nte,iu..:.I's e.vriile,blc t,:,~ C'.ilT'IC;)l"' 'b th cJmTì2~nics i
nùs lrJT FreiGhtliner ~'it the ~~r',ne tine 0 Should lHJth CiJL1T),':1,nies':1ttempt
t.- send tlicir g-:)cJ.s "oy lìrlJ.ightlincr Ht tbs same time, then, D0G8.USe
tb.t;r~: r:~:r''.; not (j (~~')nt2,ì.rcLI'S ::,vail,,:;,blc, C' bl(Jckr-.g~.. will c.1cc"lrr'"
,_. ßO
¡.rh i fj -b i 0 ckr\.(;0 '_"'rJ ,.1 a,bly m8an a do L1Y Hill ensue, and since
profits depc~d 0D speed of iolibery, the blockage will mean a lowering
in potcY'.Lt:i.al pl of:'.t" T.'~c,ch cor':prn:y Day thus opt for tl18 third choice _
to Hait and allew the other comp2ony to consign its goods by Freight-
li~:ier :fï:r'i3t: bnforÐ sending its Oi'Jrl. Tb.is choice Deans that the
COIìipany r:1C:dcir.g i"c; vii 11 ;.')?-Lin ê~n int ormodiat e amount of pr ori t (le 8S
th20n VJJ'lYl goods arc sent diroctly by Freightliner, but greater than
when thoy '"..re consigneil by Goods Tretin). Should both conpanies d.ecide
to wait, however, a d.elay will also occur ctnd Eigiün profits Hill be

































Hhen Q, blockí.igÇ3 occurs, tho pl8.yers are required to maktj a
further attf3!~1pt at sondinG' their goodu i when th'3 payoffs will be lower
(bücause of the SUjJpoi::ecl c101E1Y in delivery cauGod by the blockage).
This further attempt is prosented in a second natrix Hhich shows
the) new dc)croased payoffs, In keopin¡; 1"Ì th Gallo i s oxpeririental
deFJizn, six atteriipts (Ghoiccs) are peruitted per batch of goodsl'
Six matrictJs a,re thUG required, each 8ucc(~sGivo natrix having a
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SI.IClllcr pEl,Y-_ Ef th:;.r-.. it,s pro~.~G~~eBso.r. I.f::t t(lG cnd "if six chuices
thEj plriZ/(,:r'8 i)'.ve ri()~;: rC:LC(:.',:;c~ ng-recLlcnt (Tl1p~t is, they c nt:inuu tu
lJl,)ck C)Xle ::l.:rL)thcr) th~~n t:hc tri~.1.i is te:crninc~tcd ~~nd e,::~ch plrLyc-r
suff8TS r" c;::"lsi:j.L:rr:,l)lc lDs,s. Sinco the prE";sent exp(;riment is n':Jt
spccificc~llJT c,"'ncerncc1 v:i tll the rule of thrc'8..t in bc:1rgaining, the
gates E,nd l)c;,rricrs ':lsed by E~pcrli(~~r t:~XnEjriL18nters hr\vü boen CTIi tted
fron the cxnc:rimGnta.l sttunti;:-,n. 'l1he acturt.l pay::iff VFl.luüS aV8..ilable
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'.Ihe n::~,t~., i.:c 12,yout :for cIH? first
this gc.wc, t.¡ '" :'J t' "1' (n -¡'TimRI'-nUd ~j.:3 10J..I,0118 \oeoJ..d."_L-l ./,.
attempt
0) .;; .
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Thìr3 presentation, allmáng each subject corJplete
informat ion r1G to his Ol';n and the othi~r pla:ror i s payoff's, is the onc
norr;în.lly used in experiLiontal bargaining gaL18S. i'Jhore this is not the
case, one often finds that the game is played with a complet e lack of
inforInat ion about the other player's payoffs. The present invest igat ion
disregarded. this latter cour~~e p and instead manipulatod the pn..yoff
oatrices of the game just described in such a way as to croate a gaos
of ir.iperfect inforï:at ion lvith re spect to the payoffs of the other.
This ne,i gane (vll1ich we shall call "GAhL IT") is played under th'!
sane rules as that previously lÌ.oscribed (l.¡1ioh \'e shall oall "GJ\lE Iill
but unrler the nevl system the paycffs 1. ;crueing to Player 'B' are
uncertain to Player 'A', and vice-versao rrhe present author feels the.t
this si tuat ion cf Ìiiperfact informat ion reGarding the other's payoffs
approxinatas Doro closely to re¿t1e-lifo
- if) -
than d. tn,~.r:;(- ,si.!cu' ti ,n3;ihi~~li inc:Jr';Y;Tc~,ttJ c e tc inf ~:,:rcl,c'i"t i:)n,
~)r c',)E1pl(;~,(; l-":,c-k .JCn. ~l.ni' ,:'l':.~J.:;.t j (in.,
ITJ rc ".life ~'~J.tur~ti:)ns it is r:'í3Y'it;rn.lly r8c:\s,:_-)nß..~Jlc tJ
sup se th, ~ t jllG COE,_:;,r;ny can C'stim~-" te f-l.ppr':')xiInc: .tel;y the:')ro1Jahle
prc)fit ;:J.' in the sal~l¿' line ,"if ousiness ;~:n ¡;l, G'i veil contrs.ct 6
H'y.c~rr:_'ver5 i t i~~, uJirealistic t:,'¡ supousc th~.-', t the c~'mpci.ny can estim.r.\te
this pr::f'i l; §Xfi.Ctl:y ((U~ iEì inferred fr::JD1 the: nrcscutntion of the
prty,:::ff i~).--:tric0.s ~l~'o:r:ially used) 0 It is rnich El'dJre 1'8(-'.8 Ti?,,-olc t~-\
r~~S8ume t this 2stin1f':c t '!_..JYl vv:i.ii be; :)nly r'.)pr,d¡xìma te '" 1l1h,.,.t is,
. +
i 0
seems rrc'..r;h r¡;Cire likcl;y tlic~t vrli.il(; " C -)Piy)any cp.ll ruu;.rhly estim2.tc
another f ~3 py-::':fi ts Cjn the; basis ','j~ the Cnl1l.ìEuiy i S ov¡ll eX~jeriencc in
the mc~rkct, it is unlikel:i thr:;t (2. c:;,iril)any vrill be a1')le: tn say
whether tnc c'¡-chsr ,pill mr~kc ~11CTe '::r IGss~)r .:fi t than the cl)inpany
i tsc:lf v.¡:uld :-ù£:ike H1 th0 Sr:UJ(; contrri,ct - simply 1.. cause the exact
1'i' "ure" (pr 1(' '1 c+í nn
") ...l _ \..l.. '-.._ '" c,d!S):.~~.i , 'V(,'''~ "'l(~ r. r:' co (', + c)l '~...L vu.' ..:J, '". V :')1' the other C()l'Dany
2,re un~-).v;:~ii
In CiiuviI) 11 then, the subject if. civon sc"me i6.ea')f thf;;
(jth8r's pay::J'fs, 'òut h~; :'1 ':)(;8 l'i:it knuvr \ivhc;..t thGY~1.:ce rend cannot
()st;:"bli~.jh thGFl dofini tely. VJlii.10 in 8,CtlF.~l plti.y tne pgyoffs to
b~')th siib,jücts ere J_n fct CXE~ctly cqur;,l ((';8 in GJiJl.,Ij~ i), the subjects
aTe .:;iven imperfect inf_~:r¡;lr:.tJ '~i:n aB t the pn.y',;ffs c;,f the ()ther by
intr .ducint~ int.:~i each 1:1atx'ix cclJ. threE: pc:ssitlG pay','¡ffs f:)r the ~)ther
plp"y"r, ,me pay,iff being' equivfücmt t" whpt tl:e subjc:ct himself would
rocci vc given the' t hi~ rnrtde the se":~ie Ch(iice; 8, sec()nclpaY:J.f.'f ~J8ing
lc:.rger th;in tÌH) plp.ycr is )wn p:)ssible ;)Hy,¡ir' ,-)n the same choice;
ari~1 a t...ir(~ pay:ff 1Je:.n,ç S'.:lE'Lller tb.an thc':.t vifhich tllE:; j)la;yer himself
wc-nld recei vc O::'l the S(;':.Í'~e c:J.C;iCf-:.
The pay.iffs pCDGihlu ti the other pla/er :in each
attempted dclivtJry (E-;,g Drt;sj~Jrl.tc'd t') ü2.ch piayi~r in the le';PLme) Eire
._..,_____.0___.___.._
,POSSBLE Pß.iYOPli1S TO 011nJ~R
.~-~'"-
J?RLIGIITLIH1~H HAI'l GOODS TRAIN
i
5 or 20 or 15 20 or l5 or 10 l5 or ia or 5
I
0 or l5 or ia l5 or 10 or 5 10 or 5 or 0
5 or 10 or 5 10 or 5 or 0 5 or 0 or
-5 l
0 or 5 or 0 5 or 0 or
-5 0 or -5 or-lO





-5 or-la or-l5 -la or-15 or-20
- -, ""~-
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The Datrix layout presented ta Player 'A' for the first
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is Q,S f:i1iO":'1n .~'n I.=Ar.rn.:~x 11 :













containers 20, 15 20, LO
- CHOOS)!; l5AG/tin l5
-
20 Delay and 20blockage
15, 20 - CHOOSE l5, lo
ia il.G A Il' 10
15 15 l5








iTlT-l,: J:'i' " S i"¡: i~ i I !.lV ' ., k S 'I' B ,".':" 'l"11~,'l-¡Y
~_-l__ .~ .Lll ~..~:..:_.l,_l;~"'__.....-:._ ~.i
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löc EirJ:ii:ig U rj tiLe tent L ttory proved diffi,cul t, though
th~ -fri ~lc ~v'r;_' u L e:.Ò.O::, rJ ""ici,v.b:~.l': c :t-s:i.er v,~hGn sevcr¡::l cri teric:'" of sui. tnbilì ty
were iiiliY)SecJ.~ firutlY1 Q large numb.c'r ;)f subjects WgS req:iired by the
Gx;::erimentEi1 ,:'.esi,.?T.. 1'11i8 nn.de inclividu~tl testing iBprr:,cticable and
group t,Jst "r1Liinistreitü)l w',s thus consiûered a first essential, This
ruleC! out :Hi. use +' t" '1'1- "" P I (1- ,'",." ,,',).. Jolt; i.l.i. . . \ Du...7l(tUc .1. Form) and ~,ll the T)ther
o'!vims Iric'iviC'mü tests. Sco,md1y, tests Fhich required internretatl'2!2
in scuring were C "Dsidbred unsuitn e, since scarer l s inexperience
could lerid t) mist2kl~8, ir, equRllY inf~clL1issn,bic, scorsr' s pri':ìr
acquêtint;~:tnce ()f n su.bject might lcacJ tc El I'halutt (or uther) effect.
(rrh~, new Uni versi ty of Stirling in 1967-1968 had ,mly 165 enrollerJ
students, niir¡ only CL tJt,\Ì IJf 283 in 1968-l969. lioqur.intrmce with
a nu.ber uf ~3lll~jccts was th8refJro inevi table). .B'act;::¡rs such as
these I;Jermt tnr:~t the use cif test" like the Thematic Appcrcepti'Jn
rest, Hc.;80nsweig PicturE: Frustratinn Study, i::,r the H(:rschach
Inkbl'it iilest v/ere iw-,ci.csirahlo f'JT thu purpuses ')f ths, riresent
investigation. Ace inU,'ly a slrirt-listJf POSE_di. bIe (n.nd nvailttble)
tests for l)Lìttery use VI,' s co.mpilcd f-,S fC,ii(j¥lS :
i) Bernreuter lJers m'",lity Inventury,
ii) Cattell's Sixteen Personality Fcctor Test,
iii) Ii;dwaI'C1S Pers ,nal Preference Schedule,
, ) " 'l" ~!z ' '1 t Si v (Jui 1 (~)rul' immerme,n l-C;'~l;)er,ruY1en ~ urvEY,
v) M.M.P.I. (Grnup Form),
vi) ~innesotß Pcrsr)nnlity Scale,
vii) Stucly ,of V-f'lue fl'est,
viii) 'lest:Jf S8ciH.l Insj_ght..
:F'roil tris list, cm the b:ses Jf usefulness, administr,itLm time,
rmd availr.-oilit,Y, the Bernreuter Persmality 1nventur;¡-, the
lV.M.P.!", and the l!innesota Pers,ine.lit" Scale were cimitted. The
Bernreuter test was Ul.i tted c)n several grounds : it hc:is a
CUEil-:,crsnfi8 scoring s;ystein, (lend reviewers have 1ìcen c~)nsistentl;y
Boepticrc:L ab ,¡it its value, VellllB.n (1965) desoribed it as
r8pre~~811tp"tive '~:if rlIrJthcr era in test cUDstruction. C'Jnside:eing that
t,he n:;rm~.ti V(:. c1ri,t,":: !jruvided l/i'itn the E1FLnual c~rG dated 1938 ~ind thnt
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the mcmt rCCBnt "ttmnpt at scale revision included in the m,\nual
is a 1935 facto:r 2cnrll;rsis uf the form scales, it is not surprising
that Veldl'irm consic!crocl the inventory as "nu ilnru than a landmark"
in the devclopment of pers mali ty assessr:ent techniques. 'lyler
(l953) inintec', (Jut that sccres can be C20sily faKed by intentional
bias cm the part ef the respondent, and this view is reinforced liy
thc findings of sl'1Qn (l952), Shaw (l962), and rn2ony,thers. Becker
(1965) foun.::', r,11 these tc; be groun,\s for criticism cif the test,
"b2si:ces its ùü1ure to dC1 anything well enough t" justify its
existence.!! (page 745).
'fhe M.M.P.I. was omitted frum the test b¿~ttery hGthcJn
the groumês of administrn:tion timel, and on the basis eif its
inadequacy RS a general test of personality, (Lingoes, 1965;
Bentm, 1949). As Aclcnck (i965, page 313-3l4) h20S explained,
ti (The M.M.P.I.) d:ies n.:t 1Jretend tc) prDvide b20sic
pcrscnali ty dimensi,ms but tri predict the currently
accepted psychiatric categories. These m20Y be basic in
their 'wm right but this is beside the pnint ..... Because
the test is c)ne of the fe~, multi-dinensimal tests, SCJme
people hsve thought uf it c:S ", useful test for a general
survey ('1' personality. For this it vm.s not designed.
It may draw attentim to p:issibly disabling c1E,grees "f
mental disorder and indicate the form of such disorder,
liut whother the J)8.ttern er diS'~ird8r ten.iencies ha.s any
fJignifice,nce when none Df the scores falls "utside the
normal range is anothGr Ilci,tter altogether."
Of the six re::J"ining tests, the Minnesnt20 Persc)i'lli ty
Scale was omitted Dn acciunt uf its length, the ac1ministrc'tion time
invcìlvcc1, and the fr==ct thr-;.t Et m( re C::.H1IJrehensívü test ;Jf gCllel'Fll
.....e.o........~.........o........................................a..
1. Al thou,';h "untimed", the test coiiinonly takes "'ell ov,"r one
hDur to cc,mplete. t~ys€nck (l9'f9) h8.s cited cases where
"clr,ünistrF'ti'ii time was a much as five hours.
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pers cnali ty (the Cc,X¡;",ll Sixteen P.F. Questimnaire) rec'¡;'ln¿d fer
use in the test br,ttcry.. In fh~~.ii ti,)n~ thi:ì test 1,72.S n':it rea,(lily
aV2.ila1Jle t~, t lE~ aut.h,¡Y.. rI'hus tliü fi'"/8 ren::.i,ininu t~~t)ts 9 \,vnich
tugetner :nr:c1e UT) the test br:ttc:ry USE:'~i in the present investigation,
were the Sixtoen Perscmali ty Fact)r Questicmn2oire, th8 Guilfur:i/
Zirimierrncm 1'hi! ¡'erp,rnen t Survey, the 'l'¿st ,A' Se; cial Insig'h t, the
Edwards Personal I)referenc8 Schedule, (J"ud t:.'le Study eif v.~il.h;.S Test"
Ii :::rì dcscriJtion ~f each test is given below.
The Sixteen PersJnr~li t':B2,~:~ctCJ:z~~ti;ìn'J:.n,irc.
IThe 16 P.F.. QJucstiDnnairc is, accCìrdin(" t. the mr~nuai,
the psychologist i s answer, in the qUE:stionnairc re::lri, to the
deaand f:,r Co test givin,r fullest inf)rrnati n in the shortest time
ab::.,ut mnst persCll1Fil-. ty traits. Bein.g nr)t, merely c"'nccrn(;d with
8 ~ìrrle narT;, c:)ncopt eif neur;'iticisrri ~)r loxlj-:.U3tmcntt, ur SCilQC si::ecial
l'::inc ;~\f :~l.bility, it sets ',¡ut t-: CCfver planf':11.l;y E!,n':~~ precisely all
tnn di:nensi ~l1S alr;Lß' l,'vhich jJcnplc CQn differ, eGO ìrc1ing tc
bb,sic fact:)r al1c:,lytic research. rl'ho test C(Jvc:rs 15 pers')nc~lity
factc,rs: re served v.. CJU tgC)inéš CA_); affe ctGC~ by feelings v.
enoti :inall~;r stal)lE: (C); hULble v. assertive lE); S~)11e-r v. happy-gc)-
lucky (F); ex¡:er,'icnt v. cunscientious (G); shy v. ventureS)n8 (H);
t cnigh-¡~inc1ed v. tender-minded (I); trusting v. sus piciuus (11);
prEctical ,. inaginritive 0'!1); fcrthrii';ht v. shrròwd (in; placid v.
n,ppreheneive (0); c 'nserwc,tive v. experiment in,,; (Ql); group-
dc"pfmdunt v. self-sufficient ((~2); casual v. c,mtr'lled (Q3);
rel~'"E;r' v t~~se ((,~).¡ .cA :. ,-1 . L J..C , "t'"r, aníl rilsi,~ .:)Ur'p~lrts t,;) rrive 2. rreaSiirG of
In telligence (B) 0
DeSLJite 'che f~'ct thc,t Harsh (1953) f')imd it unlikely
thc:it tho 16 P.F. c u1(1 f;i ve an p"ssessmen't (Jf p8rs .;rir;,li ty much
superior t" thot "f Dther mul ti-L,ct')r 1lô1.per tests, nnd l,ut)in (1953)
reiur"ced j t n,S lvwinc n,) kn,\Wll valid,..ted use, it has been gemorally
trrc.;ll received. \~littenb,':rl1 (195:5), rcccjgnizin?:~ the testIs ii~:litati::)ns,
c.1ncluded th0t the aucsti8nnaire ~s it s W~S nr)t a finished teiol,
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yet represented a very wJrthwhile ftnd a1~ihi tious boginning. Since
then the test h¡:lS been revised and extended 'L.; throe forms E.nd an
evcr~incrc8.sing vieal th of data ab jut t.r-ie prE"~clicti vs significance of
its scur,s hpB hac' me "v"cil,~ble. Kc, thi s in mind, E¡,nd ,S'i vel" the
fact thB.t the test ~ 0 net unweildy, .',nd is easy te) administer and-'v
sCTe, Adc ':.:' ck (l ;159) JJredictcd thRt the l6 P.F. 1.'2.8 likely to become
tht.; sta.':idard quosti:)nna.ire--typt? T)(~rE,','nl).li ty test ,,'f tile future.
And 1cr:r (1)65) grudgingly 8/lmittc;c1 it t(:ì 1e "the best fF!,ct,)r-based
persJ.!ali ty inventury avs,ile,ble" (pèJge 368), declp,rin¡'O it tt, '8e
"still primarily a research instrument."
The Gi¿~lfcrd/~:Lnmerm2on 'l'm'1"'Jrament Survey
ilhe stated purpose :if this survey was to cOllbine the
findings of the G uilforc1 series i)f pors:mali ty inventuriesl into a
single b:i.ttery cnd thus cibtain SC(Jres un 10 pers'mali ty traits frOm
the '1dministrn.ticii of it siné;le b oklet.
'lhe traits are: gener20l activity (G), restraint (n),
ascendance (A), sncial;ili ty (8), en()ticmal stability (E),
()bjectivity (0), friendliness (F), thuughtfulm,s8 (T), pers mal
relnticms (p), and riasculini ty C:,). The reliability with which e)'ich
')f the trR,i ts is assessed is SheJ'Nll tc, ~.)C uf the ,:)rder O.BO; and their
interc()rrel£tions are, s the 8uth:Jrs say, "gratifyingly low", the
implicaticn -beinc; that nll arc r::v)pr,~,xiin2teiy c!rthogonal in fc"-ctor
terms, (that is, that !unique tr::1its' 1?re invulved).
The test has met vri th S()ffC decree eif indifference. Fç)r
exiimple, Saunc1ers (1959), while ndni ttinr; thnt
"i t seens f,,',r te say tJú,t studies using this survey
have d;.;ne much t, tL0L'l":'nstratc the pc\tential advrrr-,tages of
the fnct(;r-c~nrtlJTtic approt-l.ch to personality measurer:cntll,
.. . .. . . . .. . .. . . . .. .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. .. .. .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. 0 .. . . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. . .. . . .
1. The IkbI'8,ska Persnnali tyhvent'ry (SEM), the GuilfuI',l-Martin
InventfTY .:.'if Fnct':ìrs GjiL-IIN, the Guilford-:Mcirtin Personnel
Inventory (0 Ag Ci), anc, the Invent ry )fY'1cLiI'S SirDeR.
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ri'und the im,trw¡¡ent itself to he "neither fish nJr fowl" so far
as prActical applicatiüns were c ncerned. Nevertheless, the test has
overall been well received since its inoeption. Schaffer (1950)
commented that as th8mtstanding :ininibus instruJ:ent liased primarily
on factor analysis, the survey would he useful for screening, rRpid
eval uidim, and research.
Stephenson (l953) f'mnd the survey, its data, ane: sUPpcJrting nC'rms
to be adequate, UlC)rough, and fc10tUAllY orientated, and ooncluded
that for the purPOStlS fCir which such invtlntories wtlre used it was
probably better than most; whiltl Vai SteenberR (l953), reviewiw;
the Survey found it to give (pr;.e 97) :
"a VU",! fe.vour2oblo inpression of 1" well rounded, carefully
worked out method of evalu,Q.ting an inportant portion of
the total iiersonality. It is easy tr, administer and to
score, a,nd if interpretation of the obtECined measures
is difficult, it is n function of the complexity of
personFlli ties rr1.ther the.n 8. functi'Jn of the survey."
The Study of Values 'lest.
The Stud,Y of Vcdues ''lest aims t,) ¡l,Onsu.'.e the relative
importance of six basic intorestsir motives in personality : the
theoretical, eccinomic, aesthetic, s.:ial, pulitical, and rolig~.
The classific,¡tion is be,sed directly upon Spranger' s "Types cif Men"
(l925), a wurk which defends the view that the personalities of men
a.re best known throu¡çri a study ,,r their volues ,'r evalur,tive
atti tndes.
Despi te the fact that Sprangor 8P,Y he said to have held
a sOEl(èwhat fhitti:rin,g view 'Jf hUff20n nature in thqt he did not e,llow
for forriless or valueless personalities, nor for those who follow an
expedient Jr hedonistic philosophy of life. the Study of Values ':rest,
or:Rinally publishod in 1931, hp-s been wid,,;iy accopted as bein¡; of
value. Meehl (1949), reviewing the test, reportod that
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"Considering its a priori methc)d of construction, the
problematic validity of its theoretical fouw:h,tim
(Spranger's tynes'i and the rel20tively sJ'w.ll nUl.béèr (45)
of items which are used tu mC8sure six valuc dimenHi'.ns,
this se8ffS tc. 'ie a remarbi,bly good test . . . .. .. with
suitable caution as to its use with the less educated, and
as to the intrustworthiness of the social value scure,
this test can be rec!Jl!l!H.mdGd ns one of the few structured
persnality devices he.ving considerable value." (page 200).
In 1951 the tcst v¡as revised, increasing the diagnostic
power of the items, simplifying the wording and eliminating outdatuJ.
and over-specific cultural references. In addi tion the scoring
system W20S revised and shortened, fresh norms were provided, and the
reliabili ty of the t8st as a whole we,s increasE(~. The ;nos t important
improvement, hc)wever, was in the redefinition of the social value.
l'he old soci2ol v2olue, which had prOVEd unrelialile b,;cause of
adherence to Spranger' s excussi vely brorcd definition, was now
redefined in terms of altruistic or philanthropic interest. 'lhis
edi tion t )0 was well received. Gough (1953) found it to be a
"de Jendable and informative instrument", possessing "considerable
meri t and utility"; Schaffer (l95l) described it ,tS an "excellent
new revision"; anel Gage (1959), looking ahead to the 1960 revision,
concluded that "for research on a wide variety of psychological
e'uestions, the test is already very go')d."
'rhe 1960 f3di tion mn,de no further changes in the test
itens, but prescntee! improved norms. 'lhus, although Spranger's
value tyries hElve what Hadcli.ffe (1965a) called an"arinchair" rather
than an "empirical" bn.sis, and d8spi tc tile f20ct th,C),t in somi' cases
the tGst may fail to distinguilih betwecn value 20ncl interrôst, the
Study of Values Test has re"lC',ined a useful research instruElent.
In 1965 yet another edition, st2ond,ircüzed for use with a
British populatLm, was formulated, and this latest (British)
editicm hrw bcen esployod in ti1e present investigation. Since some
of the original items were no t apprpria te for people living in this
country, the British Ec1i ti:m uses a new set of i terns, though the
,;rcneral plcin of the origimü test is followed as closely as possible.
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The Test of Social Insight.
'lhe Test of 3c)circl Insight, develuped"y B..N .Cass81 in
1959, purports to aDpraisc the c¡';.;:,~,cteristic ¡node ,¡f reo.ctie.n the
individual uses 1n resc)l Ving typical adul t interpers"nal (social)
problems. A hflS1C 2ossum:"tion underlying the test is thn,t "s:cisl
insight" is related to intelligence (primarily tllr, ugh the eg')
functim), and to perscmality (thr ugh cognitivc and enc,ti,mal
activity). The test consi stsJf 60 multiple-choice items, eHch
having five alternatives. Each alterna.tivc nffcrs onc of the
following modes of res(;1ution of the problem expressed in the i temi
withdrawal, P2ossivity, cc,operati.on, competition, aGgression. The
characteristic pattern of the individual is determined frml. the,
frequency of modes Clf siüution chosen.
The test has n,)t, hoviever, enji)y"d the popularity
ass)Jciated vii th the other tests inclu.ic:i in the present test battery.
Reviewers have generally been c:ri tical, (Black, 1965 j and :tiercc-
Jones, 1965; in particul ar), but even Black had to admit that the
items were well written and ing'enL1us, and that the subscales
re:Jresented appr.,),pri8,te categorizations iJf rüsponse tendencies in
human interactions. Pierce-Jcmes, despite his cri ticisI!s and
misgivings abr)ut the test's relLtbility c'Jncluded th"t it was a
prClmising effClrt to measure variables 0f obvious interu,t nnd
imnr)rt,s.nce to research psychfìi,,~gists.
Despi te the many cri ticisl's of reviewers and the present
auth'Jr's own reservations reGarding the test's validity and reliability,
the test was incc'rporated in the experimental test battery since the
vihole project vms basically one concerned wi th interpers~nal behaviour
and thü scales ')f the 'lost of Soci2ol Insight are claimed to anpraise
the Dode of reacti'Jn the individual uses i.n resolving such interpersonal
pr'")lJlens.
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The Ldwe,rds Pc:rsonal Preference Schedulo.
'lhe ff2onu2ol of this test states that it was designed
primarily as an instrument for research and counselling purposes,
to provide quick and cunvGnient measures ()f i'. nui:lber of rela ti vely
indelJendent normal personality ve.riablEs.
The items in the l;PPS and tho variables tnat tÌ1~se
i teEls ID820Siire have their origin in 11.A. Murray i s list of "lte.nifest
Needs" (l938); and the names assigned t the variables are those
used by Murray. In additi'm tu providing a me20sure of test
cmsistency, the EPPS provides measures nf l5 pers'mali ty variFtbles :
achievement (ach) , deference (def), order (ord) , exhibition (exh),
auton','llY (aut), affiliatiDn (aff), intraception (int), succorance (suc),
dominance (dom), abasement (aba), nurturance (nur), change (chg),
endurance (end), heterusexuality (het), and aggrcssinn (agg).
Many inventi:ries hcve the dravhack thr;,t subjects tend to
end,)rse desirable ccnd reject undesirable i tenls. 'l'he EPPS has 2ottem"ted
tD miniLiize this influence by means of a specific kind of forced
choice. Each item of the tGst consists of tWi.J state'Ilents. The subject
is forced to ch,Jose in each p!'ür of statements the one which is most
chlU'acteristic of himself. 'rh" two statements in each pair represent
different personali ty variables, but they have at the S2-me time a
c'.'miJarablü degree 'of social desirability. Whi le sD.ch an arra,ngement
constitutes "a technically optimal Dr2octice" (Fiske, 1959), the
forced-ch,¡ic8 format dOGS carry with it cert20in disadvanta.ges : the
resultant scores ".re slightly interdependent, tendinG ti) hreve small
nege.tive intercorrelntirms because the sum of the 15 scores is a
fixed quantity. 'l'his is El Blight disadvant:s,ge for thOSE; who wish to
use the several scales separately. Another c nSÐouence of the
f,)rced-choice technique is the n,a.rrow ran",:e 'if content involvf)d in
the assessnent ()f 8ach variable. (In the test nine stö,tements 20re
utilized f ')1' GP-ch vFlriable, m"st of the stnt€'nents being used three
times). The manual (and hence the test itself) h20S been criticized
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for liwk of validating evidence by Gustad (1956), Bordin (1959),
Strickler (1965), Hadcliffe (1965b) and others. Nevertheless the
schedule hi'S the advantp,ge of be LWr bCcsed on a l'ore sophisticated
theoretical fc,rmule.ti 'n than n¡.,st inventories, and th., fact that it
has been carefully c-instructed to ninimize the n20tural tendencyif
exruninees tu choose facc-s,tving or socially desirablE: respenses makes
it "an ingenious and novel instrument f::r pers:inality assessment."
(Sehatfer,l955, page l56).
The selection of tests for inclusion in the test battery,
as can be sef;n, was not an easy task. The number of p;Jints for
consider~-otion in tha. selection (viz: the factors measured, administra-
tion time, reliability, velidi ty, Elvailabili ty, and SCl un), meant
th,..t somo S'Jrt of compromise on one or more of these had to be
reached in respect 0f each test, Despite such compr:il'ises and the
best Jossible effort being made, the resal ting test bc.ttery leaves much
to bf; desired. Disc,cmnting any faults inherent in the individual tests,
the b2.ttery c'd:nsidervd ,'s a whole is unweildy in a prp,cticrü sense.
'laken t:)ge ther, the five tes t s ccmsti tute 817 i te:r,s, rendering scores
on 54 variebIes, and tciking an averar,e of 3~ to 4 hours cidriinistration
time per subject. Several ,;if the scales are duplicated (for example,
there are throE Eleasures )f dominance, tw'. of airgressi,-;n, two of
einotiunal stability, and several dealing with s'Jciability and
porsrmal :relati'ns), and the inf Tmati'Jl gloaned by runny ',f the
re::iain(:'or CF',n unIy be redundant as far CiS the present investigH,ti':;n
is cuncerned. 'lhat a test b".ttery specificFillY oriented tCJwards use
in experiment20l h20rgaining studivs is needed is ubvi"us. However,
sinoe such a 11r'1ufacture would in itself require considerable
rese2Tch, the present author has had tob", c,'intent with the battery
"ls c'Jnstituted above,l
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. it Ferscilali ty/Atti tude Schedule s,iecifically designed to Hssess
the role of "ersonali ty and f'tti tudinal d ifferünces in bargaining
behs.viour hr's been devüloped (by Shure anc' Meoker, 1967). Its use
was precluded in the current study, however, since many of the
items were applicable only to 20n American populatJ_on, and, in any
cccse, llUblic,',tüin,)f the test C20me after the present investigation
had been ini tinted.
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CHAF'lEli TEN i 'l'HE EXPhRIMBT
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fupo ~.§
The aims of the investigation "'ere threefold: to
investig'ate the effects :if f"m)unt of inf,irmrrtiun :,vail,"l,bl" alyiut
the- payoffs :f the (ither on players' bo;.ccvinUT in the c.':,mo; tC)
investiR'''te the effects of sex un gaGio"plrryin,r behaviour; and to
investigete the eff8cts of porsonali ty cm b8haviuur in the ¡'Bme.
A. Information of the other's nayoffs.
¡Vi th regard to the degree of inf'irma ti on about the
other subject's i)ayoffs, vie must ask whether "i' not differences nTe to
be expected betwum behaviour in (ijJvJE I and boliaviciur in GJ-tlc. 11.
Since the exnerimental sit\mtion in both W'l!es requires sU!Jjc,cts
to maximize only their ')Wn pay:)ffs, and t;1iscoint is strc,ssed in the
inst:cuctions given to both suh,jccts; and since, in adclition, a tot2ol
of six prizes "re offered t:i those who l'pke m,)st pr:)fi t, there is no
game.,theoretic reason t:) suppose th20t 2.riy reference to the "ther
player's uayoffs vnuld be taken int,) Elccount by suojscts in th8 wune,
regardless of whether this inf"lI'FJc,tion WiS complete (as in GAMI, i)
or iniperfec t (as in GAl'l(l 11). However, it can he nrgued that the
CJ(1di tionEl uncertainty f:nmd in GJUVIE 11 bcc:1useif imperfect
inf,)rivLtim of the other's payoffs, miid:ht well have cJ' affect on
behavi 'ur ¡me! that differences in behavi'ur in GAME I and Gj\.ß'I; II
sh"uld be expected F'S R result.
AS has al:rendy heen n'Jted, ,o,linost nIl experimental SturU(j8
of I;êtming hnve ignored the possible effect .,f the ¡;mnunt of inf,rmati'n
;,10 ut each other i s payoffs on the deci sions eif the players. ¡1owever,
thei'e have be8n a few exceptions. Shubik (1962) str ,ssed tIlE
iinpGrtance of the inf)r"1atiun vciriable, but did nut attempt to
manipulate it experimentally. Sieirel and Pouraksr (1960), wh') did
manipulate the info,rnaticm vp.riable, ran a study of bilaterill monopoly
which cfJltirmed the hypothesis that devintions fr,)lI the Pa:retian
:Jptima1 nre minimized FiS the c1m(lInt of infcirr.atiul1 2000ut the P20YDff
..................".........."'........................."..........0......
1. The set of prices which includes the best profit pcisi tion of both
parties and from which it is imp:,:ssible tC) move without w:rseninc
the profit DOSi.t lCn of at IGp.st ,:me of the parties.
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matrices ccvailabü, to the bargainG'ls is ilf'ximizeci. Swensson (1967),
attempting to duplicate Siegel and Fouraker' s si tuc,tion using a prisoner's
dilemma game in which players were ,;iven assymetric information about
each other's payoffs, reached incmclusive results. Messick and
lhorngate (1967) on the other hand, showed that subjects playing a
two-person non-zero-suin garc,e do mrire pocirly (in terms of their own
gain) when they have knowledge of the other's payoffs than "Then they
'mly know their own payoffs; and their results i'"re reinfJrccd by
Ùmnon llapoport' s (l969) finding th,,"t as the aroiount of information
possessed a1iout the payoffs of the other pl20yer decre"sed, the
percentage of cooparati ve choices increased, as did the difference in
¡;ain wi thin dyads.
On the basis of these enpirical findings then it might be
expected that thedegree of in for nation available about the other's
payoffs would cause differential b6havürur in the gmne situation. rrhe
following hypothesis was thus formulated:
1. "here only partial inf TEla tion regarding t!'l other's payoffs is
available to players in t:ie gaiiic, more c,'operative behavic!Ur will
occur than whuD there is complete informatiun.
B. Sex differcmces in game-playing behiwiour.
'lhe resul tsJf Vinacke (1959), Bond and Vinacke (1961), and
Uesugi and Vinacke (l963) have all pointed to sex differences with
ri)spect to competi ti ve spirit (men being more competi ti ve than women).
Wbile several experimenters, such as Lutzker (l961) and Sampson and
Krirdush (1965) have found n~) sex differences in behaviour in game
si tuations, sex differences hAve been found by others. llApoport and
Chammah (1965b) in an exieriment involving 300 plays of the Prisoner's
Dilenma reported lPTge differences in behrwiour between male and
female pairs, the princip2.l difference here being in the considerably
greater ovurall frequency of cooperative choices by men. In a
)revious paper, (lIack, 1967), the present author hr'S also reported
sex differ"nces in gnme-playing' beh'livlour, 20scendant females being
L~,)re competitive than ascendant Dales. In viuw of these reports,
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a secGnd hypoti;esis nJlated t sex differences in !~a.¡;ie-playing
behavi 'ur W'lS IYlstull,ted ,nth res Ject t,) the present investigaticin
2. j',!ale subj'"cts ~md female SUbjfJCts viill behave differentially
in the ¡:,'ri:'~mc si tU::'ttir)u.
9. Effc,cts c'f Pers~nali!: 'cm :,(',mG ):e'12vi')ur.
Since the investigation y1r.'s ini tiate:d on a brOtLd front,
w) hypothoses rega.rd.ing specific persuuali ty mCJasures were p,)stulate:L
On the basis of tile li terp,ture reviewed, however, gener,ü hypotheses
regarding bshriVic)ur in the tT,in-person lJargaining ga.lUt: were fnr:iulated
3 fJlloWG :
3. 'rho first strategy choice cir, the first run of the ga'ie will be
cl.e:pendent on the pGrsonnli ties of the ple.yers involvüd, as
mee.,sured hy the ners~)nali ty test battery.
Hegarding the efff:cts of persune.li ty on behavi')ur in the
remainder of the , three pussibilities exist: that the effects cif
personnli ty will increaSE: ,s the gw,ie c:)ntinues; thc:t the effects will
decre~Lse; or that they wiii remain c:)nstant~
The !'I'(':UElent in favuur of Rn increasing effect of
personali ty ,',in bG'hnvi :)ur !",ß the Ç(a~"1e proceeds is bDsed on the
,~d.ìsGumpti()n th"it vvhils pcrs.,.inali ty tr:=\i ts Liciy occasiona,11y -be S J marked
in an inc:ivic1ual ns tu affect -l¡ehavi:)ul when it (¡cenrs in isola.tion,
( 'PC~'- , for example, on the
g,:unc - see Hypothe si s 3,
first str2ote¡ry-chuicc point in the bargaining
ab CiVEJ) , they arc, rarely so grossly manifest,
and generally remain 'hidden' urit 1 some sort of interëction takes
place. Given thp.t personnlì ty ch'Tacteristics do ()p8röte in triis way
and bec)me manifest only 'Ni th the (H:lvent of extended interaction, in
the present ex perioent¡ü si tuntion, while the interaction is
adciittedly minimal, wc mig'ht indeed nevertheless expect these
personality choracteristics to develop and the effects of pors,inality
tn incrc,':1.sC S the gr-.L18 progresses.
On the other hand, however, it might be A.rguec1 that,
while the rlmninating- persnnali ty traits of rn indi viduúl r',RY hs.ve an
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in:i tial effect on behavirHiT in the 8'2x:ie,. the 4linimril interRction
situfitinn, coupled with the "rriti:mal" w,lution pr()vü1ed by the
game and the ccmstrain ts of the game itself, WCJUlc1 prevent the
development of the unc1erlyin:; less dominant personality traits, Emd
th't any initial effects thr't personality mLdlt have on gpome-pl!"ying
behcwiour w:uici bc) wC9..kened by rein tera t;ion over a number of trials.
.li.nd it mi.?ht 1;)8 argued thr:' t both possi hili ties mny occur.
That is, thcit for a certain type of player, (say one who scores highly
:m the "theoretical" vQriable of the Study of Values Test), the
effects of pers ma1i ty vwu1d diminish as the game continued; while
f()r an.:)th8r type, (say one '¡inn scured low on the "theoreticc'vin scale,
or hi¡rh1y on the "social" scale), the effects of pcrsonnli ty would
increhse c1s the i..;rtInO pro¡:J,ressed. In either case we vtCìuld not expect
the effuct of p"rs:m2oli ty to renmin c()nstcmt thr,mghout the game.l
Up to this point it has been possiiJle in the light of
published research rind the literature reviewed to make directional
hYo'Jtheses re,,:urdinr: l~eh2ovimr in the gClcie. In the present instance,
however, the auth;r c'JUlc1 find no support in the li territure ei ther for
thc ',crgument th,;t predicts an incresse, or fcir that which predicts a
(jecre~se in the effec tfJ of perfJomüi ty on behaviour in the game. Thus,
since both these V_'ssi:iili ties remain equally likely, no fcirmal
hypotheses rel:üing the effectsif personality to behavi,iur in the
game. subsequent to the firfJt strater;y choice have been formulnt('r1.
Huwever, since tr.e whole investigatir;n was by its nature '''n exploratory
cme, it w,~s cÌfci~le.c3_ tc' le (,k at behavi:mr ')ver the 30 iterations of
the (Same in seaTcn of pcrscnn,lí ty effects on heiiavi::;UT.
..0........................"............................................
1. Should no effect of persomüi ty ~)e found, it is not argued
thfit the increr',sing effect of some personality variable s on
the une hp,nd, rend the decrucsing effect of some ''Jther variables
on the other, h"we f cancelled each other out f, but rather
merely thnt none exists.
-lOl-
Method
All Bub,jGv ki fii'st cor.ploted the personality test be,ttery
and were then randomly alôsl,lsn"d te, thE exp8rimental gr cups whore
they were rancL mly paired wi th et rrerjlJ(:r of tt18 same sex.
I.c',ch dycid played 3D it8retiuns,x the two-person bargaining
g'ame, the ubject fur each player being t) gain as r.iany points for
hinself ns possible. 'lhe nurber cif points held by each player was
registered m a digi t20l counter and adjusted aftor every triaL.
A detailed record was kept of 2011 the responses made by
both subjects in each dyad.
In order to provide incentive fDr the subjects to work for,
six prizes Df £1 each were offered, to be given to the six subjects
who amassed the great8st nurnber of points in the experim8nt as a
whele.
J!xperimei:al Groups
Two experimental i_T'JUj)S weru used in order to test
Hypothesis 1. J!ach experimental (trOUlJ conte.incd forty-eight pnirs
of subj8cts, twenty-four pairs being male and twenty-four pairs being
female. Wi thin these constraints subjects were assigned to the
experimental groups randomly, and within 8ach group the dyads were
also assigned at randon. (All subjects were listed alphabetically
and then assigned to one :)1' other of tile twu groups by tussing a coin.
Wi thin each group dyads were furmed simply by pairing any two subjects
who were available at the same time t) participatc in the experimental
sessLin). Since the groups were constructed by this random method,
no re20l differences of age and personality will exist between the
groups. However, because of the large number of variables involved
(55), it is to be expected th2ot, merely by ch2once, some differences
will appear statistically significant. To demonstrate that these
expected "significant" differences do occu:r, and to establish which
particular variables are involved (so th20t account may be taken of
the fact in any later analysis of the game), a series of t-tests
were conducted by computer (See AJ?nNDIX 1 for programme).
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Th8 resul ts cti~ thesI2 eTe r:;ívc'n in th(~ foiii)vnng t,qbJ.es. (In CLch
oc:;o the fiCl.~rE.s p:rr~sGnts-d Etre: the nbtaincd vrù ues of 't'. M L:i.nd :8'
refer te, ffcüe and femnlc subjects res;l'eetively; I and 11 refer to
GiJJ11~ I r:t.nd GI!l'J:~ 11 respecti\iel;y).
Age
~---~




__I 1. 7347. --
No significant differences at 0.05 level
lJi1g 3
Sixte¡jn l'ersonali ty :¡act'Jr (tucstÜmnairc

























Ql -2.2300 .; -0.0359
Q2 -0.l989 -0.EJ295
¡ Q3 -1.9072 1.0558
I Q4 l.0646 -0.7047
.; Significant at 0.05 level
'TABLE 4.
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GnJl.f r)rd!~j_EH~lcrrEin II\Errr()~:rnDcn t Survey
1'------------------
i¡ Ì"actor ! Ml v. ¡JITl Fl v. FII
--- I
1--i G I -1.7115 -0.8741, i









'1' -2.1741 ,¡ O. l506
P -l.7226 0.3556
IvI -O.440d Cl.3020
,¡,¡ Significant at O.OL level
'" Significant "et 0.05 level
ilA3LI~ c;
_~_..
Study of Values '~'est
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It Cf:.n be SC;:jL fr:Jm thc;se te,bles that male subjects anc1
f () subjects in '.h8 tVi' exp,.rimentf),l i~'T:"Ups differ "sLo;nificantly"
jTI )n.~y five a:!l(5 ur vari: ,1)les r8spcctively : (Mn,lcs ,n the '0' and
tQl' f;~ctors ,,).' tJ.i8 Sixb:::~(-n ii.:B1. (.:lu8sti,Jnnair8, Eind '1i1 and ffr'
vi'.ri'ibhs :J the Guilford/Zimneri:f)cn 1'cElpern,ment SurvEW, all.d the
'Defcrcnc() i scalc of the LdVlards Pers:mal Prcference Schedule; Females
,-)n the 'Aggression' and "fotal' scc-res of thE: T8St (if Social Insight,
2J1d on the 'Duminance' rJ~nd '.l-irrgressìoYl i sCr.:",lcs ':J:f the Ed'w¿:~i.rds PersollEil
l~referencc Schedule) ~ A te.ble (1,i vin(; ilSP,n SC()r8r:~ c;,nd s C8.ndf~Td
devin.tions f()r me,1e ei.nd female: siJl)j8cts ,')n E:i:~ch vari,~tble measured
is listed in APi.d!.KNDIX 2.. The cO!1puter -pr Jg:rp.Elme f')r cl¡t,~,ininfr these
ff;8SUres c:nsti tutes úP?:BNDIX 3.
Sub,j ccts
Ninety six mill" and ninety-six femièle lL'"dergr2.duatu
students, fcllowing c:JUrses :i. the lJni ver'si ty of E3tirlinf;, Scotland,
t,)ok lJrLrt in the inv8sti¡(:¿::tiun. frh0ir help was enlisted by mertns of Cl
løtter sent to 240 randi;.mly selected student~3 v/hich ')u.tlinc,d the f()rmat
.',f tho inv8sti(rntinn and aski-:,d fr)r tl1Eir help in carryin..: it out.
l1J.í.eminderslf 'Here. sc:nt uut une I:L;nth iF~ter. ItS Et result of thesf'
l"tters (Sce AIJP,;;NDIX 4), 2()2 stuctents v,lunteered t') ¡O.ssist v!i th
the pr)1jcct (a response rate of 84.1'7%), and "f these 192 cciopleted
all five qU()EJti:mnaires of tile test brcttery cind the eX1Jerinentnl
session.
Experimental Si tu::,t., on
The expe.ril.ental sessüms were ccmducted in the
Comnunications LabJrat;.ry of the De:iartnent.if Psych,ilcgy, University
of Stirling. The la':: rator;r, specLi.ly designed for use in situations
viiere cmtl"'J !if communicc'ctinn bctwcun subjects is recuirerl, contains
six cubicles viith full fAcilities for handling up t, twelve subj'cts
at 'my ",iven tine. (Br'.ch cu'bicle l1Ccomodates two subjc:cts).
Each cubic le is semi-sCJundprooferl and eq ui pped with a
table and stcul. 'The d:ior of each cubicle accomod:Ües a panel ')f
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shadovJ'-glass v:rhi ch rLll:)wu the b'xperi:-ento.I' t,:) observe subjects wi th:)ut
himsel f -~jeing u1:JsGlved by thsi.:i..
Tnü gene:re,l nlHn (if the labire.tcry is shown in J?IGUHE 3.
For the pnment eXTJerioent only two cubicles, (Cuhicle 2
i1Dd Cu')icle 5) were used. In a:1ci ti,jn tn the t20ble and st¡¡,l, the
apparatus reouired for the present study (nariely 2. microphone, a
headset, a m"trix-boarc'., 20nd c', fGu::'-c'.igi t c,mnter - 811 controlled
frum the experimenter's consGle), was sitioned in er~,ch cuhicle as
shnwn in l111 GUlG-:; 40
!lhe C()n8~.)lc
The conscJle, t,y ì:il8t1,ns 'jf ì,.ihich tht,' experiment was conducted
anö ciltrcilled, is shown in~'IGUm~ 5, 2nd described briefly below.
~ssentially the ciJnsole provides the experimenter with a means of
C.,iIisiinicP,tiun (nne-v/ay.2 two-W:1Y) -.vith all six cu~iclcs, either
simul tanecusly, in ¡my ccimbin tion ,f cubicles, :ir individually in
is")lcitic)n fr~)ri ,ine an-:;ither. ;r"ì f~'ciii t.ste these conncctic)ns, fuur
separate COffIYH.inic;:tion channels e"re _c)r:Jvided to(rether Vii th a
Elicrcphone and headset fer the experimenter's use. In addi ticin,
t filCili tatc the r¡,c')rdin;r of ins1:riF;ti,ms and data, tw:i f,ur-speed,
two-tr,',ck tr'¡JC recurders hiwc been built intci the consule with



























Thc~~1t.:': t..ix-B :)f-\rd '2
fEhe H12trix-bciards ~)l";.vidcd fÔi" th¿ 8ul':,jE;c:ts ~i¡,'tre of
eie~n8ntary cDnstructi'~)n, 'being sirnYìly El, \,y'-)o,.jen box i!!i th slopinp; frcint,
wi th six shalluw compp.Itrrents r'ch pRinted while inside and fi tted vii th
a 12 volt, i Vï2c,tt bull) 11 Lf,ieh ffB,trix-b:)8rd W(?,S fi ttec1 with 2. perSTJ8X
cover and fCiur h.:)ldinp:: clips, used t' secure the actual tj8ffC
Cia trices v¡hich were printed on paper p~nd inserted:1v8r tl18 (wrs;Jex.
L. sketch diFtgram eif the JTn,trix-bcard is /.~iven in £ilIGUHlï. 6.
':rhe ffp,nipulation "f the !Q2otrix-boards ,,¿(a,in required nnly
clc;:¡entr'ry electrics - na:ncly R s'''i tch ccmn"cted t,.J er:ch bulb s.') thqt
illu3innti\-)n nf th¿-) COl'i'.JF.trtments c(Julc,i_ bE; ~;lchicVGd ind.ividu,~ill,y.. fEhe
wiring dü:gram is given in FIGU.iU; 7. The switches c1mtrolling the
ill uminr:':.ti ',in (;f the mc~ trix-board s y.rere l,')c!-l, tcd :In the C:)Ilf=)ole, as were
the switcrws f',r tb.e r"ur..digit cDlUlters.
,¡~ "lNirin:~' dir-J.grc;,El uf the c()mmunicr~tiuns a:i!parntus is not
included here bacause its complexity, but sume further exple,nrt.Lon
of i ts wnrkini~2"Tì is yz-i ven in the Procedure.~. -,-----
Jhc Dir;i tr1l Counter
111he digi tal c:~'un t8r -(Jr:.:vided in each cubicle W'P.8 made-up
fr:JDl four rn.-Lino Dip:i tD,l 1)ispIßY uni ts. Br~.ch single uni t is canrible:
of displaying 10 different nunbcrs. .tach unit c"ntains ?,n assembly of
:ninü1ture incandescent lamps ~,t the (Jack, a ne¡rati ve wi th an eqwü
num::'er of Ii1uf3SE',.ge dis:)lays, a series (if lensos, and rt frnnt viewing








of the nC3gativG :1.::; :il1w!1in ,tû,:i, ~_:.nd T..'T )jectod thr~)ugh the lens
s,ysi;em ')11 t'¡ '0218 viQvrinr; screen givin~;; rin ime.p;-8 '-)ne inc-i hìrrh"
1111.8 di s e_ys " c conne c tod in ~~s scnblie S r!vnd , +in "",;. cl
hrillSir:t( Eh)UnteG in en.ch oubicle. rl'his is perT:1:1nentl;y ',;;rirf.Jd, ìv'j.th the
ccnnecti)n f:'ìr the la21ps (-~xtcnò.in;:; t:) n series ;)f onc--channel tOTI-
way thuDbvihec~l sv!itchcs GJv~ntcd ~)n the CCins,Jle (()ue 8yri tor. pür display
uni t) .
Eeycnd the ''1pterinLs reo,uirecl for the perscm,o,lcLty test
tlF;.ttery, and in ~~idditic'n t:::., that dOGcribctl ,~.bnV8, the onl=f lYr\tcrial
required V1as a SUiypl;'/ ef Data ltec()rd.irig~ She f.'ts m~)un"tc,-~j on 2~ cli ~:¡_
br.)i:;;rêi" ('iJ~ specinen Hec,.irding Sh(~ct is shc)1¡vn ín -,,rU:~:.)bi\!DIX 5) 0
lrc)cedur(.¿
'lihe (:Xl) rir;icntal procedures fiJr GLy-lliiS I n.nd 11 ",,:;cre
i5cntict,... ID c:rr1c.,J: t:) f:i,cìlit:::,-GS the ~:,:,dministr' -ri.:)Yl uf the oX)CriLlEnt,
in bè.'th gn.ncs the LW.trices lirs¿~ente;.l tu IJIELyer ß (nc)rL12~llY;~s shown in
'''1' '1 "ix (l ~'r ~'",r,i ~''1 ')j,,,1: _'_L, .. ;; C,,_lil ;..i-i':-LJi fì .... vr8lC rcarrs.l:l7::)cJ S) th'-'.-~ for r~,ii su.bjects tr.l0
presented matrix listed him (~r her)-self t the left nf the matrix
v"ith tY~e ,thc;r pl.c.yeT listi::c1 h,~ove. 'rilE-.; .la~ý;ì'.,-t ¡:"f Pl~¡yer BIS
ar:~triceß for the first ;ttt01Tpt n ench i tc'i'::',ti:))1. c,f the gr"Ir'i0s wQS
thus as shuì,vn in l\,l.l!i'liCLCLS 12 and 13.
l'his fCcture fr,cili tuted the rdr1inistri,tiun èJ f the
ex-)c:riment by aJlovd.ng pre9isc:ly tÌle semc instructinYlS to l'e given to
buth pl,'::\yers in c:vc-:ry d;Tad, in rtdditic)n ensurint; thr:t thc.: visual
"- '
m::¡ L"rix d.Lsplay vr;,::s idcnticGl f()r t.:VCTV su1Jjcct, rc;,rnrdlel-3s----~~-- " of whether
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l:'J-i bvl..~ ~.~. intr~)ducE.d into the experimental si tua ticn
(Sec B1.Ti;unE 3)~ c:i..r-'''. . '-'-..,..J._ SU-!d'jcct \vas T:il2.ced in Cl cuhJ_clü a:1.d fitted with the
hep"dSE-)t provided. Bcith subjc7cts YTCrC then F,skcd tn listen to (" play-
bnck ef -~rc-rec(.n'ded instru.ctions (SGB APPl!~NDIX 6).
H,IVirW: :'cscertc:~n,'d th~ 1; the subjects underst!Od the
working"s :~xf' thu 8D,trix b:Jard and what ".¡; s requirod of them, the
expf)rim(~nter proceeded to oonduct thirty runs 'if the game, recording
thtD cl1:-)ices of bc¡th sutjectr.:i, r~lnd their payuffs on each iterp,ti'Jn.
I~Dch sutject's every attempt to deliver n hf':tch ')1' gouds necessitated
several nanipu12:ti:'¡ns :)f the GOIYOUnicf'.tiDn channels :.;,y t.he
experimen ter. Firstly, Plriyer B was cL)sed (,ut ~)f the comrrunicnti'm
channel aLd .Player A 20sked f1ir his (her) chcice of trrinspnrt.
Pl20yer 1l then inf Tmed the) experimenter of his (her) choice (SeEò
J?IGUHE 8e.). On receiving Pla,yer it iS cl1:.iice, l)le.yer /i was then
cL)sed ,mt of the comr:unicatinns channel and the ~)rC)cedure retJeated
fir .Flr:yur 11, nis (her) chiicG heing C),skod .for ilnd rect,ivod (See
FIGUHE 8b). On recei vinR FliCYGr 13' s choice, the experimenter then
switched Player ,h b¡:1,C'~ int~j the cll!inncl f\nd informed 1:,c,th subj(;cts
eif their reSf)'C'c'tivG chcices (.UI(;U.dL Bc). B .,;th pIL,,yers ¡NOTe then
closed Dut )Jf the circuit (FICiliL Gd) 8,nd the exp,.,rimenter rElC)rded
tnl! choic,~s (and Jl!'l.y:"ffs where a )prupriate) C)f b,)th subjects on
the Data H.ecurdìnfY Sheet. (a1icn n trial v,i-rJ,S cumpletG'd the 8xperimentcr
ad,)Dsted t:1G dii;i tR,1 ccunteI's fur 820ch playcr gppr:ipria tely tu
register their new holdings; when an ",ttempt W20S unsucce s,sful, the
illuminatic,n ,ef the m trix )we.rd w:~s rDved t:i the next matrix).
Aftcr this procedure had l~,Gen ())fTpleted an"th"r atteEipt (or trial)
wns initiated. úfter 30 iterations the griòYe We),S declored finished
and subjects WQ:re allowed (2ofter bGinV sworn tn secrGcy) to c1iscuss
the eX'Jerii:ent with the experimonter.
Finally, when all subjects had com)letüd the ex~,)eriment,
tb, elateL (iistüd in APPENDIX 7) was ,.nalysed as described in the
followin~ ohapters.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN RESULTS ArID ANALYSIS
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Resul ts The Measures Em~loyed
As already stated, during thû course of thc cxperiment
strategy-chc'ice on each step of the game and payoff on each iteration
(trial) was recorded for each subject in all dyads. From this data,
for the purposes of 2omilysis, sever20l furthor measures were
obtained for O2och dY2od.
In view of the comprehensive study and treatment of
the original trucking game given by Deutsch and Krauss in their
papers of 1960 and 1966, and the statistical treatments of the
derivatives of the original Iru:ie given by Borah (1963), Galla (l966),
and Shomer, Davis, ,cnd Kelley (l966), it was deciJed t, analyse the
data fallowin,o: ElS closely as possible the methods previously employed
by the several experimenters menticned above.
In the version of the trucking g8.rie developc,d for the
present investigation, the best sinrrle measure Df the difficulty
experienced by the bargainers in reachillr 2op,'Yeement is, as wi th the
errrlie:r versions of the g8.I'e, the sum of each d,yad i s pr',fi ts (or
losses) on a ,d ven trial. 'lhe higher the sur¡ cif the payoffs to the
two players on r, given trial, tho less time (fewer steps) it took them
to arrive at P. procedure for sharing tric Preightliner facilities.
(It W8.S, of course, p(Jsslble for 'me or both ()f the players to decide
t) send their batches of freii.;h t by "GxJds 'l'rain" so as to Iwoid a
protracted stalemate during the process :if bargaining. This, however,
20lways rcsul tcd in at least a 5 points smaller joint payuff if only
one player chose tlie Goods Train facility, than 2n optimally a:rri ved
ci.t agreement cc;ncernin, the UBe of the l"rcightliner facility).
A second, more gross, measure of the diffi cul ty
cxperienced by the b.1rgainers in rcachin" agreement is given by
the time taken (th,~t is, the nunèic,r of steps rcquirod) tci cC)inplete
the ¡same. (By the structuro cif the gaiCè, the more steps or chciices
required to complete a trial, the smal ler the payoff. Since, in the
ec momic sense at lerst, borgaining success is measured by mapni tude
of profit, the time t20ken t:) complete the ¡rame must refl8ct the
difficul ties experienced by the pI2oyers).
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While th~" TI,asure)f time taken, or numb er of steps to
cl'i,teri nil (30 i ter20 ticJns) , gives a (crUSS me" sure uf the difficulty
experienced by the bargainfJrs, jt is tu he noted th"t during the course
of ths gaLll: tine m,w be lost by a p18yer in twCJ different ways. Tim8
is lost either wnen both players choose to wai t simul tanf:ously
(strategy choice 2) "i' whÐn they !i cith chciose "FreLrhtliner" at the same
time. RJrah (1963) used the "time IDst in standoffs" by players
in the g1ème s a measure when c nmparing his experiment20l groups. His
index was basically "the tir1C spent by both sU)Jjeots activcly
insistinG by their pr6sence upon R'oing first through the common section
of the shorter pathway." (page 40). Since in the present experiment
this is equivalcnt to 20 simul tanccus "Freightliner" choice by both
members of the dyad, time lost in standoffs is represented in the
present analysis by the nu.'1ber Df block1èges on thc "Freightliner"
chui ce unly, this being H more preci se il8asure of the ciiffi cul ty
experienced by the subjects in reachin!; agreEmient.
Thus, following the lines taken by the u\rlier users of the
variuus fCJrEls of the Deutsch and Krauss trucking g'Lne, the following
measures were,)btained for each dyad frc!L the de.ta recorded during
the actual running of the experiment :-
Total Joint Payoff swnmed over 30 trials, (See APPENDIX 8) i
'l)tal Joint l'ayc)ff for GD,ch)f 6 blocks of tri20ls : 1-5, 6-10,
11-l5, 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, (See APPEIIDIX 8);
l)
2 )
3 ) Median Joint Payoff over 30 trials, (See APPENDIX 9);
;; ) Median Joint :Payoff for G'èch of 6 blocks of trials: 1-5, 6-l0,
11-l5, 16-20, 2l-25, 26-30, (See APPENDIX 8);
5 )
6 )
'lotal Number of Steps t20ken summed over 30 trials, (See APPElJDIX 10) i
Total Number of Ste))s taken in each of 6 blocks of tri2olS: 1-5,
6-iO, 11-15, 16-20,.21-25, 26-30, (See APPENDIX 10) i
7) Total Number of sinul taneous Strategy 1 Choices ("Freightliner"
hlockages) summed over 30 trials, (See APPENDIX 11);
8) Total Number of simultaneous Strategy 1 Choices in each of 6
blocks of trials: 1-5, 6-iO, 11-l5, i6-20, 2l-25, 26-30, (See
ilPPEIJDIX 11).
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By way :)f DU'""l'crizin;; the rG6\'.J tG, the Mean and
Median Jojnt PU:Juffs for ench of 6 blocks of triRls rrG presentecì
in the graphs which follow, (PIGUHLS 9 Rnd 10 respectively.)'
Analysis of Hesul ts
For the an,glysis, it VIe'S c!üciclf'd to look first for
differences in behRviour between the expcriment20l i2rclU'S due to
eXDerimental conditions and sex, and them to investigatü for possible
effects of personality on behaviour in the game.
The Search for Group Differences
It is tc) to notod that tho mecsures listed in the
previous section are E!,ll concerned with the joint performance of
players in ee,ch dyn,d and nut vii th pla,yers res individuals. 'lhis is
hecauso during the ci)UrSe of thE! ga ',e, the totril timo spent by a
pliWE!r on 20ny ,êÌv8n tri!.ü (and honce his payoff) is p,"rtinlly
controlled by the other ri€LùJ8r of the pair. (It might be argued
tha t a player does have control over his own paYJffs, since at any
',oint in a run cif thE; game he can either chClose to use the "Goods
Train" fpcili ty and aut ,maticEclly ensure successful delivery, or he
Clen choose to take the risk of non-delivery by opting for the
freightliner fecili ty, using r~i ther the "W2oi t" or "Freightliner"
strategies. E(W8Ver, the present experimenter would argue that this
is no reaJ. choice since the "Goods 'Train" str2otegy-choice payoff is
alwnys 5 and 10 points inferior to the ":iai t" and ":F'ruightliner"
choices respectively, except, perhaps, In thü sixth step of a trial
where it may b() considered suporior because of the threat of' 25
penal ty ,Joints on bl()cka¡;e).
Addi tional to, and Dsrh8.DS more important than these
partial controls by the othròr on time taken ,cnd payoff', is the
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behavioui. At Rn3' point in the game (except the very first strategy-
choice point) the stra tegy-cl'loicE of a player lNill almost certninly
be influenced by the previous chol.ces mado by b'Jth pIRyers en earlier
trials of the game. In short, there is interaction between the
players throUio;h,mt the course of the experimental s8ssion. The only
point "\vhere thi~:; is not the case is the vpry first strategy-choice in
the first tri2.1 01' the ga;Jc, when no choices have b8cn ilc'de and,
hence, no knüwledge of any strategy-choices of the other can be
aV20ilable tc either member of the dyad.
In compnring the experimental gr,iU¡)S fc)r differences
in beh"viClUI, it was (\cci'ed to look first at the stratck-y-choice of
eAch player on the first step of certain trials of the "nome (in order
to test for trends in ch ;ice over time), in addi tion to investigating
the measures of joint b8hDviour. The trials chosen were the first
in the i;ame, !Jlus tue l'lst trial included in ench of the ,six hlocks
of trials - that is, trials 1, 5, lO, 15, 20, 25, and 30.
I1he frequency ()f each stra.tegy-choice on the first step
of the first trüü of the gaLie for players in 820ch of the four




Choice 2111 !\II FI j;'II
1 30 32 3l 26
2 l3 13 9 9
3 " 3 8 l3.J
'l,,BLE 9
Since the F test requires 20t leGst intervnl me2osure~ent
of the variables inv~)i ved, the f:inal;ysi S of varianco technique was
not appropriate to the above d2ota, 20nd ir order to test for over-all
significant differences, El partition of chi SquarE W20S m2ode,
following the method outlined by Winer (1962) .lhis 2 X 2 X 3 chi














































F th t t 'lJùL1 10 \I s fè!rmer1 .rom e compu a ions 'R , ! --vc .
Source Chi df 2 critical value at et =0.05square x
'Total 78.500 11 19.680
A 0.0 1 3.84
B 0.0 1 3.84
G 72.6563 2 5.99
AB 0.0 1 3.84
AC 0.2812 2 5.99
BC 4.03l2 2 5.99
ABO L.53l3 2 5.99
TABLE 10
From the table it may 1)ü S8ün thnt a significant difference
is detected only with rei:;ard tCJ varinble C (the frequencies with
vvhich str2,terries 1, 2, and 3, ~i_re chOE1en v.'Ì thJ.n each of t.he groups).
By reference to the aDpropriate statistical te"hles it may he seen
that this differ8nc8 is highly significant (beyond the 0.001 level).
It is to be noted, however , that this difference is expected,
since by the structure Df the game, players should not chDose each
stl'ateg'J 'i th equal frequency. No ether differences are detected,
however, either between experimente,l concH tions or between sexes.
A Darti tion of chi-squ2Te for frequency ~)f strategy-
choice on the first step of trials 5, 10, l5, 20, 25, nnd 30 in e20ch
case rev8aled variable C fiS being highly significant, hut fiS with
tri20l 1, no other differences wer8 detocted either between experimental
conditions or between sexes. (rhe strategy-choice frequencies and
corrputa tions of the chi-square fJr these trial s arc given in
Al'PJi:NDIX 12) .
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As alren:ly str,teci, the best single measure of the difficulty
exporienocd i)y the uenbers -if 2" pair in re20ching agreement is the
joint pnyoff to the dyad. In order to test further for differences
between expcriiiental cndi tions and between the sexes within each
cmdi tiem, the Kolmogorc;v-Smirnuv Two-Sample Test (two-tailed)
2uSüd in preference tu either the x test or the median test
since it seerlS L¡ore :Jowerful in 1111 C2oses, (Siegel, 1956, page 136).
WE~S
Since the two-tailed tüst is sensitive to any kind of difference
in the dilitributions from which the samples are drawn, including
differences in location, (central tendency), the test was used 'Nith
tw, seprirate measures: the tc)tal j')int payoff (the amount earned hy
both subjects summed over cül the trials) achieved by each group, and
the median joint payoffs (the !:iedian value for e8ch group over the
30 iterßtions).
The results C)f this analysis aI''' 'Jresented in
'jiU3LE 11 :-
Measure C onpari son D
~
MI v. MII 5/24 5
Total FI v. FH 6/2 il 6Joint
:riil I?I 4/24 4Payoff v.
MII v. FIr 7/24 7
MI v. MH 2/24 2
Median FI FII 4/24 4J:iint v.
Payoff MI v. FI 4/24 4
MII v. FII 4/2!f 4
I'ABL:E: 11 .
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Since for the two-tFliled tes t, and N = 24, the cri tic20l
ve.lue of KD at ex = 0.05 is l~ = 10, it CD.n be seen frcnn the abr)ve
table th20t no differences !J,rf: dctected ei thur be tvl(::en C ondi t ions
or between sexes.
Since tho Kcilnrignrov-Smirnov tests showed no sex differences
within either experimental grcmp for either the total jcint payoff
achieved by the dyads, or the nedicm jêiÌnt lJ2oyoffs, the two sexes
vrer8 ccimbined for an ancüysis nf variance. The nnalysis was made of
(i) the i:ean total j'Jint payoff scores, and (ii) tl1G median joint
payoff scores; usine~ in each caSt; Et breakdûvrn of the (~nt~l into six
blocks of tri20ls (1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, and 26-3U) in order
tCJ test for trends. 'l'he moans for tüe 12 cells in the analysis of
variance of the nean total joint payoff for each c,mdi ticm by trilü
blocks 2oro !n veil in ~¡ilLE 12 :
lRIALS
Condi tiun 1-5 6-iO 11-l5 16-20 2l-25 26-30
i 114.90 105.73 114.90 111.26 11e .65 l26.04
II L05.53 122.29 119.90 126.46 123.13 120.94
'lABLE 12
'J.he analysi s of vfèriance, if s c"mputed from the ab ove




Trid Block 44.928 0( 1




The medicms fc,r the l2 cells in the analysis of variance
of Median Juint Pay()ff fDr 82,ch cnditi0Yl by trial blocks are





6-iO 11-15 i6-20 21-25 26-30
I 121.00 116. OD l?9 r', 125.3l l30. DO l37 . 50
-- .Jb
II 116.25 132.50 l33.57 l42 .50 142.00 131.00
'li\.LE l4
The cJmputed e.nalysis uf vfiriance is sl:ciwn below in
i'liBLE l5
Source MS F
ExperiE18n tal 123.0721 2.2527
Ccindi tion
'l'rial Bl'Jcks 93.5684 1. 7127
\Ni thin Cells 54.6335
TABl,E ,--
The critical v ~Jlue cif the F distribution 2,t Cl = 0.05 for
the experiinent20l cmdi tLms is 6.61 (df=l/5) and fJr the trÌ¡ü
blocks is 5.05 (df=5/5). FrDm inspecticin of the F values in Table s
13 and 15 it can be seen tlict DD significcmt differences ))etwecn the
eXT)erimenti:11 C'in(liti':J~s, 8.nd n:ì trenö.s nV0r tiDe 'I"Tithin conditions,
arc found for Edther the Ejc;an total jJint prwoff cir the :nedip,n joint
pc:woff to dY2.d s in the gane.
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Tv~~o furth(')T DE~::l SUTt:,S of bchnvi ,~~qir renained, (the nlUlH~:r of
St8PS requirEd tn rr:)rich cri t8rion, and tl:e nunber of blockages cm
strategy-cl:oice 1). Again the KOlDogorov-Smirnov 'rV/o-Sample test
(two-tailod) '1/8 employed 1Jcause of its power-efficiency. Once cigain
no significc:,nt di.fferences betweon groups were fnund for either
ff(jrCSure. 'll1e results :,f the KOIDogorov-Smirnov tests are sUlmJ2.rized
in 'llABLL 16 below. As bef,ore, wiiere N=24 and a = 0.05, the
critical value of ~ for the two-tailed test is la.
-
Measure CompEl.risnn D KJ)
Nuiner of steps lII v. MII 5/24 5
required to FI FII 6/24 6rench 'I .
cri tericn JlifI v. FI 4/24 4
¡Vin v. FIr 6/24 6
Num-ber of MI v. MII 6/24 6
blockages on PI FII 6/24 6strategy-choice 1 v.
HI v. FI 5/24 5
MII v. :Tni 8/24 8
'l'ABLE --
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Combininf~ the 8üxes for E\l1 r7,nai~Vsis C)f varin,nce, and
"',gai" 1)1j li.:.ùng six tri20l blocks tc test fur trends, the :'eans for
the twelve cells fer the c-m,ü,ysis of the Germ numblT of steps





I ¡ l6-20 !Condi ti )n l-5 6-iO 11-l5 21-25 26-30
i 9.417 10.3l3 9.417 9.438 9.271 8.917
II
i
9.917 8.958 9.271 8.604 8.7°8 9.042
¡ I
'TABLE l7
The c(liputed )'"wil:ysi s is presented in 'TABLE 18, belJW
l'-_i











'ThE: means fer the 12 cE,lls fur the analysis of vpcriance
of the Llf2on numb,"r uf Freightliner (s trate,ry-ch)icG 1) blockages for
each c'Jndi tion by trinl "blocks are èLisplE!.yed in rrJLBLE 19 :
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lHIALS
C ondi t i on l-5 r 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
i 3.875 4.688 4.063 4.146 3. 9l 7 3.479
II 4.208 3.438 3.938 3.333 3.542 3.583
'lABLE 19




Trial Blc'cks 0.0932 -( 1
Wi thin Cells 0.17/,8
LJ\JU: 20
'lhe ori tioal value ,,1' tyw F distribution at G = 0.05
for the Experimental C'.mditLms is 6.6i (df=l/5), Fmd fur the
Trial blocks is 5.05 (df=5/5). Once again, from inspeotion of the
F values in 'lUJLES ie and 20, it CAD be seen th"t nJ sig'nificant
differences between the experimental COYLÜ tions, and no trends
over time vii thin c()ndi tions ere f:Jund, 8ithsr f¡ir the mean num1Jer
of steps required to i' each cri terionir for the me20n number of
blook"ges on stnüe¡c;y-oh'lice i.
1l1hus the entire f.3tatistical rl_nc1.1ysi,s, usinß' (i) a
,J!rti tinn J,f chi-square tr) investiwi.e first clLJice behn,vi:iur in the
game; (ii) Kolmor;orov-Smirnov 'I\n-Sa;ilnle test8 to test fur differences
due t') expEòri'cent,,¡l c:mditilm or sex of the pleoyers in (a) Total
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Joint Payoff, (b) Median Joint i'ayoff, (c) Number of steps to
criterion, and (d) lJULihor of strategy-choice 1 blockages; and
(iii) Two-Way lmalysosÆ Vporic,nce to investigate for trends over time
utilbing a breakcLmn into trial blocks of measures (a), (b), (c),
and (d), all failed to find any inter-group differences due to
amount of infc)rmc)tion available about thE; othcr i s pay,)ffs in the geme
were found. Additionally, no statistically siGTificant intra-group
differences due to sex of the players were found.
The Effects of Personali ty on Behaviour in the Game
Since, in the foregoing analysis, no differences due to
either the amount ef information available about the other i s
payoffs, or sex of the players in single-sexed dyads, were found,
the four experimental groups were combined for an investigation
of the relationship between personality (as measured by the test
ba ttery) and behaviour in the game, as measured by (l) Total Joint
Payoff summed over 30 trials; (2) Total Number of Ste ps required
to reach criterion (30 trials); and (3) Total Number of Concessiensl
made to the other member ef the dyad.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. This score more accurately represents the numbe:r of times
a player was "bested" by the otl1er member of the dyad - that
is the number of trial s on which the other made a larger profit
(or a smaller less) than the player himself. It is to be noted
that such a criterion does not necessarily give a true "Number
of Concessions" score, since in a dyad playing optimally, the
choices of each player will alternate between "Freightliner"
and "Wait" and this "Wait" is not, strictly speaking, concessionary,
merely an optimal choicc chosen to maintain the players own
payoff level in the extended version of the game.
- l3l -
Since these measures of behaviour are not independent
measures of the performances of individual players, but rather by
the nature of the experiment20l sitUEition are in some degree dependent
on the performances of both members of the dyad, only data relevant
to one member (randomly chosen) of each pair were included in the
following analysis. Thus, in the search for personality correlates
of behaviour in the game, the total number of subjects was 96,
being made up of 24 from each experimental group.
Product-moment correlations of each of the three
measures of game beuaviour with the scores o'btained on each of the
variables .f the personality test battery produced correlations
which, when tested independently of each other, gave the following
'significant' values at a = 0.05 and Cl = 0.01 :_
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The Sixteen h;rsonali ty Pact()1' Ques tiq,nnaire
Variable Measure
Total Payoff Number of Steps




















In the table above and in thoso which follow,~: indicates
sib'Tificant at u = 0.05, ** indicates significant at u = a.Ol,
and (-) indicates th t th" .btained correlation h,.s a negative value.
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The Te st of Sociu.l Insight
None of the correlations between the variables of this
test and any of the three measures of behaviour in the gar;e, when
regarded as independent, reached significance at the 5% level.
For the product-mowent correlations performed, the
significance level employed was that appropric,te to a two-sidecl
significance test, since no directional hypotheses were postulated
and no assumptions regarding specific personality variables made,
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due to the conflicting nature of earlim~ reported studies dealing
i,i th per sonali ty and game-playing behaviour.
Using the 5% and 1% levels of significance for a two-
sided statistical test, and treating each significance test of a
correlation as an independent event, disregarding the existence of
all the other correlations while performing that test, we have the





Number of Steps to
Criterion
Number of Concessions





A critical evaluation of these significances is presented
at the end of the present chapter.
These indications of personality effects on behaviour having
been found by correlation of the personality variables with the gross
measures of behaviour in the game taken as a whole, it was decided
to inve st igat e beahviour more closely, examining first strategy-choice
behaviour on certain trials, for personality effects, using a one-way
analysis of variance technique. Once again trials 1, 5, lO, 15, 20,
25, and 30 were examined, and, as before, all groups were combined
and only that data relating to one member of each pair, randomly
chosen, was used in the analysis, (N = 96). The following
statistically significant differences were found:-
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The Si,2Cte('U Personali toY Fi~cctor Questionnaire
Variable 1 5 10
'lrial






















In the above table and in those which follow, "
indicates significant at Cl = 0.05, ** indicates significant
at Cl = 0.01.
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'lhe Guilf ord/:hmm.9....n Tc:mDcrame.nSurvey
Trial














The Study of Values 'rest
'l'rial










The Edw2~rds Personal , PrefE,rence Schedule
'lrials

















The Test of Social Insi.ßt
Trial









Thus, treating each significance test as an independent
event, the nLlmber of significant differences found in the investigation
of personality effects on the first strategy-choice on each of these
trials is as shown in 'lABLi! 31 :-
'lIUAL Statistically significant beyond


















Looking at the statistical 20nalysis carried out in search of
personali ty correlates of behaviour in the game, our conclusions must
depend on the light in which we view the investigation. On the one
hand, it can be argued that the experimental procedure has utilized
only one sample of subjects chosen from the general population and
th¡ü the persoimli ty variables represent no more than different
a ttributes of the members of this sample; and further, some of the
intercorrelations between the personality variables are high,
indicating lack of independence. Therefore, in examining the correla-
tions found, the usual signific20nce levels are appropriate.
On the other hand, however, it can be emphasised that while
some of the intercorrelations between the personality vpxiables
are high, slightly more than one third of them are less than 0.1;
and that, not only are the subjects sampled but so Rre the personality
attributes also. In this light, we would expect a number of significant
values to occur by chance - namely two or three at the 5% level, and
possibly one at 0. = 0.01. Looking at the investigation in this
way, and treating the variables as independent, it can be seon from
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'Liu"JLLS 25 and 3l that the twtual numbor of correlations and variances
to r8ach this levei or significance is nct much Bore than that
which would be predicted by chance.
However, if we look back E,t the primary purpose of the
investigation, it is seen th~,t the aim was to search for any possible
effects__of porsonali ty an behaviour in the experimental game, in
order to provide a pointer for further, more specific, research.
\ifuile the author inclines towards the latter, more "comiy¡onsense" view
of the significance tE:sting outlined above, to accept the extreme
and severe view thF:t each variable should be treated C\S independent
(and thus discount all the apparently significant findings as
statistical filtifacts) would be te defeat thG whole purpose of the
investigation.
For the purposes ef reporting, therefore, it is felt that
at leA.st we should accept as significant those valuE;s which reach
the 1/0 significance level - namel.:, factors C (Emotional Stability)
and Ql (Radicalism/Conservatisri) of the Cattell Sixteen
Personality Factor '1uostionnaire, factor P (Personal Relatiens) ef
thE) Guilford/Zinimerman Temperament SUl'vey, the Theoretic'll Value
scale of tile Study of Values 'rest, the Exhibi tien scale of the
Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, 2nd the Cooperativeness
tr20i t of the i'est of Social Insight.
- 14l -
CHJU'TEH T\VELV1; : DI SCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
- l42 -
Discussion
Looking ovcrcùl at the analysis then, while there might
appear to be some indicAtion of personality correlates or game.pl~ng
behaviour (notably dominance-ascendance and cooperativeness). the
investig tion hp"s failed to locate any differences in behaviour due
to sex of the players in single-sexed dyads, and h20S further failed
to show any effect of the amount of infornation available 2obout the
payoffs of the other on player's behaviour in the galle.
It may be thpt no differences due to either sex of the
players or experimental c"ndi tions exist. Should this be the case, it
calls into question the results of Messick and lhorngate (1967) and of
Amon Rapcport (1969) who did find differences in game behaviour due to
the informp'.tion variable. On th" oth8r he-cnd, it may be that no
differences between the experimental groups have been found because
of the na.ture of the "Freightliner" game. In the version of the
trucking game used in the present investigation the meRsures of
overall behaviour RI'e soniewha t gross. In particular, the "fixed sum"
payoffs available through each choice may not have allowed sufficient
discrimination between the strategies 2odopted by the players, and
the magnitude of the payoffs (up to 20 points per trial) moy h20ve
rendered the game less meaningful to the players in that the
threat of blockage (with potential loss of 5 to 25 points) may not
have re:iresented any real threRt - especially to Pi player whose
holdings may have amo\rnted to several hundred points. It may
therefore be that the lack of significant differences betw8en the
experimental situation was of itself not altogether satisfactory.
furning to the statistical analysis of the possible
influence of personality on behaviour in the game, we first note
that .from the nature of the game, where profits depend on speed of
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delivery, we would predi et an ìnve;rse rel ations..i p between the
total pa(off in 'the game and thc numb,"r of steps required to eoiiplete
30 trials. Tiw actual correlation vias foimd to be - 0.B767. 'lhe
two mG"Isures arc thus highly interdependent. In view of this. it is
only to be expected that VT;ere a statistically significant
correlation occurs betwE,en one of these measures and Et given
p;rson2oli ty variable, there is a tendency for n corrcsponding
statistically significant or near-significant, corrclation ln the
opposi te direction to exist betwoon that personality variable and the
other measure of behaviour in thu game. 'l'his corrosponding correlation
was fOlL'1d to reach the samG level of significfmce in two C20ses out of
six, and to approach significance in each of the remaining four.
Looking nore closely therefor8 at om" of these measures, the
"Number of Steps to Criterion", we find that the personality variablGs
which correlate, \Vi th significancG beyond the 0.05 l\Jvel, e're the E and
Ql factors of the Cattell Sixteen Personality Fi1ct.or Questionnaire, kiG
A d 1'1 p t o,t' .." . l" d IZ' C" t Sa.D .V l. ac - or¡= L n(:; I,.i' 11i t or I imLi.orman l GipL'rarr8D urvey, EE1d the
Dominance scale of the l':dwards Pursonal Preference Schedule. Of
these five significantly corrcclnted v'rinbleEJ, thrc,; are ffl'QSUrCS of
dominance-ascendancE:, onc-; if~, a measurü of radicalism, r--d ttat
remaining provides a meR.sure of I:asculinity41
Looking D.t what thEse veriablGs represent psychologically,
their statistical significanCE) might wcll sc(,m plausible. A high score
on PactoI' Ql, for eX2omple, accordine to the tost manual (pr.gus lS-l9)
indicates an inclination to experir:;nt vJÌ th problem solutions, and
less inclination to moralize" lI'lhe t1ctual items express an interest
in bruiking the crust of custom and tradition, an:l in lccèding and
persuading people..... In group dynaiiiics the l!l+ (high-scoring)
person contributes significantly more rumarks to discussion, a high
percontage being of a critical n2oture." Such cln indiviclual
we might well, in retrospect, expect to be dissatisfied vii th optimal-
choice play, and to try (by continued "Freightliner" choices) to
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persuade tLe ethur to concede. lidcL.tional1y, we might expect highly
Qscendant or dominan t pL',,)rcr¡ò t () choose ".B'reigh tliner" excessively in
an attempt to dOi'iwite tlw other, F,nd 'luice the positive corr€lations
vii th "l'Q'lber of Steps rc!quiTfjd to Criterion" and negative co:crelations
\Vi th Total Payoff might a yie20r to be satisfactorily explained. Looking
at fe,ctor NI (masoulinity), and notin¡! tlFt EL high score on this
variable gives a mee.sure of how hardboih;d and resistant to fe2r the
individual is, (as opposcd to sympathetic, fearful, 2nd c'lotionally
expressi VG) , we might c oncl ud e th'èt th., s signifi cance concurs wi th
those already examined.
However, before embarking on such a theory, we should
enquire into the independence or othurwise of these v2riables.
Since three of the ve,riables are measures of the same trait
(dominance-ascendance) wc would not expect them to be independent.
'.rhe actual correÌii t:i-ons betWeen the fivl' variables 2,rc givfm
below in lJJ3LE 32, (N: 192) :-
E Ql A NI dom
E .lSl1 .6837
.4419 .SSl8







From llABL:F~ 32 it can be seen th::-, t thE' three measures of
dominanc8-ascendance are, highly intercoTreL1tc:d (Y: v. A : .6837;
E v. dom: .5518; and A v. dOD: .S836). ilditionally, it can he
seen that the M (masculinity) variable is fairly highly correlated
wi th all these three.
Out analysis so far, thEm, has uncoverf;d statistically
significant correlations which i,t least give indications of the
effects of some pers onali ty trai ts (nfu"ely, factor Ql of the Cattell
Sixteen Pcrsonali ty .b'actor:iuestionnaire, and th" 'lheoretical Value
scale of the Study of Values Test), on behaviour in the bargaining
game.
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From 8:iuimi nCltion 0 f th,; í'il,tlwr analysis employing first
strategy-cbCli.ce on celGC,:in trials 'tS the moasure of behaviour in
the statistically signifioant variances are found throughout those
trials investigated number 18 in 2011. Looking at what they mean
psychologically, it can be seen that, 8S \Vi th the statisticcclly
significant correlations of porsonali ty with tLe three overall measures
of game behaviour, pIQ\lsiblu exr.Ìè1.nations can be given to many.
Looking at first trial behaviour, the following 20Ppear significant :-
fact el'S C and Ql of the Sixteen .Personal.ity Factor QUe,S tionnaire, values
S ancl P of thu Study of Values 'rest, and the heterosexuality scale ef
the EdwardsPersonal Preference Schedule. :F,~,ctQr tU h8s alrcaCly been
explained. 'lhe l'ossi bl", rE,levance of factor C, (known as ¡';motiònal
Stability or Ego Strength), which is described as one of dynamic
integration and r:aturi ty as opposed to general emotionali ty, and
whose, high scorers i~aintain bi:tt8r group morale and are far Llore
frequently leaders, can a1 so be appreciated . Examination of the S
(Social) value scale of thu Study of Values ':Cest, siieww the high
scorer to be one viho prize s other persons as ends, and is therefore
himself kind, sympathetic, and unselfipbi. rrhus the factor's possible
influenct; on ,,"me b8iiaviour is plausibl8, in that the pers"n sroring
high on social value rrnght well prrv8 less cOI'peti tive towards the
other member of the dyad than might low scorers. Hi~i scorers on value
P (Political) are describ8d as pririarily interested in power and
leadership, and thus the relevance 01' this factor also could be
accepted. 1Nhile any relevance cf the heterosexuality score (l'm the
Edwards Personal Preferonce Schedule) to first trial behaviour may
seem obscure, the significances found for subsequ8nt trials can
generally be successfully interpreted. The possible influence of
measures of cooperativeness (the P scale of the GuilfordjZimmerm2on
temperament Survey, Emd scale ILL of the 'rest of Social Insight,
where the high scorer is described as ono who ini tiates an active
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and positive endeavour directed at tne solution of the problem). is
apparent. ThD pOClsi blD influence of the 'lheoretical and Economi.c
values (The Study of Values Test), where the interests of the
theoretical m20n are described as empirical, critical, and rational.
and the economic man is cha,racteristically interested in the
production, 8arketing, and conswnDtion of goods, ..... and in the
accwnulation of tangible wealth; aggression (the i ap;g' scale of the
Edwards Personal Preference Schedule)r and acceptance of dominance
as measured by the ~' scale of the G uilford/Zil.imerman 'l'emDerar:ent
Survey, should again, in retrospect, be obvious. The relevance of
the Exhibi t! scale of the Edwards Persona,l Preference Scrwdule
may seem somewhat less plausible, however, f'S indeed may the
measures of deference and nurturance on the same test, and factor
JI (absentmindedness) of the Sixteen l)ersonali ty PactoI'
Questionnaire.
Nevertheless, indications of the influence of
personali ty on strategy-choice behaviour throughout the game are
clearly apparent. While no trends over time can be claimed
wi th confidence, it is to be noted that there is Fm indica tion
of 20n increasing effect of cooperativeness in the second half of the
game (first apparent on Trial l5) when the carJier effects of
emotional stabili ty, radicalisiCl, i'_g"ression, and economic values
have all but disaooeared.
Overall, then, accepting the l% level of significance,
it can be seen that six different personp.li ty v20riables influence
behaviour in the -bargaining game: Enotional Stability, Hadicalism/
Conservatism, Personal Helations, ThE,oretical Value, Exhibition, and
Cooperativeness. Prom the foregoing di'3cussion, the possible
relevance of the maj.ii ty of the se factors is understandable.
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It i suglcGst,)d thet th"se should be ti1e subject
of fuX'tbJ~;.r invHE3ti.i~~'i::,tion. It Dlay bc, thi't 801:18 of these
pOÌ'itcrs would, inèhe event, prove spurious (possibly ths
ExhibL ti on scale wcu,Ld SCCr¡ ¡¡¡ost likely hie're). N'3vertheless. nt
our prcsent state of knowledge of the influence of non-6conomic
factors on game,-playing behaviour, thoE'" pd~s,mrili ty traits
1iifhich have proved to Sir'Pifi'~a.ntiJr affect behaviour in tlh3
presently invt2stig'atcd r~apie, viould appí;Je~r to be valurlble
indicP,tors of the dj.rection futurL research in thG c~rç;a. should
follo'!f.
ConclllJ_icns.
'lhe present investien.ticn failid to suostantinti; tiie
hypotheses relating gc,,,e pla,yinf! behEiviour to (a) amount of
inf orUè, ti on L1V&ile,bl e regarding thEe' other i s i)rixoffs (HYPO'I'HLiSI S 1);
or (b) sex of the ple,yors m single-seYicd d,ye,ds (HYPOTHESIS 2), 2nd
thus in (!ach cpse tlw mül hypothesis i'3 acccitad.
StatLJticelly significant persen.o~J.i ty correlate,s of
behaviour in tho gar:'¿:: when taken ns a \9holc, c~.nc1 specifically on
particular trials (including Trial l) v'erc' fo,md. HYPO'?.d~HS 3 1"8.S
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"PPP'TDI" i...:1 ".!..d.\, ~
nStuclent ç S Ttt - ,:: conputeX' programme designed. to
perform t test s on 55 v:Jriables of two set s of ,lata,
each set having 48 scores.
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STUDEHTb T TE:ST'
~¡BEGINn nIJTlEGEI), .r ~¡J , T'J,N ,;P:.;
"REAL"X" TX, SU¡'SQX, Y, TY ,SL,E1SQY ,K,L ,P ,Q ,S ,R, T;
""'i:AL""'RDAy"vAri.¡'O l'-S'j '1,'r1-j'8 1'5,1.I\..::o .1\1 N-l .l.1-11. 0 T(;:; ..: , .".n. 1. ~ + '!i... oJ J :;
llFORnr ~ =l!tSTEpni1iUNTIL "?!+8';\'DOn
~TFOR~lJ: =inSTEP;;,.11nUi,TTIL~155;rDO'i
,mi:r,n,"v,ri Tl.l'-t!"" /\.1., L 'U) ~
¡¡FOR;îI : =i'~STEpn l~1U?'TTIL¡';'48'nDO"~
HFOR?liJ: =1 "STEP,11:;'f.'NTILlt5 5°ïDO~\




TX: =TY: =SutlSQX: ::sm!sQY: =0 ;
H: =ll: ='+8 ;
"'FOR"l: =r'STEP"i"¡n:TlL"'T'¡"DO"





"BEGIN"IY : =YA t ,J ,A 1 ;
TY:::TY+Y;





Q. -'''.'(T 1'2)', . -J'l ".l ~
S: =SQRT ( (Stn,lSQX+STJ!SQY- P-Q) I( tl+N-2) ) ;
R: =8QRT( UT,¡-N) I (w',;¡) ) ;
'l'=(K-T) ,(",',,,).
.: 0 .. I .. J., :i
"PRlFT"T S A !'~I" LTNT" ' '83" ,;,






A set of Tables showing the means and standard deviations
of soores obtained on the Personality Test Battery by r.1ale
and female subjects. 1ilhere comparable norms are given in
the test manuals, these have been inoluded here for readers'
convenience.
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MEANS l'LNTI S'lAi'LDIiXlD Dl!~VI.;:\i:rI()I.JS ()J? r'Tè S'TB Trcp", (IN 'ì'I'1S \u~ (I U.1..1J _.1 .: LE ¡'.
Stirling IJ:liYi~rsj_t'_SE,mD18
1TL'JIûf S'liU,UJAn:D D,E;VVüii ONMen Womenl'Je 11 v'Jomen
20.50 19.92





JlLjANS MID S 11jü',.fDiic.i:W DLVIiú'Il;IS l'Oii LI1.fü;~ TRAil' SGOH1.GS OH THE
CAi'TEL1 ' r P..F. QUi,si'ioN1IAim: .1.0
Stirlin,K Uni V:8LsJ_"tScunp1e
T.RAll Nü:~lîNS 8 'l'liN D .üB.D ;)LVljùlIONS
MEn l'IoffÐn :Bo th 1,.ien "vlomen Both
1i 8.95 11.06 10.0 3.06 3.24 3.32
B 9.3B 8.99 9.2 1.64 1.99 1.84
c l2.67 12.43 12.5 3.36 4.2/l 3.83
E 14.67 1i .45 13 .l i 3' 1f.56 4.74L. .' )
F l4.38 15.67 15.0 /~. 70 5.19 'f.99
G 9.00 10.25 J .6 3.88 3.63 3.79
H LO.S3 lO.27 10.6
' 7' 5.36 5.07it. "-t.
I 11.10 l2.98 12.0 3.47 3.49 3.60
1 9.00 9.08 9.4 3.4l 3.08 3.27
l" Li.n 13.71 13.9 3.82 3.37 3.61
N lO.O; 9.79 9.9 2.88 3.42 3.16
0 l1.06 12.'32 l1.9 3.81 4.11 4.06
QJ lO.80 9.70 lO.3 2.42 2.75 2.65
Q2 l2.',2 11.92 l2.2 3.09 3 sr 3.25
:)3 7.79 8.43 8. 1 2.72 3.0l 2.88
1~4 13.63 l5.Bl li.7 .¡ .89 4.38 4.77
N = 96 96 192 96 96 192
- 1'70 -
LIEJ:LNS JUID S'lAJU'llD DiWI!l1'IOJJS UF 'ri1L ¡lRJil'l SC:)B.ES PUR llH:S
Ell '. iiRD S Pi~i1.S(",';.i~L ?RJ~FgRE~\r Ct~ se HED U.L1iJ
Hariual Norma for College Sa~'iDie
'lHAll ïvEùtNS S'l'j-iJ"JJJ.IL.;iJ) DEVLú'IONS
lIen ¡Nomen Both l;'(en "iOffE:n Both
ach 15.66 13.08 l4.38 !, .13 4.19 4.36
def 11 .21 l2.40 11.80 3.59 3.72 3.7l
ord 10.23 10.24 1 (). 24 4.31 4.37 4.34
exh 14.40 l4.28 l!l.34 3.53 3.65 3.59
aut l' 3' 12.2) l3.3l 4.45 i "4 4.53.. it. Lt , '.J
20ff l5.00 17 .40 l6.l9 4.32 4.07 4.36
int 16.l2 1'1.32 i6.72 5.23 4. era 5.0l
suc LO.74 12.53 11.63 4.70 4.42 Il .65
dom 17.4!;. 14.18 l' 83 4.88 4.60 5.02j.
aba 12. ;24 15.11 13 " 4.93 d! 04 5.14.00 , . -'
nUT 14.04 l6.4;) l5.22 if .80 4.4l if.76
chg l5.51 17.20 16.35 4.74 4.87 4.88
end 12.66 12.63 12 ",. '; .30 5.19 5.25.0)
het 17.65 1/;.34 16.0l 5. ,18 5.39 5.68
10 79 10.59 11. 70 /~. 59 4.6i 4.73agg J. '-. .
con l1.';3 l1. 74 11.64 1.88 1. 79 l.84




TRAll l";'frjJ.~.-,~' S S'l'ANDAFW DEVTúlIONS
Hen it,jomen Both Men ìi'/omen Both
ach 1505 13 .0 li;.3 4.12 3.85 4.l7
def LO.4 10.3 10.3 3.47 3.87 3.67
ord 9.5 9 ,- 9.5 4.98 4.86 4.92.)
exh 13 .8 13.1 13.4 3.86 3.68 3.78
aut l6.8 l4.6 15.7 4.43 !I .42 4.57
aff 14.1 i6. ï 15.4 4.05 /)..41 4.44
int 1'7.2 17 "1 17 .3 5.49 4.30 4.93
suc l2.3 li; .3 13.3 /~ .87 4.90 4.99
dom 12.7 8.9 10.8 5.l5 4.23 5.08
ana l1.8 15.2 l3.5 5.09 4.87 5.27
nur l~,. 5 17.7 16.6 5.18 !¡.HJ 4.82
chg 15.8 1'1.7 i6.7 " 9 '1 i '3 4.59'i' . Lt :, . '+
c;nd l2.8 12.5 l2.6 ') .62 5.52 5.57
het 18.3 17 .0 17.7 6. l4 5.48 5.86
agg l3 . 'j 12.1 12.8 4.9) /'9 4.80Lt. Lt
con 1 i 12.0 12.1 1. 78 1.79 1.79.~
N = ')6 96 192 96 96 192
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lv1~¡.lNS lÜn) S:l'jU.\rDiU-(l) .JLin ¡Pi ONS Ui 'lHE TH.ü.ll se 0111£8 J?OR fllHE














IvL',JÚTS S iii 11 :1rD Ji1il DEVL,TIONS
l-Ien \'!omen Both jiilen Women Both
17 .0 17.0 17.0 h '1- 5.20 5.46J .0,-
16.9 l P 1 c" /
~'.94 !;.73 4.89) .u o. '--
l5.9 13.7 l5.0 5.84 5.52 5.82
1 C!.2 19.6 l8.8 6.97 6.33 6.56
l6.9 l5.5 16.3 6.15 5.76 6.02
17 .9 l6.8 l7.f, ¿;-.98 5.37 5.18
13.8 15.7 14.6 5.°7 4.79 5.06
lfL.4 18.l 18.2 5.11 1;.7° 4.90
16.7 l7.6 17 .1 5.05 4.88 5.00
19.9 10.8 i6.i 3.97 i; .12 6.05
523 389 912 523 389 912
*For all except score T, for which the N'8 were l16, 136, and 252.
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Stirlinr; Vni vor8i~.:LS§QlPl_Cc
l'AI'l I.'li J1 t_ti S sr.rlil'jD.iú~D DBV Lid r ONS
'O,T Î',iomen Both NIen VVomen BothJ'.icn
G l/L .2 14.8 l/l . 5 5 0' 5.89 5.49. ,~t
R 15.1 14.8 15.0 5.07 4.74 I). ;n
A 15.0 l2.1 l3.5 6.44 5.34 6.10
S 13.9 16.l 15.0 6.32 6.46 6.49
E lil .4 l1.6 13 .0 6.03 5.77 6.06
0 16.2 14.l l5.2 5.44 5.40 5.53
F 13.l 14.6 13.8 5.66 4.45 5.15
'l 19.0 19.;) 19.1 5.39 4.55 4.99
p 13 .1 l4.5 13 .8 4.44 4.88 4.72
J\ ie .6 11.3 15.0 4.29 ;).70 5.43
N = 96 96 192 96 96 192
M.L.iiNS S'r.~i.NTIiLij) DLVL,j,'IONS
ùicn 'INomen 30th Men V~'om8n
32 .62 30.80 31.81 6.48 5.95
30.29 26.38 28.32 Cl .15 7.10¡
24.3/j. ') 7 9 l 26.15 7.82 "7 .83~ . i.¡. i
38. ')0 40.97 39.94 7.51 5.49
26.'j.2 21.64 24.02 7.23 6.82
2702l 32 ')" 29.76 12.49 12.76. - i
324 326 650 324 326
M::;¡U\fS J\.HD Sfj'¡JJJJirtD D~~VI.!'cliiIONS
S ~ilJD)~ OP 11.!\1 11J8 'lJ~s¡r






















.JiH!'~ ;iiil'~ J '.: se UHx,;S Ui¡i rrll
l'ìLiL!\íS 8"i " "DiaD DEVIATIONS.i _li
',¡omen Both Men !.,'omen
3107 32.1 6.26 5.50
2Eì .6 29.9 Eì . l6 6.32
29.5 2:J.0 9.66 8.26
41.1 38.b 6.68 6.52
2" 9 27.2 7.32 6.74:.t .
24.1 23.0 l2.07 10.94
96 192 9' 96' 0
lhe Standard Deviations for "Both" (i.e. Males and FeEiales co oTY 1-~ -j ne" d \v ~~1,~.. I
arc not given in the Test Manual, aYJd are not therefore cited for
the Sample from Stil'ling IJni versi ty.
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TEST OF SOCILL INSIUdl




j\,ien Women Men Women
-1.39 5.42 2.38 5.10
LO.96 l2.83 4.08 4.43
31.45 33.23 if .87 6.01
6.36 5.63 2.90 2.26
6.37 3.49 3.62 2.34
21.39 17.36 6.01 5.04





Aggri, s si venc ss
'lotal Score




Men Women Men Women
3.85 3.86 2.41 1.96
12.88 12.89 4.90 3,68
27.39 29.77 5.72 5.03
7 l' 6.80 2.87 2.77. Ltl~
'3.42 6.66 3.53 2.77
26.10 23.30 6.78 5.66









"Percor" - a computer prograL1me designed to calculate
the Bean and Standard Deviat ions of the scores for
96 subjectG on each of 55 variables; and to perform
all possible intercorrelationG for these scores.
PERCOR:,
í?BEGIN71
nIM~lE'-C'T~"I J P ().,,~"., "..,-.,
,o'REAL','1K,X2T ~ Y2T ,XYT;
"P.EliL""ARRAY"BnÜ: 2J ,en: 2,l: 951, "n: 55 ,1: 55 J ,SD (1: 21 .Ai1: 55,1' 961,
BO-:21;
:'IFOR"I: =1 ~~S'I'EP':"i í1UNTIL!j2"'DO"1
Bn1:=O;.
"~roR';lI: =1 '¡S:Epn l"¡UJJTIL'!15 5t?DOn











1'FOR?\T: =l;~STEpi'; 1 HæJTIL¡~95 ¡~DO:¡
HBEi7,IrP~
Bí 11: =Bí1J+A tF ,J 1;




IF:"P=l ¡iTHE1J1T \ :BEGiir.õ
It IF' 'P=1 ¡'AND" Q::l"TlIEN" ," GOTO" STOP;
"po, T'.¡'T:i"L~ " ~ SA'''LI''lE P Q -'C"~~ B"'I), '-C'2~' B"II2"














Y2T: =Y2T+( Ct2 ,Ilt2);
XYT: =XYT'¡-( C í 1 ,n;,C í 2,1)) .
'lEND'i ~,
"IF"P=l "THElf""BEGIN"
n Il"P=l "AND" Q=l"THEN '" GOTO"Bi\CK;
SDtll :=SQRT(X2T/96);
Sn(21 :=SQRT(Y2T/96);





RtP ,Q J ; =XYT I ( (X2T"'Y2T) 1 K) ;









"IF"P=2'AND"Q=3"THEN""PRIWf "'L ~ D ¡'lACK - CORRELATIONS ~ 0
"'GO TO"START;
FIN:
;lFOR1~'P ~ =17~STEpn i \'tJNTIL 55HD0'1
''FOR''Q: =i"STEP'" l"UNTIL 0; 55"DO"








I am vrr'- ting to ask for your help in some resoarch on
which I æi presentl,Y vwrking. The v'ork for which L require your
help consists of two sessions for the completion of five quest-
ionnaires, followed C.t a later date by one experimentE\Ì session.
Each session will last approximately l~ hours.
'rho questionnaires give ,,_n assessment of various person-
ali ty traits, and the rosul ts are, of course, confidential.
(If you wish, your own SOOrE, will he given to you personally, butit wil_l not bo avp.il8 ble to anyone: else .J At the present stage
I cannot di,sclose the nature of the experiment, but will be quite
h20PPY to discuss it wi th you in the future when the work is
completEd. In the mr;antimo I would be gratd'ul for your help in
completing the qUGstionnaires.
If you are prepared to help, I -;ould like you to come
to the Main Lecture 'lheatre!or the two questionnaire sessions
on :-
. . .. .. .. . . .. .. . . . .
. . . .. . . . . . . .. .. at ........~.. p.m.
and. . .. .. . .. . .. . . .. .. . .
. .. .. . . . . .. . . .. . at .. . . . . . . . ... p.. il.
'dhilL I r02olizo that thE: time invJ1 vod is considerable,
the wc)rk is not at all stressful or over-demanding, fJnd it provides
an opportunity wherbb3' you can compare various aSDects of 3' our
own persomüi ty with the norm of the student body as 20 whole.
If you cannot !1tte!ld the first session, please 1e2oV8 a note
or come and set) mr; in Block D Room 13, se that we can 20rrange Fm
201 ternEl ti vc time.
l'rusting you will be sufficiently interest8d to take pc"rt






Since I last v,Tote t,ì you asking for your help in
my rE: sç~r.,rch PJ:Cijoct, on SCE.l.rching through th~; que stionnairGs
complett'd :J.t the testing sessi;~)ns, I notice that you were
not .presu::it at the timus r0qu8stod. I rcn,liz8 thE),t you may
simply ht~;V(; forgc)ttcn, or tnrtt the timL8 suggested Vicre
inconvonient for othtjI. reasons.
It is important tha.t ,;JS many :TtudE.:::1tS as possible
"ire tested and I w:,mld still like you to take Durt in thE,
~.:L-:'OjE:")ct. .ti-S the entire research project ca:rttiot be cOLl:;letûd
without these results, I ìvould stress that vow' hcl-o is vital,
..i-____
and I ask :iOU to make every effort to help. Please cOllplete
the attached. slip D.Y'.ld rc'turn it to me rtS soon as posHible.




. . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .. (a) I S;.~,E1.Li be viillinlr to help and viill complete the
remaining q\18stio~naircs(in Room DIO) on :-
. . . . . . . . . , . . . . . .. . . , " . . . , . . . . . . . . at . . . . . .. . . . . . .
(dc'Y) (de.tE ) (time)
.... (b) I do NOr wish to give imy furtlwr hclo in the rc,siarchproject.
(Sig'nod): ......................... Student Registre..tion No.: .............
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DE:fU'
I would like to thl?~~nk you for your help already given, and. to
ask if you arc; wiL.ling to help again. (rho r(,;su.lts so far o-btained
from you can onl;:T be useful if they pore combined witn deita gathe:red
from the experimental session.
The s0sf:ion will i,ost fer f),pproximately 30 minutes and will
'he held in the Communica tions Laboratory (Room D .lO) . As it is
best that you appro~l.ch the oxperimental sGssion with &"' Ilopen
mind", I cannot disclose the nnture of the ex")orimont at present,
but will to quit.: happ;ir to discuss it with you P,t a 12"ter dato
whon tho work is com,Jletod. In tI18 meantime I w"uld be grateful
if you would c~~.ii .':.it Room D.IO tC) E:Lrrfuige p suitable time for the
oxperi.ilental f38ssion.
:lt__jß_j.r:oortant t:lJ',t V'L_triJ,.G_call wi.thiiiJJlLnext Jew 1nYs
as I vm,nt to di"stribute scores befC)re the cnd of the prosont
S8ffcstcr and this cannot rH) àon(; until evüryonc hEtS cc¡mpleted
the tests.
;lh.:~nking you for ~Tour help, I am
Y01.U'B sìnccr(;l~r,
D 'd v i¡ avi J,I1D.Ci(
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'PP,"'HDTY 5~.~.J.~.L~~
A saDplu D0ta Recording Sheet.
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DATA lriW)RDniG SH:CE'J~ GAim:
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IUt-3tructinns tn isU.hjCi-~tS. In the Îollowing instructinns
ruund br;-'u'=üt", ( ) indicute that wi th fe¡cialc; subjucts
the word inside the br¡wkets is substi tutl,d for thc"t
immediately prcccCl'ling it.
Square brickets, I J, indicate steps to be taken by the
experiment8r at tht p,ei.rtìculn:r f3tccge in the codr:inistratien
of instructions \;:) subjects.
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li\TS'lri'l Tr' '1"10'1'''' ".,/ ¡ ,,,
_:~___~_l.--'"_._. - ..~~) \1 J. _-".1':':__'- .~."~~-!L;' SUBJLCrS
"For the expüriIJcnt t,)day, I want you tci take part in 20n
s-x-perimcntal g2.~/t8 involving' ti.vo pt.:(Jple - ~rourselÎ and one other
ffRle (fcm~le). :E'or the pUrpi)S0S of the: ga'18 I VIB.Ut you to imagine
Y'JurS81f :.\8 t1'1¿; rt:".pr,-.: seYl t.~" ti VE: '~)f D i oC8.1 manufr:cturing C 'JFinany
which hn,s j"st won a vC',lu2hl,ò contract from a huyer in the south
of England. As tht) firm's r8presentative, your job is to ensure
th,t its profits arE' E¡S lügh as possible. 'rho proLi ts on the
,)r¡-;SClH c;mtr,)ct depend entirely on how quickly you cun deliver
the goods to the bUYE::r - the quick~r .v'Oll delJ_ver thf---!:ri, the more
pI'ofì t ;you make. 'rherc n,rc only two sui taule Vlt?,YS of transporting
the product - by rr_eightlin.2, which is a fpst eff.icieut service,
t'Jud DY normal 9..2ds l'rn.ill which :i8 sl()i?ícr and less reliable.
A second cOElpanj, rqircsented b;¡ th" oth,,,r playsI' in the
ga.me, also hr-los A. C', ntrr:'"ct for the delivery ~)f goods where profits
elso de¡.:+Jnd on speed of delivery, FUid the same mi:3t.h.~)(ls of tre,nsport
r'vrc Rvailable. Now, whi18 it is obviously t() the advantage of
both compi'Lies tci send gOGds by :8'reil2htliner, there is '3 problem
in that thcr(~ f.i.re not enour:rh ccntain~.::rs Flv::\ilcLolc to tE'"ke l:.oth
c,impanies (\()ods by freightliner at trie same time. Jis a rcsul t,
during the C()urS(~ r)f the gamE: ;you J:ilUst CODe:) tn some arr8ngcmcnt
v.ri th thE: o1~hLr pla;YtJr OVl:,;;J' the use of the; transport availr=:ble.
In 2oddi't on to the tv;o IDf,thods of tranSDort, a third
choicE, is nvailable - to "Vai t and alloiri the othE~r :person to
send his (her) goods cy F:r:ci,c;h tlin"r first 20nci then to send your
goods by F:iç;ip;litliner aftcrvmrds. Because there arc not enough
containers c,vailable, s.hould both pln,yers Ch',ìose Preightliner
'C1t the same ticie, ''i hlockage will occur. This blockage l.eans a
delaf will ensue and, sinGe profits depend on speed of delivery,
the profits to be made cm the oatch of I:oods will be sff2oller.
Similurly, should both pln.yurs cwose to,icci t at the s¡~me time,
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c1 blockn.ge and d(;l.?~y ~ .:.cc C~(~::)í.Vl ;',F~~:j 1..;;-dhy n. loss in potential profit,
will occur.. lllhis is 1H;.cD,use 21::tycr fA! decides to 1\1a.i_t and allow
Plexor i B i t,i us" t:roi-Rhtlinor first; Pla:ior i B i, n t the SRt'e timo,
and unknrywn to Playcr 'I i, alsc) decidt:,s to 'dait.. As c)~ result both
pl~yers0ai t 2nd then, ter, try to send their g")ods by l:lreightliner
sirnul tancc1usly. Once ri,gciin, t;..i\:~rc are ncit 8nough c'Jnt2.iners
c,v2il,=lble a:nd Cl blockeg8 and delay oceiU'S. Tf.:.'~ pl,?n of the game
is shcy.vn un thü mp,trix bor:-rd. in front of you.. rll1erc" you will S~..8
six ,lle,triccso The top left-h2,nd one is illumin2oted. YOcl will
find yourself listed pt the) left-hand sic'GJf the rr"trix together
with your three D,v8ìlnble cJ:ioices - ~=r~c¿lKhtlillGr., Wait, (:cnd
Go_ods~'1"tin. 'lhe other iilayer is listed Fit tho top of the matrix.
¡.:o calculcLte yr:iur possible profit, you read f\CrUSS the t:1atrix in
rows, taking the left-hnnd figuro in each squarG r~s the nmount you
may grJ.in. 'l'tus ;you cn.:'~ s"u that if yuu chcosc ll'rcightlincr, then
you will gain 20 points, unlo8s the othur,ù,wer also chooses
l,r§;i-Rh tliner, when 20 blockage will oc()ur. l,ikowiso, if you chHJse
to Vlai t, :i~OU yrill gain 15 pDints unloss the other plpYtT FÜl10 chooses
tD ':l!Jai t, wlien èl blocke,ge will oecnr. If you ch!)ose Goods. Train, then
you v;rill ga.in 10 points, regardless of what the oth\:";I' playc:r mEty
choose.
As Ì1' S r;lreeJ1.y bc'c;:; explained, if b()th players choose
Freightlinûr at the Sat:18 time, (ir l\lai t at the samG time: ~ then Cl
blockage occurs 2,nd tho potenti.nl profit is lowered. This delay
and blocb;ge giving ., lc'wer profit is reprosont8d by m()ving to the
second riatrix wh,ich I hp,ve illuminated f'or you now. L~ Here the
oxperimenter shifts the illumim'tion from l!Rtrix 1 tC) Matrix 2J.
H'"re you C20D s'e th. t the, situation is exactly the SAme as before -
you are listed in the s(Ji~1ü place r.nd have the same three choices
as before, the only difference is that the possihlo profits are
lower. Where:,is bf)fore you could gain 20, 15, or LO points, now you
can only gcün 15, lO, or 5 points. Since you still havo three
- If,f-l .-
alt,0TYJc-vt~L\rC8 f:'Ot1 ,/o:,.l¡jr:.":t t cL.'::;'CJsc., it is possibl(:1 that ;you me.y
block :::Lgain, in which c~r':SG yeu r:.JVC d :J1.vn to the next matrix i,;¡.rhich I
have illur;in"ted for you now, LHere the eX'Jerimentcr shifts the
illum.inct,on fro!'¡ Matrix 2 to I'IlJ,trix 3J HorD you can sec that tho
si tuc¡tion is ,':gel.in the S8'no 8,S before, but the profits 2,re lower
still - 10, 01'5, or not'iing Et all. Should you block "gain, we
move down anothbr untrix, ¿-Here the experimt'nter shifts the
illurT1ne,tion to lip, trix 4J, whE,rc the profits arc'igain lowEr. Jind,
8flCh tine Y:JU -öluck, v/c continue to niove down a T1atrix LLxoGrimúnter
moves illur.intition tu L'I8.-Grix 5J, and each tiL"w the profits dccrep.se;
UJitil finiúly Wee 3,rrive pt the sixth matrix in the bottom right-hand
C,H'ner of the F:fc,tr,Lx ue:rd which I li;,vc. illumin;c'tcd now LHere the
eXeI'iUEmter shifts the illuaination to IiHtrix 6__' Here you caii




-.L) . Obvicmsly t'jC best Y'JU oan dCi here is t,:) !'2oke
smi:lll t..i y:.iursclf:-.l,s possliJlc. If on this sixth nttempt
you still fail to sond the gc)ods - that is, you both choose
Frej_iDntling or ih.~i t. nn:i. cause .Y, t an'Jthsr blockr:ge - then,
rc;membering th;,. t by thb ti,:18 you nrri VG ~,¡t the sixth me. trix you have
ô.lrcridy h: d fi vc deia~is in trying t':J SCYHl the sa:1.C batch of goods,
vnJ invoke Cl p(~nal ty Clê:U8ü in th(; c~)ntract 'Nhich states that for
failing to deliveI' Pc hatoh of toods on tim"" 8,'ch player suffers a
loss of 25 points. That is, if you block on the last matrix you
lose 25 points. NCHV, whsn you hFLve s(;nt 2. b,qtch of gCJods, wh(~th8r
it he on the first e,t berapt, or the ttiird atteT.pt, or the sixth
atte:E1nt, or if you don't lQane.gc to s8nd goods and si.dfer a loss of
25 penalty points, then Vh, always return to tb) top-left-h2ond corner
and the first m" trix and begiD sendin',' :m)ther bc,tc,'i of ,:'oods.
r-_
L Here the E?x)krimenter rlòturns the illumin ,tLin to the first
matrixJ. Y"u wtll be required t,) send 2ovcI'n,1 batches of gocds in
this 1ji¡-ß,Y.
To kCfJp an :iooount ,Jf Tiur own pr'Jfi ts and lOSSE?s thrcl'ghout
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t~18 gc'~me, yuu will find ~')Gsidc thc r:icrophonc il countor which
regì.stf;rs 10U points. This l1undr¿d pc-iints is given t:) yuu as a
sort of '~1r:)J.'"king CD-pi tc-~l p-.n,d, as rh: g--) througl'J_ the gE'~.mc, when you
mr',ke r-è profit we- will add to it; when you ElP,ke a lOf3s Wc will
subtract frCiI'l it, SJ thE't at 20ny ¡Joint during the ga'ic you can see
h,y!, well "r hy,'; baelly :cou iln: doing. J\t the end of thi' gP.lE' this
ioo points will be subtrccted so that tho countor will sl~()w the
~'-LL1ount 'iidiich you y:)ursclf hnve \VO~ or lost in the COUTS8 of the
experirrH.:n t.
H8gnrding the actil'ü running of the cXDcrioE:nt, there' are
onE: or two m.inor points. Firstly, ;7e alw:::ys vlcTk 8n th.s illiulJinated
m("-\"trix, so t~-i.:_t you can S'::C i~:t EL glp~ncu th(~ pC'Jssible profit you can
L1nko fr :)m your l10xt chcic'.:~. Sücondly, you ;~.iwr-1Ys ch,::osc independently
of the other pi2y(~r. th?t is, 82011 playor cliooses without knowing
WhEl,t the other pla2.rLY' lE3 ch~)usinc. VlIltct ne,,"' 'ienS is th8t I will
20sk you for your choice, you i II give it; I'LL ask the othoI' player
for his (her) choice, he (she) will give it; thon I will cone back
'md tell yeu hew ~b()th p12,ycrs chcsu, fur eX2o:rrplc, ii Player 'A i went
G(?.~ds ¡iìrain, Player 'Bl v¡cnt G!Jods Tlain,,!f Wh,~;reupon I 'Nill adjust
your CÜu.nt;-.;r, in this ÐX8mplc by ,1,dcling 10, c,nd then we wiii begin
E"Lnothecr ncv7 bntch (jf goods".
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SUPPLliMLN'lARY IJJSl'WJC'lIOLTS J,'OH Sll.rJLCl'S DJ GA;,lL I OJJI"Y
-----_.._.....- ...- -_.... ~... ._._...- -,.., ._- -~_._-~--_.~~---
"I hpcvo explained to you hCFi' tri calcui"te your own profi t;
as y"t I h,e'yen I t said anythinr; e:hrmt the othor pGrson i s pr'Ji'i t. To
calcul20te this you r8fld. the mat:rix frDm the opposite direction. For
y,mr O\'iT profit, you read across tho matrix in rows and t20ke the
left-hfmd figure as I hfwe already explained. 'fa C¡Ú culate the other
oerson 's profit, you road down the nn,trix in colur.ms and teke the
right-hand figure to represent his (her) potential pr')fi t. You can
see th,it if ~T()U Y'mrsE)lf ch'1üSO Freightliner then you will giÜn 20
points unless thE)re is E, blockage. R()~dinr; the oth"r way for the
()Üwr person i s profits, if he \ she: chuostJs FreightlintJr, then
reading down in colunns and t20king the right-hand figuro, you G~~
see that he (she) will also get 20 points unless there is !' blockage.
Simile,rly, if you ch(Josc to ~ then you will gain 15 points
unless there is ''l block¡,ge. If the othrcr pe:rson chCJoses to )hü t
then you can sce tli0t he (she) will also get 15 pc)ints unless there
is a blockage, and so cn throughout the game.
Finally I want tCJ stress tht your Objf,ct in the game is
to m,ùe h,'; much profit as possible for yourself. Therc are six CR.sh
prizes for the six people who mR.kc mest profit over the whole
experiment. Yom' object is to d,) well enough in order to win a
prize for yourself. II
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S~TRPLLI;1E.i,C.lÚiLnfS'r~OCTI9lT_a_:FOlL13Ji:~JEgTS IN GAiæ II ONLY
"I hrrve cX1Jlainu!. tu you h,"w t-i calculcite Y'Jur own profit;
"8 yet I haven't said anything':bout t¡-ie othc:r person's profit. To
get s,.'iEEi id ea uf this Y'JU read the ffè trix fro:J the opposite directi'On.
For your own Jlrofi t, you ri:ad Clcross the m_~trix in r:)VIS and take the
left-hcmd figure ~,s I hFve already explained. 'ro calculate the other
persm's profit you r'2od down the matrix in columns and take the
right-hand figurG t) represent his (her) potential profit. However,
you will S8e th"t there are three right-hand figures in eich square.
All this re20llY means is thp,t you don 't kn:)w 9 ui te how much the
other person will get. Y:)U can S0C thr',t if you 2iourself chc)ose
Fi:ei'sh tling then Y'JU will gain 20 pJlnts unless th8rc is c, blockage.
Reading the 0 thcr way fer tho Cl ther peers on f s profit s, if he (she)
chooses Freightliner, then rending dovm in columns fld taking the
right-hand figure, yem cnn s. e th",t he (she) \fill get either 25
points, or 20 points, or 15 points - you don't know which. That is,
he (she) ciay get the sane as YDU, or he (she) nay get f\ hi t more,
ir he (she) Day get p, hi t less. Similarly, if y:m ch'XJSU to ¡,!ai_i
then you will gain 15 points unless there is a blockage. If the
other person chooses to Wait, then you can Sd; thc,t he (she) will
get either 20, or 15, or 10 points; and so on throughout the game.
ri'he i'Jport2on-c thing to remember is that the uther perscin always vT'Jrks
nt the samo level of profit. 'lhc,t in, if he (she) g:-üns 25 points by
using Freightliner, then hE; (she) will gain 20 by waiting, =d
15 by using Goods 'lrain. If he (she) gains l5 points by using
Preightliner then he (she) will gain LO by waiting and only 5 by
using Goods Train. In other words, he (sho) works at the same
level of profit all the way through. He (she) ei th0r gets the top
figure, or the middle figure, or tne bottom figure. Als! while
you know your Qvni. profi t and hc~ve SOFi8 :id8.', of how mucli the ,.)ther
person gets, the other person knows his (her) own profit and has
so::n.tJ idea. 2~8 to hew L1uch you ~~;et.
- lCY': -
Pi...,;:l.lv ~.i 1~'~.."1t C() stress th~t y':-'ur object in the game
is t-J m(tk¿~ t18 much prufit r~s possiblE. f:,)r yourself. llh8TC are
six ce.sh i)rizcs for the six i)t)nple who l11E'"ke nnst pr(jfi t Dver the
wh,)le cX;djCriLk?nt. YOUT ot'jf~ct is to d;J "vell encuf";'h in orde:r to
'iv-in 2, prize fer y::urself .11
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APPENDIX 7
In the appc~ndix which follows, tho choices made by the
players in each dyad are given in the order in which they occurred
(reading by row). In each case, the choices are listed alternately,
the first figure referring' to the first subjeot listed, the second
figue to the sec~nd subject listed, the third to the first subject,
the LJurth to the second subject, and so un.
Cj'he numerals 1, 2 i and 3 indicate the choices "Freightliner",
"Wait", and "Goods Train" respectively. V!here the figure 4 Occurs it
indic20tes the end of a single trial; 5 indicates the termination
of the experiment for the dyad.
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GAl.IE I - lllàLB SUBJ:8CiI1S
~-----~
KNOWLES, D.lI., BISHOP, G.
, 2 4 2 i 4 1 J 1 1 1 2 4 2 2 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 2L L2 2 2 2 2 2 1 4 2 2 , 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 4 1 1 1 2 4L
2 i 4 2 1 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 i 2 1 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 tl i 1
1 1 2 1 , 2 2 1 2 4 1 i 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 4I_i- ¿2 2 1 2 4 2 1 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1
1 4 i 1 2 i 4 2 2 1 2 4 1 i 2 1 4 1 1 2 1 4 2 2 i 2L
4 i 2 4 1 1 1 1 i 1 2 1 4 1 3 5
MITChJ::LL, G.R. , WA1rl1.i , I'.f:\ .
1 1 3 3 /1 2 2 1 1 1 3 4 2 1 4 1 2 " i i 1 1 1 1 1 i"f L '-
2 1 4 1 2 4 1 1 3 2 4 2 2 2 1 4 i 1 1 1 1 " 4 1 1 2/
2 1 i 2 2 1 1 1 i 4 2 1 4 1 2 4 1 3 , 2 1 I' 2 1 i' 11- 't 'f Le
2 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 i 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 3 1 4 2 2 2 1 4 1 1L L
1 1 3 1 4 i 2 4 i 2 4 1 1 i 1 2 2 2 2 i 1 2 1 4 1 1L
1 1 3 1 4 2 2 3 i 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 2 " i i i 1 1 1 2 1
4 1 1 2 2 2 1 5
DJNALD, A. P. , KOREN, J .H.
3 2 4 2 1 l~ 3 2 , 1 3 " 1 1 1 1 1 2 /: 3 3 4 2 i !t 2Lf '- -,
2 3 1 4 i 1 1 1 1 1 i 3 4 1 3 4 2 i /~ 3 2 4 i 3 " 11- '+
2 4 2 1 4 1 2 :+ 1 i 3 2 I' 3 3 4 .3 1 4 " 2 4 2 3 4 2(~ ,L .J
2 , i 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 4 2 1 i 3L 1- L , fi 4 i 1 1 2 " 1 1 3 2 4 2 1 ,I¡ 1 i 3 2 5i~ , ~.
EAVES, R. :M. , SCOTI.t , J.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 , 2 1 4 3 1 4 2'-
1 4 i 1 3 1 4 2 1 4 2 i ,l 1 1 1 i 2 1 4 1 1 2 i 4 2
1 4 1 1 2 1 4 i 1 1 1 2 1 4 i 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 i i 2L
1 4 2 1 , 2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 , 2 1 4 1 i 2 i i 2 i l 2'f 'r , , ,. r
1 4 2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 'f 2 1 " -') 1 4 2 1 5't ,- L
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\\IGÍFL~ .T -8.. ~3~l.rN~fF, :.eo
11l34324111ll11242222l1l1l24214l1l12211l112~314l11242222222l41111124l1222141242142l41ll1ll11124214113241lll12 il2411l24124l12l4124214ll11124214l1l11l124112222214111112422215
LùLOR, J" G. , EiiIIDiiY, A.
214324214112141242342212411214l241112411l11243l4214124234221l1l11124124214134314111112412421421411221241l221l1l11'1423/f22111241l12
"t 1 2 5
JUNES, D. J .. HiLiJKTN, E. Vf.
124l11ll242141l411134124214lllllll141242l4
4 2 2 1 2 4 2 1 i~ i 1 i 3 4l4l11341121411l24215
1 1 1 1
1 1 ? 4
1 1 1 2
1 1 1 2 41112"
112/f23l341i1421411






1 1 1 1
MYLES, A..B., LE\vl, Pçii..
214l342141l11l12l411iii11111l1412~lll111l2411ll1ll12l42141242141llll1l2421411l242141l1ll242l4l2421~l24214l11111112141l1ll24l1222l411l24214124214l24215
HEV~'IlllT, M ~ H. , 3.1,11 rrH,. K .1'1.
124222211314324314l12l421411l13l4214324ll22l12l43l42l4l11l1111214214214112142l4l1214214214324l13l4l11l1ll3415023411113l42343142221411325
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WELSH, T., í\cLUSKY, D.
214lll3A2l41l12
2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 4 1. 2' 22421411l2~21412214124214l242l44124214125
4 2 1 ¿'t
1 4 1 1
4 2 i 4 L
1 2 4 2 .
1 1 I 1









::VIIl1L, D. B. , CRLGEEN, M
2:'4. 13122~l14J~_:li
::24_24214~1_24l24l
l41111iii'i 1224111l3L41l 1124111111 113241241ll12:4124l212l4l1l1111111124l24l2 2412
2 4
1 1
4 1 2 4 1
1 2 4 1 2
L 1 1 2 4
4 1 1 1 1
1 4 1 1 1
2 4 1 2 5" 1 4 1











2 1 11 1 2
1 1 1 1
4 1 2 4 1
1 2 1 4 1
1 2 4 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
'Tl12l























Fos'-iER "I F R Ho"iCHKIQ. R.1 . V. . ., ~ v
ll1124112l4l2411214l242l4
11111ll1111l411214214' 242141l22l3422l241l2l421411l12l41l1111ll113241l21421422lll1214214214l1l12l4112142l42142l42ii211215
THOMPSON, B.S., HERON. D.
2l41l134214234222212413411111111112 142 142 l413 42 3422234l1l242142l41l1241ll24234llll2141l22 112 142 l4214l2 4l3~23421411124l24112l4215
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DYAS, W"Á., HTJlLliERí l'..C.J.
1131411111 1 2 2 2142142 2 1 243141l2141111ll1111114214l24314l1l 11121 411214l243l 412 421421412411j~4111ll12141l2141242l4214124l12141l11314l
1 2l4l 1 1 1 1 11 1 11 124 1 1 1 1 1 25
IV!cILIWY, J.P., M:\,(llIN, P.A.
11334111113142l21/f21442142141 2l/¡215
3 21 4 4
2 1 1




3 1 4 2
2 1 4 1
2 1 4 2






CLJ:';GG, J:'QG.? 1,'ItI it ? '. ....1 ('1-:". Iv.,v.
3l4ll2341132422ll2211324112143242141121431421411111343l41l2143142141l111l2l432411214l13l~314l241111l34214j1411l11ll242l41122l11111
2 2 ~ 1 1 3 2 ,; 2 2 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 5
.t'(AC1E~OD, A.l'I., LAI:'lG-, D.
2 1412 432 412111214113241123421412422ll214l24214124221
3 4 2 1 4 2 1 if 1 2 If 1 2, 2 1 If 2 1 4 2 1 4 1 2 41241l3l4124111131412422124l131421S
MUNRO, R.J .B., Born, B.R.
llll3142342l411l24l20l1214
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 2 " 1 1 1 1314111242143242 1412 ~111l2l4l24ll1l1l2l4l12l421422l121 ~ii2l4214l12l4l121421~2l4214215
- l?O --
F .4.B_RI SOH) "'~ ~.J '" :i .f 01')1) , R ..
32411 i12l41l2 2n14314l2 t 1111l131412422l1l111l1ll4l123422l242143241122ll1242l4l1124311l241~21412 11ll134l~2l412411l11l124214324l24l242lq11l1l2ç3l5
.Pltl:RICK, J .Go, CLABK, D.P.
l122l1l112432ql1314l1ll1l1
2 4 2 1 if 1 1 1 2 'I 2 1 4 1 1 1 2 'f L 1 1 1 1 2+ 2141ll241l111241241l1241l11
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 i, 2 1, 2 1 4 1 1 1 2 L, 1 2¡ 1 1 1
1 1 2 4 2 ~ 4 2 1 4 1 1 1 2 LC 2 2 1 1 3 2, 1 2 4 2221411l24214l1l1l24215





2 1f 2 1 if
¿~2i"r1r
1 4 1 1 1





1 1 1 3 1
1, 2 1 44l121!,
-',11314
WOOLAS'l'ON, G.E., BUllìEl'T, G.
1 3 .1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 .1 2 1 4 2 2 1 3 4 1 1 ii 1 1
1 1 1 2 ~ 3 1 4 3 2 ,\ 1 2 4 2 1 4 1 1 i 3 4 2 1 4 124i1214314223241llll2422111122113 2 ~ 1 34112 2l 13342211 13413q2l4222l4~lll13421421q1242223411ll1l124221ll35
H.Alv'lILTON, R.;l., \'lOOD, A.
2343143l42141l21421q11112l
4 1 1 1 2; 2 2 1 2 (, 2 3, 1 2 'i 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 1
4 2 1 'r 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 2 2 1 2 4 1 2 4 2 1 4 1 111112142 l41l12 42141111124121411215
- 199 -
GjJ:J~ ~ - J?tJ~vli1.LE SU:BJ.4~CII'S-'
LEG, J., BLAKl;l\;LU~, J.
2 ~ ll
i Co 4
1 3 ,; 2
2 3 'T 1
2 21/;J3
1 4 1 3 "' 2 2 2 1l1342l4124




i 2 _~ _;
2 4 2 1
21/1,12









1 2 1 4
2:~.23¿l
1 3 1
1 2 4 2
"i. 11
1 t 1
BJ'J'_CL:l, NI. I .11. , MlJRPHY, P .)i.
111_3l!l23J1342141132421413
'1 2 2 _ 2 4 2 1 /t 1 1 3 ? ,1 2 31 2 2 2 3: 2 2 3 2421~l34334222141l31411?343342 4l2421432!l21!ll342222214l1_1l34214l25
NOLAN, ? J. , ROBLR'rS, J.
1 1 3 -'
2 2 1
1 1 1 '2 -" '.














1 1 3 1














1 2: ? 1 if 1
1 1 2 2
.3 2
4 1 2 4
1 1 2; 1 2





;~)'\"IAN, 0.8., 3LIiCK, J.
i :. 3 2 /~ 3 1 'T 2 1






2 1 ", 1
i i 2 L~
2 2
i 4
f 3 .3 if 12'1134311411111343343141132
2 5
1 3
4 ,) :'~ i














i; 1 2; 3 .3 4 1 2 4 1 1 1










-¡- L 1 1
- 200 -








2 1 4 1 3
2 2 1 4 ii i 2 i i;






'_',l 1 1 2 i 4
KYLhS, B.E., s;rOcK, J..
3 1 4 2 1
3 1 4 2 1
1 1 1 1 2
4. 1 1 1 1ILL 1 1
2 1 If 1 2
1 1 2 4 1
2 ,1cf
4 2
4 1 1 1
'f 1 1 14214111124llll
1 1 1 1 1
1 4 1 2 4


















III ,~ 2 1 4 1 1224214.l241111l1l41421/¡1251 1
MACDON¡iLD, A.M., THOHBUHU, 1,
2?1241243141342l4134113l412411l1113241122211l24214l2
4 2 1 " 1 2 4 2 1 i~ 1 2 Le 1 1 2 1 4 1 2 it 2 1,c 1 24-Ll22214l24l1111111111142211l122124j1411l242l4124111
2 5
FOHD, C .1., SOUT¡il, F.
1111124l243141l124ll12411l
1 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 2, 1 3 if 1 3 4 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 11 1 11 1 1 1 l4111 1 12 412 ~ 1112 4l'
1 l314l 11 1 1 1 III 1 1l4.1 llll 1 1 1
111l412412~ 12 t lll24l2411324ll1132411314l12141l11lll2411l11l223141l1111l2411125
s.ú.V.dG\, K. J-i.. , CH.iiNC¡'j, h..
31422l2421413421~lj~1342l4134. 1 l2 21241 l3 342232 411ll 13
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 2 3 'I 2 1 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 3 4 2 2l341l11134l1l242142212 ~ 1111l111112142l42l41l22113l412"l24l25
- ZCl -"
iæSSON ~ lVr.. ~;:ov. , S'iiI?ERGUSSO:N, A.
3l4111242l41242l41l3l412421 4 1 2 't 2 1 it 1 2 4 2 1 'l 1 2, 2 1¡ 1 2 2 1 4
1 2 4 2 1 4 1 2 If 2 1 4 1 2, 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 1 4 2 23l41ll242l4124223l4l25
:rOBBIS, A.M., DYKES, M.
3 1 4 1 1 3 2 4 3 ii 3 2 4 1 1 1 2 4 3 1 4 1 1 1 2
4 3 1 4 3 1 4 3 2 .; 3 1 /~ 1 1 1 1 3 2 L; 3 1 I: 3 2 4214124214124314l243l4l243l
4 1 2 4 3 1 4 1 2 4 3 1 If 1 2 ,i 3 1:, 1 2 5
CAIHNS, J.K., NíUHH.úY, N.H.
11112l43141122112l42141l2l4ll2142142141l21421411112l4112141l21411314214112l431411113141 1 2 1 4113 1411l II 1 II
1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 1. 2 1 .~ 2 1; 2 1 4 2 1 4.
1 1 2 1 4 2 1 ,i 2 1 4 2 1 5
'lUDOH, L. 1. , McLEOD, Vi.R.
2342l4111l214214l24l
4 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 'I 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 124324l12142l41l2l4122l41121l222l4l242l42
4 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 2 1 4 2 1 4 1 2 4 1 1. 2
2 2 1 5
24113111ll1l
2 1 4 1 1141121l421r;2
GRANT, J .M. , ViEI'FroIl, G.
l12221423414ll2142l4134ll1l1311121ll1121+ll2134111111111lllllll2l4ll14l24ll21ll1115
1 1 1 2
















1 !t 1 1
1 2 1 4
3'¡llll132l41342l111121411111l2l42li,11124
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
- 2 ()2 -









1 1 i 1

















DENOVii.N, liI..I\II", Ivlti1COLIVI, J. V.





















1 1 1+ 3
211 1I ~











1 1 1 If









2 'r 1 1 1 1 1 2 412!¡ll111121:i11111124111241l4l24ll1i214124214
¡VUiCDu1"1", J .J\I., MAC DOUGjJJL, 1.
324l1214124l12l41343342141
2 4 2 i 4 3 1 L¡' 1 3 4 3 2 " 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 1 4 3 3 I;1342l412411214l24214l24ll214324221 1 2 1 ~ 1242 1 ~ 1 2 4 335
~- ? 03 -
RAINFORD, ./~,,_:~1~ j J(ìHNSON, M..A.
4 1
4 i















4 1 21 1 4 i
1 2
NEILL, A. P. , iilUNRO, \í.
3l42l~l24214113l4221l.514112l4l111113l4221131411111l11214221l223143l42142142l4112l4l24l11ll~l1214il2l42l41l2lç1242141illlll11l114ll111241111113142142142 l4112
2 2 1 5



















BlilAiCbS, :¡. S. , HOL¡'OYD, 1.
1111l24l112411ll1l214111l2141l112l 1l314'1l11111ll21
4 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 ~ .1 1 1 2 14112l~21411i1i1illlll41111l1221111411l24ll1l11l11241242 l~12 421412 421412 42141242l4124214l25
~ 2
G.!iJ',Gn__._,LI~._l"Ui-LL 0UbJi!~CriiS
Mr.. T,1? rj N ~ T T,





42l 1241ll1i1 2 1 1 2 " i 1 2/t 1
i /; 1 3 .r~ J. i 2 2 1
.'t121.¡31
1 /~ 2 2 1








.L '+ 2 If 1
 i tr;-
3 1 L, 1




1 1 2 2
1 4 1 3





4 1 i 2
1 2
1iUlX~vl~Li~ ~ H ~ 1 ViA.DD1~ljL, G.







1 1 2 1 4
3 tr 1 2 !, 2 1
2 2 1 2 4
1 ( 1 1 2
1 2 ' 1 3
': 2 i "r i
















1 4 1 4 1 1 1
1 4 2 2
4 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 1 4 1
1 i 2 1 4






" I' ., AltLJ.'T




WiiLDEN, N .G., CGIÆRIL, A.
2 1 2 31l1124221412if














D.(\.~".rSo.N =r .., "i'('--;~i ,"; _ -l-"
1 2
1 1
.i 1 1 1 2 i ,~.
1 _! 1 1 2
4 '22 1
1 "
1 2 4 i
1 'f 2 1






2 1 4 2
i i 2 1 /f 2 1 '-i-l112l5
1
1 1 4 2







2 2 2 .5 'c 1121,¡,2l
,+ 2 1 " 1 2




1 2 1 4
1 1 2 2
2 4 i 2
2 3 1 ,~
5
1 2 4 2
2 1 If 2
'i 2 1 4
1 3 if 1
2 3 1 ,) 2 1 414221121341242242l43l4 2
1 2
O'HAiTLoti, Tu. , S\VOüDS, ll/l.D.
1 1 42li)l3
2 1 1 2 1












1 4 1 2) 2
1 1 3 4 2
1 3 2 2 1
1 1 1 2 4
3 4 1 1 2
1 Ij 3 1 4
,j 1 2 4 21"
.L Lt-
SPOWAGE, A.P., LINDSAl, ':1.P.C.
1 2 4 1 2 4 3 1 /; 3 3, 1 2 4 ~: 1 i; .5 2 4 2 2 .5 2 4
3 1 4 1 2 4 .5 1 /; 1 2 if 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 1 ,) 1 2 If 2 1
if 1 2 4 2 1 if 1 2 4 2 1 't 1 1 1 2 4 2 1 4 1 2 ,t 2 1412 l1l2~21~124215
















Bli1lHGA1.ri:;, A.A.., N"ICOIJSON, J.L.
.5 1 If 2 1 4 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 3 2 'I,) 1; 1 1 2 1
4 2 1 4 1 1 1 2 /; 2 1 if 2 I /, 1 1 1 1 2 1 if 1 2 'f 1111 l121412 4214112141122 1 12
1 4 1 1 2 If 1 2 !) 1 1 .5 1) 1 1 1 2 if .5 1 'T .5 1 1+
lll2 4l1l 111l11l1l41l12 421 ~
2 IT 1 2 5
_ 2(ìh






i 4 i 2
3 1 ¡'~ 'r
i 2 /;.
') 1 If 3 2 it
3 1 If 2 3 /~
1 c:. 1 1




If 1 2 4- 2




















2 I; i 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2









1 2 2 1 2 " 1 2 4 2 1 4-
1 3 'f 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 111l111ll4l241ll31412~lllllll1214ll12
SlVi:u11T, K., l¡L-iCDlVI'llill, lt.
3 1 'l 2 1 /1 21411111
1 2 If 2 _ if 111121412221411241l1J.1214111l
3 4
2 i1 2 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 i
1 2 2 2
















1 1 1 1
1 2 1 4
3 1 4- 1
1 1 2 I;
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
L 5
S;l~VLl SON, I'i._ G. , L.L110 'lli.e , A. T.
2 2 2 2 2 1 I; 1 1 1 2 If 1 2, 2 1 i) 1 2 4 2 1 If 2 1412~112141241131412~2142l4l2421ifll12if111121422214l24
3 1 4- 2 2 1 1 2 1, 1 2 if 2 1 if 2 1 if 1 2 if 1 1 1 24l12l02221lll125
HAI,L, R.R., GUHDO¡., J.H.
llll' 31111 l11l111114234lll2~2l4214222l4l1i242l411l242 1 !¡21411l13141111l12 1412 41
ILL 1 2 'T 1 2 4 1 L 1 1 1 1 2 1 " 2 1 4- 1 1 2 2 2141l1ll24134214ll2l421412421ifll2l4214l12l5
- 20,/ -

















1 1 3 3 4
1 Lf 1 2 4
1 2 if 2 1
If 2 1 If 1
, ,1- it
1 2
QUINN, J.. G.., GLrPl1i',~I:,!I1N, A.
111111214134124211ll42lill2221~1
2 1 1 2 It 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 'r 1 1 2 1 4 1 2 If 2 1 " 1 1214l24l1111111l111l11411l11111~1ll124111l1l11l11214125
1 4 1 1 1









If 1 3 4
McNAIR, A.E., liLIR, G,L.H.
124214112l4l24112'42l4l2al1111111l11142143241242l431l1222l41241113421~112l421
4 1 2 " 2 1 4 1 3 4 1 1 3 1 if 1 1 2 1 4 1 3 4 2 1 421/fI243j.235
C.ARlvIICH.hEI, A., GIBSUN, I.
llllllll124214l241ll2(11214l24l1l1l241l2l4124111112411l2ql12141241l2 2112 5 4l21l
1 1 _ 1 1 2 1 4 1 2 '. 1 1 III 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 1
1 21 1 1 2 2 2 1 4 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 2 4 12421412411ll2141241l11l111l111/,l25
lVIOEGAl'I, j.. G. , ZVEJ.íF;'r1r, I'if.
III llllllll lq12 41 1 124111l 111l11l1~111ll1111l1lal1124llllll124ll1111l2411l111llll1241l124lll11l1111ll411111111111141 llll 1 1 llll 1411l
III 1 11lll4ll111l II 11114l 1 1lll11l1114ll1111111l114111241241l124lll24l1124111241lllllll~1114l1l1ll111l1141111l11ll1114111l1lll111l41lllll1111ll411l1ll1ll1ll41lllllllllll5
- 2 OS -
S:l/AN, W.J. , CON1:E, R. I eD.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ¡l " 1 r: 2 1 4 1 1 i 1 1 1 ,./ Lf 1-
1 1 1 1 2 , 1 1 1 2 if 1 1 1 2 if 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i i 1it ..
1 1 4 1 1- i 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 ¡.~ 1 i i 1 i 2 4 1 1 1
2 , 1 1 1 2 ,et¡, 1 1 1 2 l~ 1 1 1 2 ,~ 1 1 1 2 /1- 1 1 1 2Lt- .. 'f
Lt 2 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 i 4 1 2 ¡i 1 1 1 2 4 i 1 i 2 i 2 1'T
4 1 2 L' , 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 2 4 2 , ,l 1 2 4 , 1 1 2 4 1t .. ..
1 1 1 i 1 2 2 2 1 /1 1 2 L! 1 1 1 2 5- , , ..
NrAC DON.l-LD, A. , KLY, N.lvI.
1 1 i 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 4 1 1 i 2 , 1 3 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 1~ L.i. ~ ~
2 if 1 1 2 i 4 1 i 1 i 1 1 i 1 3 2 4 1 3 4 1 , i 2 4~i 1 i i 1 1 1 1 , 1 i 3 , 1 2 ¿Î 1 i 1 1 1 1 2 1 tt 1.. 't ,
1 1 2 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 2 4 1 3 " 1 1 1, ~ '+
1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 4 i " " 1 2 /( 1 1 i i 2 1 4 1 1 i'- , ~ .. '-l
2 4 i 2 11 1 2 4 1 2 i 1 0 1 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1, "- ''j .c
1 1 2 1 4 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 L 1 2 I' 1 1 1 2 (,' 1 2 5-' r ~ -'
I;LCOCr:, D.D. , HOLDEN, \'J.P.
1 1 1 3 , 1 1 2 2 3 1 i¡ 1 1 3 1 4 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 4 1'-i' ~i 1 1 i 1 2 1 4 ') 2 ~ 1 1 2 ,i 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 2 1,- L ~t
" 1 1 3 1 4 , 1 1 1 2 1 ij 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1't 1- .. ..
1 1 1 1 1 , 2 1 2 l 1 1 1 i 1 2 ¡ 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1" -' .. J. ,:¡. r if
4 1 2 " 1 1 i 1 2 1 iT 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1' t
1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 if 1 2 4 1 1 1 2 / 1 2.. '-t
4 1 2 4 1 1 1 2 ¡i 1 2 if 1 1 1 2 4 1 2 5
- 209 -
G i\-~,E~ 1:= __..___-!l~f:lliJ_l:E~ _ SUB JEC lE S











2 4 3 1 4i¡124l
4 1 i 1
2 4 1 2







2 4 1 2, 1 2 4 1 2 4
5
4l2'f12
2 4 1 2 .~ 1
2 I¡ 1 1 1 2
PICKEN, K. J. , BUCHl-'NId''r, 1':'1. K.
3l422113l4l11111l12l4234l1
2 1 4 1 1 2 1 cl 2 l, 1 ILL 2 1 4 1 1 2 1 !f 1 1 1111112141341111221241131413411112141342 1 4 1 1 1 1214111 1l1214112141111ll1l11114314111l2342l4l1l1234214l1l12141l2l4~ll341l1ll1215
McFARLANr~, J .I;., ,\!."LNLl.N, J~I.E.
13qllll2341l2222l111l24234
1 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 4 1 3 ,¡ 2 1 4 1 3 4 2 1 4 1 2 4 214l111ll~1124l1221llll342l41242l4l342341121~ll21411214124214124222l4l111l113411214124215
mm, M.C., DOYLE, M.B.S.
214134221111
3i 1 1 1 2 4 2 1 4 2 2
2 4 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 1 "I 1411l11242l411 2 if 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3
1 5






J. 4 1 i
:i 2 4 22 1
¡~ 2
1 1
















1 i 1 1 1
2 1 5
- 210 -
J1IIJLS, 1\L.E~, 'l S'ii()ì~i-:.ì, s.
1133a1212l42211334222233 '1
1 1 3 4 2 1 4 1 2 4 1 1 .5 1 ~ 2 1 4- 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 :11123'12 'l"'l ll"1/12.le'.'"3',,',,,ll. c, ~ if .c ¿ '., "-. ,. r2 1 i) 1 1 2 1 1 3 'i 1 1 2 1 ,! 2 1 1 3 4 1 1 2 1
'f 1 1 2 1 4 2 2 .5 1 4 1 3 4 ~ 1 2 1 4 1 1 2 1 5
'vlI Sl-AHiJ.l, D. /1.. , C ON'NOLL Y, B. S.
3 2 4 1 12232:¡
2 1 1 1 2
3 :, 1 2 :L3'i33iI 3 32 1
223l 122 2223 32 225 II
4-11jl411 ~32
4 2 2 1 3 c, 4 2 3
1 2 2.5 4 1 21 2







.3 1, 2 3 'eif 2 2 1 1 2342141
1 'C 2 1 4 1
1 3
1 3
IVlcPHLESON, R., ROBER'J:Sül'i, M.
1342141343242l~124214l3431
if 1 2 if 2 1 4 1 3 if 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 3 " 2
1 4 1 2; 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 1 4- 1 2 4 2 1 4
1 2 .; 2 1 4 1 2 a 2 1 5





1 1 2 2 2 1 'f 3 2 'i 1 1431~.514314313143 3143
, . ~,- r "-t .J3 1 i 43 1
32 ','1''"J-) 'rL13l431








3 1 -1,- 't
\1i\- LLli CL, )1.. D. , 'llUJiJ\J~;R, l!1. J.
3.54l342l4l24214324234l242l
4 1 2 If 2 1 if 1 2 " 2 1 4, 1 2 i,: 2 1 4 1 2 'i 2 li 1
2 Ij 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 1 " 1 2 ,2 l, 1 2; 2 1 1 2 if2141242i"l25
,LilDY, C. W.lli. , YOUNG, E. J.
13~2142341lll.5423411l341341113
1 .5 'e 1 2 'f 1 2 1
4 1 2 5
3 L~ i
1 1 1 3
11. 1 3 4-
3 4- 1 1
3 3 4 1
If 3 3 ,)
1 2 4 1




1 3 /1 1 3 ",'
3' 11.,
1 3
4 1 3 4




G.iJ¿PBL1L~ /1.,. ~ 1\:111LiUit S.E~M..
1 3 4 1 1 2 3 i 1 1 :: '2 1 3 'I 2 3 ~. 1 2 !, 2 1 '¡ 1 2
4 2 1 ,l 1 3 ¿; 2 1, 3 l: 1 2 if 3 1 4 1 3. 2 1 1
2 4 2 1 L¡ 3 3 !¡ 1 2 ': 2 1 1 2 i, 2 1 " 3 2 'I 1 3 4
1 1 2 3 ¿¡ 1 1 3 3 :J 2 2 1 ), 1 1 2 2 1 3 if 1 1 3 1
4 2 1 5
HUN'iiFiR, M.P., iN'ßjjS'.lJJH, ~'.L\¡I.
22 !¡3l41l2112411214221321+12,,1242







'f 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 2i¡ 2 3 4 1 1 1 3 '¡
3 ¿; 2 3 i; 1 2f41121423
3..,2l/¡
1 1 2 1 4
1 2l 1 1
,j 1 3 4 1
SIlv1L, L., DcrvlNS, C.A.
2l4124l24234214314214134l1
3 3 4 1 1 1 3 4 2 1 't 2 1 4 1 3 4 2 2 2 2 1 3 4 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 3 4 3 If 3 1 !f 2 2 ~ :: 2 1 2 1 !¡ 1 3 4
1343243l~l2 ~ll21422l2433 ~21!f234125









1 3 1 If3l/,12










3 1: 1 2 4
1
1





GAJ.J1JJi.GlILH, K. il 0 , FILSiil , .¡: I:,'1..1. ,~ II
1 2) 1 1112L,2
2 4 1 1 2
2 4 1 1 1
2 1 4 1 1
4 1 1 1 1
1 2 4 2 1
3 1 't i 1


















1 1 1 1- 2 2 1 2, 1 1 1 1 12422l24ll1l1llllll12!¡2l41241l4l24221114422ll24214214221212222124112211
if 2 1 5
HAJTDS, G. ,Vl.lilSUj- ~ P.
lll12141l3141241122l1112l4221l1l124l2 112l4134l12221
4124lll1l11ll2431!¡ 124 112 22
1 4 1 2 4 1 1 1 2 ',' 2 1 't 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 !, 1 2 4 1 111111112 41122221242 1412 41 1
1 1 2 1 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 2 1 4 1 2 !¡ 1 1 2 1
4 1 2 5
- 212 -
'I"~ "'( 'lT' B ,", p'i~1. ..J~ ~..l.~",..." V ùL ::l..I, Y J C ..1'1..
134124 1111111411514112421 1
1 4 ~ 2
2 2 1 1 1
1 2











4 2 1 c') 1
i 1
1 1 2 ;
~T ..





















1 ,~ 2 2
2 1







1 1 i 1
'1 2 2 1
1 4 1 2
1 2 !¡ 2














1 4 1 2 4
2 'f 3 1 ,i












4 1 j It 2 1. '¡-1111112l2lf¡234
S'l..'_~-.Th, H.il., l"lcGB:8j, F..f!..l1ilo
11214 324222142l412421f¡ll2lf¡11l12141141121421411 1 1 1 1 .; 2 1
1 2 1 5
1 1 1 1 :5 1








f¡ 2 1 i, 2 1 4 1li1214:514
















2 " 1 2 1 2 ~ 1412.+12"2"l12/rl
1 1 2 5
1 2
/1. i ? i¡ 2
2 2 1 1 1
- 213 -
JOLKIlV, :CL, (lLIZ~Jl , .t,a. U.I.
3 1 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 3 1 'i 1 1 2 , 4 3 2 ,
-¡:
1 ¡' 1 1, , .L ,, +
2 1 'f 1 ¿ " 3 2 4 3 1 4 2 1 ,+ 1 1 2 1 " 1 1 3 1 4 1'+
2 /¡- 1 1 3 1 4 2 2 1 1 3 , 4 1 1 3 1 , 2 2 1 1 3 1 1.l Lf 't
1 1 3 1 , :! 1 ,1 1 () ,.;. 2 , it 2 1 j 1 /Î 1 1 2 1 4 1'I' "r '- .l ' c
2 ,i 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 ~ 4 2 2 I 2 " 2, i 5i
ROGBHS, s. , BHO"."iL-,! , J .H.
I 1 1 3 4 2 1 ,A 1 3 4 1 1 1 2 4 3 1 /1 1 i 1 2 ,ç 3 1't y
if 1 1 1 1
-,
1 2 2 1 4 2 2 2 1 4 1 3 4 1 1 ') 1
,
~ ~ ii- ,- 't
1 2 /' 1 1 2 l 1 3 l~ j 1 " 2 2 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1, r ~ -i f ¡
3 " 1 2 " I i 2 2 J. 1 2 J. k i. 2 2 1 2 /1 3 2 2 2 3 i, , "'+ -.
" 1 3 1 1 1 l j il. 1 i 2 3 4 1 i 1 1 1 1 i 3 4 i 1 3.+ "¡. ~
2 i1 1 3 L) 1 1 1 1 1 2 ~), t
- 214 -
li1?PbNTIiX 8
The total joint payoff acquired by dyads in each
of four experimental groups for TRIALS i - 30,
and f or each of six blocks of trial s.
- 215 -
'Eo tal Joint Payoff to dyads in each of four experimental éi:iOUrJS,for 'ilI.ü.1J S , - 30.1.
IH PI Mir E'II
790 980 790 730
665 880 805 840
310 8' , 840 1005.J l,
715 715 855 LOLO
680 810 l55 860
790 170 725 CJ25
890 725 970 6i35
600 765 840 710
590 720 770 i330
905 585 750 825
665 435 955 695
720 "40 635 795"
585 895 535 890
695 825 905 725
870 895
-585 765
910 675 490 795
715 625 805 970
710 640 5" " 695/ (.J
755 585 565 835
740 670 825 770
610 745 375 710
775 l20 710 785
885 400 890 635
615 565 455 515
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'.lotal Joint Payoff to Ji¡ale dyads in JAME I for each of six blocks
ef trials :
rrHIALS
1 - , 6 lO 11 l5 l6 20 2l 2 'i 26 30) - - - - e -
130 l' r 135 95 i60 l55~)
120 70 l05 115 80 175
20 -15 85 85 40 95
80 l35 85 145 135 135
l20 2; 125 135 12', 150/
130 115 130 115 135 165
155 115 i50 175 160 125
70 15° no 105 115 30
120 85 125 100 40 120
105 l20 l55 175 l75 175
105 75 13 () 130 165 60
135 80 l30 ';5 1 Li5 1 7".L f 1. /
85 35 170 12 CJ 75 ioo
l30 l05 160 125 55 l20
120 140 l25 l45 165 175
l50 95 l65 l50 175 175
115 no 130 155 lOO l05
55 105 l35 155 85 175
115 150 75 140 150 l25
155 l35 140 125 135 50
eo 60 115 125 145 85
l45 125 135 125 105 l40
l65 e5 160 l50 165 160
75 145 l40 20 155 ioo
Mean = ni.567 98.333 l31.042 l23.542 l23.542 l27 . 917
Median = 119.375 107.50 132.00 l26.875 135.625 l30.00
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" 10 11 l5 16 20 2l 25 26 30- b - - - - -
i60 16c 175 175 l60 150l20 l40 125 170 160 l65
l35 135 l50 i 7,¡:- 145 130'" )
155 140 65 110 l05 l40
l35 l30 130 160 145 110
l55 95 175 165 30 150
145 120 110 110 115 125
1 ' 5 l40 l20 ioo 165 l25~.L
110 155 l20 no 60 l65
40 105 50 l25 l50 135
130 " 1 5 35 5 lOO 50.L
60 ioo 5 60 90 l25
1 ~"" 120 165 iO) 175 175/)
155 80 l4~) 145 l45 155
l40 155 160 145 1 c" l40))
115 l55 15 120 125 l45
l55 40 l35 115 60 120
65 115 95 140 85 l40
75 50 -15 -¡ "i: 1 7 re 175-Le. j ~ '"
130 150 l45 125 80 60
60 160 1 ! 5 l25 ioo l55.. 'T
140 30 -50 -25 10
-5
95 125 105 -l5 115 -25
90 20 65 135 80 175
Mean = 118.l25 113.l25 98.75 llI. 042 113.75 l24.167
Median 13" 2 r 122.50 '21 ')5 l24.575 116.25 140.001. ._) .. _. . !..
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Total .TOi.i~+, F"0,j""olf to :'Ja18 dyads in GjLfn:E:~ 11 Îor each of six blocks
of h,,\ ",.1,~ ,

















































Mean ~ 103.958 108.958
Median 122.50 116.25
'lRJ.ALS














































































































Total Joint P8.y~.ff t- 0 11eT~1al e dyads in GAJYIL 11 for each of six blocks
of trials :
llUALS
1 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 15 16 - 20 2l - 25 26 - 30
75 145 90 150 155 115
115 170 160 i60 140 95l55 165 170 165 175 175155 l55 l75 175 l75 l75
l20 140 150 l50 l50 150
130 140 110 145 1'(0 130
70 140 no 155 85 125
165 l30 45 145 75 l50
120 140 l50 i60 130 l30
165 l25 iiO 140 145 140
55 75 125 l35 l4° l65
105 l35 l55 135 l45 l20
l35 l25 135 l65 1'75 155
95 iiO 130 140 l35 115
80 l45 135 135 l45 125
85 160 l30 l55 120 145
l45 170 l55 170 160 170l40 120 lfi~ 95 120 75'-r ..
r ,. 150 155 175 175 115D)
20 l50 145 175 105 175
110 110 140 150 70 l30l25 l45 155 95 160 l25
70 115 U5 95 l45 95
85 95 ioo 110 25 lOO
Ivlean ~ l07.708 135.625 132.083 144.792 134.l67 133.l25
Median ~ ll2.5 140.625 l36.667 150.0 l44.375 130.0
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APPENDIX 9
liedian Scores per clya,i over 30 trials for each
of four experimental groups.
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MI FI Mir FIr
34.239 28.333 33.553 ;~9.500
26.389 30.000 30.500 31.667
33.333 32.813 27.500 34.239
27.500 34. l67 32.5UO 34.6l5
27.500 30.41'1 22.5°0 29.7°0
23.500 27.500 26.250 30.000
23.750 28.2l4 34.09l 27.500
26.667 26.500 33.333 30.000
33.750 26.389 27.5°0 27 .083
33.864 25.357 28.750 30.000
27.500 23.750 33.333 25.000
32.813 26.250 26.667 27.500
33.750 33.553 26.667 33.553
25.357 32.500 34.375 25.000
2'1.167 32.500 -18.167 26.136
25.833 25.833 23.929 26.944
23.2l4 27.500 32.500 33.553
26.59l 25.500 23.500 25.625
27.5°0 26.500 25.357 34.239
33.0B8 25.625 32. Bl3 33.0BB
l5.277 30.000 25.000 24.773
26.250 32.500 23. l25 26.250
32.B1) 22.500 33.188 25.000
25.833 15.000 22.5°0 22.500
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APPE1'DIX 10
The total number of ste;JS to criterion as required
by dyads in each of four experimental groups, for
'J'RIJ\LS 1 - 30, and for e20ch of six blocks of trials.
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Total Number cif Steps to Criterion required by TEale dyadsin G1UK.E I ,
rrHIALS
1 - 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 1- 3 ()
8 10 7 12 r- 7 ¿L q, ) u
10 l5 11 11 11 5 63
20 17 l4 14 15 l3 93l3 9 14 8 8 9 61
9 l5 ') 8 9 7 57
8 11 8 ' 1 9 c 53.1_ 0
6 9 6 5 6 9 41
12 " 8 10 10 l5 6l0
iO l4 10 l2 15 10 7l
9 10 7 5 5 5 4l
11 11 9 9 6 l6 62
9 11 9 16 8 5 58
12 14 5 lO l4 l2 67
'7 9 5 6 l2 8 47i
iO 8 LO 8 6 5 47
7 12 6 7 r 5 42)
9 10 9 7 9 9 53l3 12 9 7 l4 5 60
lO 7 11 8 7 lO 53
6 8 7 9 9 13 52
13 16 11 9 8 l4 7l
6 9 9 10 12 8 54
5 i 7- 5 6 5 c 40-') 0
13 ~ 7 17 8 11 62b
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'I'otal Number of Step.s to Criterion required by l1'emale dyadsin G/l.ßtI~ I :
TI:¿IALS
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 2l-25 26-30 l-30
r" 6 5 5 6 7 350
7 6 7 5 5 5 35
7 7 '( 8 8 7 446 7 l2 9 12 8 ,. ~J '
7 8 7 6 7 9 446 11 5 6 l6 7 5l6 8 9 10 9 9 5l8 7 7 8 5 9 4411 7 10 10 13 6 5714 11 13 7 6 8 59
9 10 15 15 iO 17 7612 13 18 13 iO lo 756 9 6 10 5 5 41
7 15 7 8 8 ~ 52(
7 5 5 6 6 7 36
9 r' 16 9 10 EJ 57;"6 17 f3 11 13 10 65l2 9 10 7 lO 6 5415 1'7 17 lO 5 5 69
9 fJ '3 LO l4 15 62
1 h 6 7 9 11 7 55j8 l6 21 18 18 22 10311 9 11 19 11 18 7912 17 15 9 11 5 69
- 2() ~ -Lj
Total Number of Steps to Criterion rec"ùred by Male dyads
in GAJI!E II ..
TRIALS
1-5 6-10 11-15 1(;-20 21-25 26-30 l-30
7 l2 9 11 6 6 5l
9 7 13 5 8 9 51
9 8 8 6 6 6 43
8
"r 8 8 5 8 44
11; 19 17 20 12 12 95/
8 11 1 () 11 11 ß 59
5 6 5 5 6 6 33
l2 6 9 6 6 5 44
6 1 () 6 8 7 9 46
7 7 10 10 8 1i 53
5 5 ,. 5
- ?
32) 0 lo
11 10 1 () l6 8 l3 68
14 l5 14 13 5 14 75
13 , c- 5 5 c, 38;J j -
21 18 3 () l7 18 30 l34
5 l2 9 16 l8 l5 75
11 9 9 7 10 7 53
iO 14 l3 15 14 7 73
16 19 10 9 7 11 72,
'7 10 7 7 '7 5 431 ,
13 11 l' 8 23 11 79/
13 8 10 l2 8 7 58
8 6 6
'3 7 9 45
l4 iO 9 14 17 l8 82
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Total Number of Steps to Cri teri~Jn rcqu.tred by Pemal e dyads
in GAMF, II :
.i1lìIALS
1-5 r: .10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 l-30
12 7 l3 c 7 10 550
8 5 5 5 6 10 39
5 5 5 5 5 5 30
5
-
5 5 5 5 30~-'
8 5 c 5 5 5 33.J
r 6 8 6 5 8 390
l5 8 11 7 14 10 65
5 9 18 8 l5 7 62
9 7 7 5 8 7 43
5 7 la 7 6 6 41
l3 11 7 6 5 5 47
la 8 6 8 8 10 50
8 10 9 6 5 7 45
l3 la 9 7 9 ia 58
10 7 8 8 7 9 49
12 6 9 7 lO 8 52
6 5 i: 5 5 5 31-'
7 la 7 12 8 l2 56
l2 7 7 5 5 11 47
16 7 8 5 12 5 53
9 10 8 7 12 7 53
(j 6 8 11 6 9 4e
l5 11 11 13 8 13 71
12 13 11 11 14 l2 73
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APPENDIX 11
The tot~l number of blockages on strategy-choice 1
made by dy~ds in each of four experimental groups
for ;lrials 1 - 30, anl for eaoh of six blocks of
trials.
- 2?8 -
The total numb"r 0í "oi""lr~go" on strategy-choice 1 for Male
dyads in Gj~ll I :
TRI.AIJS
l-5 6-10 11-,l5 16-20 2l-25 26-30 l-30
1 5 1 6 0 2 15
4 9 6 6 7 0 32
l5 13 9 9 11 8 65
7 4 9 3 2 3 28
3 9 3 ~ " 2 24-' l+
3 6 3 6 3 0 21
1 3 0 0 1 3 8
5 1 3 5 5 8 27
4 4 5 5 8 4 28
4 5 2 0 0 0 11
4 6 4 4 1 11 30
4 7 2 10 3 0 26
6 7 0 4 7 5 29
2 3 0 1 7
", 16
-'
5 3 5 3 1 0 l7
2 5 1 2 0 0 10
2 ~ l 2 4 3 19c¡ f
9 7 4 2 8 0 30
5 2 7
n 2 5 23¿
1 2 2 ~ 3 7 18"
6 7 5 4 3 6 31
1 3 i1 4 if 3 19~,
0 7 0 1 0 1 9
6 1 1 8 2 4 22
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'lhe total nuniber of blockc"ges on s tl'a tegy-ohoice 1 for Female
dyad8 in (~lùVIS I :
1'RIALS
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 l-30
1 i 0 0 0 1 3
2 1 2 0 0 0 5
2 2 1 3 2 2 l2
0 1 6 3 6 2 l8
2 2 2 1 2 3 l2
0 5 0 1 9 2 l7
1 3 "' h 3 4 19-' -'
3 1 0 2 0 2 8
5 2 5 5 9 1 27
8 5 6 2 1 3 25
4 5 11 12 5 11 48
7 7 14 8 6 5 47
0 ~ 1 5 0 0 10..
2 (1 2 2 3 1 18
2 0 0 1 1 1 5
4 0 12 4 5 3 28
1 10 1 6 9 4 31
7 2 4 2 4 1 20
10 l2 13 5 0 0 40
3 2 3 5 7 9 29
8 1 2 3 4 2 20
3 12 16 14 l3 l7 75
5 4 5 l4 6 l5 49, 12 8 3 7 0 360
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The total num"Lcr of b.! (' ç.lc":,,gG 0 on ,ára teg;,-choice 1 for Male
dY8.ds in GL.l"Uiì II
TRIALS
l-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 l-30
2
"I 3 "I 1 , 21
, 2 7 0 2 2 171.+
1 1 2 0 0 0 4
2 1 2 2 0 2 9
9 15 l3 l8 8 7 70
3 5 4 3 5 3 23
0 0 0 0 1 1 2
6 1 3 1 1 0 l2
1 4- 1 3 1 4 l4
2 2 5 4 3 7 23'+
0 0 Cl 0 1 1 2
6 5 4 10 3 8 36
ry ie 9 9 0 9 44i
5 0 0 0 0 0 5
19 13 30 14 l5 30 l21
0 7 4 12 10 7 4Cl
5 4 ¿1 2 5 2 22,
It fj 9 10 10 2 43'-,
11 14 5 3 2 5 40
2 6 1 2 2 0 l3
9 4 8 3 21 7 52
9 2 5 6 3 2 27
1 1 i 3 1 3 10
6 5 2 7 13 12 'l5
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The total nu.in1)e:: oJ blool;,pgo8 0" s tra tegy--choice 1 for liler:al e
dyeed.s in GJJvrr:. II
TlUALS
1-5 6-l0 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 1-30
5 1 7 1 2 !J 20t
2 0 0 0 1 3 6
0 0 0 0 0 a a
a a a a a 0 a
2 () 0 a 0 0 2
1 1 3 1 0 3 9
8 2 'i 2 7 3 27/
a 4 10 2 9 1 26
3 1 2 a 3 1 ia
a 2 2 1 1 0 6~
4 2 2 a 0 0 8
3 1 1 4 2 3 14
3 5 4 , a 2 15.C
8 3 3 2 3 4 23
2 2 3 3 2 3 15
6 1 , 2 5 3 2l't
1 a a 0 0 0 1
2 4 2 5 1 7 2l
8 2 2 0 0 4 16
11 2 3 0 6 a 22
3 2 1 1 7 2 l6
3 1 3 'i 1 2 14',"
7 4 5 6 2 5 29




The computation of partition of chi-square for TRIAL l,
and tables giving the frequency of occursnCG of each
strategy choico on the first step of each of Trials 5,
lÜ, l5, 20, 25, and 30, and the tables derived froil the
computation of the ac.co::1.f)anying parti tions of chi-square.
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The Gomput'ction of Partition of Cr~i-Square
'The partition of chi-square for the frequency of each
strategy-choice on the first step of TRIAL 1 is calculated as below,






+ (31 - 19::(i2)2
192/l2
+ (~_ 192/12)2 +
192/l2=






(l3 _ 1;2/12) 2 (9_~l?l (9 _ 192Íl2)2+ 192 l2 + 192j12 +192 12
(5 - 192/lgi ( 12 )2 (n - 1 2 12 )2()
192/i2 + 12 + 192 l2







2 0x iì =
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(1.lL- ì 92 ö.)'
192 3










x AB = 0
2
x AC = r(tl.l,2!6)2 + (58 - lO?l§i + (22 - l+2/6)2 + (22 :-~1EL§i
~ 192/6 192j6 192/6 192/6
(D___~92/6)2 + (Jo6 - 192/6 )2J _ x2 i192/6 19276 ,i









= L62 i9~n!(,)2 + ('il -_i§_~-%r;)2 + (2_Li9~7~¿6)2 -t (l819S7~/6)2 +
(B - 192/(ii; /
192¡ Cl
= (C2il + 252 +
(ll - lj2/6)2l 2
+ 192 6 -l- x B











X2¡ilC = x2 total 2 2 2 2 2- x À - x B - x C - x AC - x BC
= 7B.50 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 72.6563 - 0.0 - 0.2813 - 4.0312
= 1.5313
l'heso calculations are summarized in 'llu3LE 10 of the
text. The frequency of occur2once of each strategy-choice on the
first step of 'l'RIALS 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30, and tb,e swnmary
tables of the accompanying partitions of chi-square are as follows :-
- 2j6 -
'i:HIAL 5.
Choice MI IiitII J:'I ì FIr
i
1 33 29 30 25
2 12 l6 12 19




df 2 critical valuex
at (: ~ 0.05
'lota1 04.875 11 19.680
A 0.0 1 3.84
B 0.0 1 3.84
c 80.2813 2 5.99
AB 0.0 1 3.84
Ae 3.2187 2 5.99
BC L.l562 2 5.99




Choice MI MII FI li'II
1 31 7.1 33 2l)~
2 l3 l4 9 23
3 4 3 6 4
Frequencies
Source I Chi-Square df 2 critical valuex
at Cl = 0.05
Total 89.50 11 19.680
A 0.0 i 3.84
B 0.0 1 3.84
C 77 .l563 2 5.99
fil 0.0 i 3.84
l' (' 5.9062 2 5.99,'v
BC L.53l2 2 5.99
ABC 4.9063 2 5.99
Parti tion of Chi-Square
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lRIAL 15
Choice MI MU FI
I
FII
1 3l 27 31 31
2 16 18 12 13
3 1 3 5 4
Frequencies
Source Chi-Square df 2 critical valuex
at ci = 0.05
'lotal 92.750 11 19.680
A 0.0 1 3.84
B 0.0 1 3.84
C 90.0313 2 5.99
AB 0.0 1 3.84
AC 0.4062 2 ,- 99) .
BC 1.9062 2 5.99
ABC 0.4063 2 5.99
Partì tion of Clii~are
- 239 -
TRIAL 20
Choice MI ldII FI FH
1 29 32 53 32




Source Chi-Square àf 2 critical valuex
at Cl .- 0.05
'J.otal 105.25 11 19.680
A 0.0 1 3.84
B 0.0 1 3.84
C 103.875 2 5.99
AB 0.0 i
.5 .84
llC 0.1250 2 5.99
BC 0.8750 2 5.99
ABC 0.3750 2 5.99
Parti tion of Chi-Square
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'liUAL 25
Choice HI I lHI FI :F'II
1 29 29 29 36
2
I
l5 l7 15 9
3 'f 2 4 3
Freq uçncie s
Chi-Square df 2 critical valueSource x
at et = 0.05
Total 100.750 11 19.680
.1': 0.0 1 3.84
B 0.0 1 3.84
C 96.5938 2 5.99
AT) 0.0 1 3.84
AG 0.5937 2 5.99
BC i.2l87 2 5.99
ABC 2.3438 2 5.99
Pa.~i tion of Chi-Square
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'I1iIAL 30
Choice MI MII Jj1I FII
1 29 30 32 25
2 17 16 14 22
3 2 2 2 1
:Breguencies
Source Chi-Square df 2 critical value Ix
at a = 0.05
Total 97 .250 11 19.680
A u. () 1 3.84
I
B 0.0 1 3.84
1I
c 93.4063 2 5.99
,I
JLB ().o 1 3.84 I
11AC 1.3437 2 5.99
i










°Anovo.H .- n COE1PUt er programne designed to COGipute
Gn 2~nlysis of variance for each perGon~ii ty trait
(v) on eC1ch of 30 trialr;, where the traits aregrouped according to fir st strat egy-choice (TR),
on the trial, and where N = 96.
.- 2/~L3 -
ANO'1A;
?~BLGIN\I nIN':EGrp'~ii ')J ;;,K:1 Tr;.;:N :i TRI:; 1,7 ,COUNT :;Z;




¡¡ INT:CGERdnnARRAY~)!~ f i ~ TR)- ;) Dt.l: N ~.l: TRI; ~;
!iREAL ;lSSA,: 83;1! ~ SST s!"'SA, r'1Sll , T 9 S2CT 9C ~F';




"FOR"I: =F'STEP '1 :UNTIL"N"DO"
"FOR"'J: =1 "STEP"l"UNTILi'TRI"DO"
"PlèoJ"Dfi T1.
_\__...r_'._ l,1, J :#
"FOR"I: =l"STEP"i"UNTIL"N"DO"
"FOR"K: =l "STEP" l"UNTIL"V"DO"
"RE,úD':PU ,10;




n¡:OR"Z' =.L" "S'fEP'ii ;¡¡"''t-.L" ii¡,'DO"Sfi 7.J" =n.
.. - . . .. ~~ -",~ :..i'l J. .J 1.'.' ~:i ~ . u 5
"FOR"I: =l"STEP"l"UNTIL"TR"DO"A U:r : =1;
"FOR"I: =1' STEP"l"UNTIL"N"DO'"
"BEGIN"
StDf i ,J1,A tDt I ,J:r f 1 : =Pt I ,Kf ;
AtDfi ,J1:r :=AtDtI ,Jf f+l;
"END" ;






7?FOR9'I ~ =1 1"STEpHl HUNTIL HTR~~DO'i
"BEGIN"
HFOl~H~: =1 ltSTEpni.tUNTIL ~'~j'rHDOn
"BEGIN"
SCTtI1 :=SCTfIf+StI ,Z1;






~ : =T~ 2 lIT ~\
YlpORHr: =1 lSTEpniî1FNTIL~¡TRi¡DOH









"PR-.L\!T""OUN'"' Cr.I,""T I'JE' "Sl" J "s'" K'...\. -. ,.... ,l :;O.:i_.iJ.J 1.. , 5' ~ .J :!_;¡
"PDK-lI¡'T;~ ....r.... "'..riD'i:,~milttl.J'TS' Sfli,,"TT TNTT' ....c:'8" S"A -'''3.... T'-IS~'1... .. LJ :~ l... il~ ..!. J.,..~ ) .d.)..,i..l..:: ,-t " i.:::i ...  3,' ~"1,:
"RRT'¡T"~'L" ~'-\'¡I'1HIH G.'0u"l'PC' s~i,""LI"''' "C~o" S"\'i. "S3" MS"¡'
.. ..1' ~. .J.~~ .'~ !.\. .h.. 0 , .. ,_'lLi ",'1..!l .. , u , !:.l' I" ;i
"pn, TI,TFOH" .', .... ..'j..U'l ~\ T'" S '"\ l'~LINE- - -Sl~" SS""d.\..l.~i .... ,.. ,t"..i, J4l... ~;i ¿ 5:'-'"":;
"PRIN'11I "T " '1' c:' ¡.r-r I'It: F'
_.. i. ~_,..n_".;...J..'~,.,
NXT:
l¡END'~ ;
"END" ;
"END";
